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Vorwort
Seit 1984 veranstaltet die GI–Fachgruppe 2.1.4 “Programmiersprachen und Rechenkonzepte”, die
aus den ehemaligen Fachgruppen 2.1.3 “Implementierung von Programmiersprachen und 2.1.4
“Alternative Konzepte für Sprachen und Rechner” hervorgegangen ist, regelmäßig im Frühjahr
einen Workshop im Physikzentrum Bad Honnef. Das Treffen dient in erster Linie dem gegenseit-
igen Kennenlernen, dem Erfahrungsaustausch, der Diskussion und der Vertiefung gegenseitiger
Kontakte.
In diesem Forum werden Vorträge und Demonstrationen sowohl bereits abgeschlossener als auch
noch laufender Arbeiten vorgestellt, unter anderem (aber nicht ausschließlich) zu Themen wie
• Sprachen, Sprachparadigmen






• Sicherheit (Safety und Security)
• eingebettete Systeme
• hardware-nahe Programmierung
In diesem Technischen Bericht sind einige der präsentierten Arbeiten zusammen gestellt. Allen
Teilnehmern des Workshops möchten wir danken, dass sie durch ihre Vorträge, Papiere und
Diskusion den jährlichen Workshop erst zu einem spannenden Ereignis machen. Ein besonderer
Dank gilt den Autoren die mit ihren vielfältigen Beiträgen zu diesem Band beigetragen haben.
Ein abschließender Dank gebührt noch den Mitarbeitern des Physikzentrums Bad Honnef, die
durch ihre umfassende Betreuung für eine angenehme und anregende Atmosphäre gesorgt haben.
Kiel, im Oktober 2005 Michael Hanus, Frank Huch
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Über die formale Beschreibung räumlicher Netze
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Abstract. Although no such event has so far been reported, we predict that we
will soon witness denial-of-service attacks on mobile-code systems that will be
based on algorithmic complexity. For example, the worst-case performance of the
standard Java Bytecode Verification rises quadratically with program length. By
sending a legal, but difficult-to-verify program to a server virtual machine, we can
keep that server occupied for an inordinate amount of time, effectively making it
unavailable for useful work.
The problem is not restricted to verification alone: for example, an attacker could
exploit knowledge about a just-in-time compiler’s register allocator by sending it
a particularly difficult to solve graph-coloring puzzle. This even puts into ques-
tion the premise of open-source software, since it is knowledge of the underlying
algorithm that is exploited in the attack, rather than a particular implementation
defect.
1 Introduction
Safe mobile code is a major accomplishment. The two leading standards, the Java Vir-
tual Machine and the .NET Common Language Runtime, provide target-machine inde-
pendence in a code distribution format that can be verified by the code recipient prior
to execution. Safety in such systems is based on code verification ahead of execution
and runtime monitoring and resource control during execution. The research emphasis
in this area so far has been on thecorrectnessof the safety mechanism and its imple-
mentation, and numerous vulnerabilities have been discovered and removed.
In this paper, we contend that mere correctness of the safety enforcement mecha-
nism is not sufficient to defend the host computer against mobile-code based attacks.
Instead, there needs to be a dual focus on the (worst-case-)performanceof the verifier
and just-in-time compiler. Otherwise, as we will show, formally correct safe-mobile-
code systems are vulnerable to a new class of denial-of-service (DoS) attack that ex-
ploits thecomplexity characteristicsof the underlying verification and code-generation
algorithms. Since the attack is located ahead of the point at which run-time resource
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control sets in, and since it attacks the very mechanism upon which safety is founded,
conventional defenses cannot fully quell this threat.
For example, the standard JVM bytecode verification algorithm exhibits quadratic
worst-case complexity. We have been able to construct relatively small mobile programs
in the Java JAR archive format that require hours of verification on high-end worksta-
tions. The programs in question are perfectly legal JVM code, perform no malicious
action on the host, and will eventually be verified as being safe. However, the process
of verification itself is so costly as to effectively constitute a denial-of-service attack.
The problem with the kind of attack that we describe in this paper is that the pro-
grams in question are not “illegal” in the sense that traditional safety mechanisms would
defend against. In fact, there might be completely reasonablev lid and usefulprograms
with verification complexities similar to our attack programs. Hence, one cannot simply
deploy a traditional monitor that would abort verification when a certain time limit is
exceeded—unless one wants to also accept the random rejection of potentially impor-
tant non-malicious programs. The risk of rejecting certain useful programs might be
particularly unacceptable for an unattended server virtual machine.
Unfortunately, attacks based on algorithmic complexity affect not just the verifier,
but the complete code path on the client. For example, an adversary that knows the
target virtual machine’s register allocation algorithm might be able to maliciously craft
a valid mobile code program containing a particularly difficult to solve graph coloring
puzzle.
An interesting point to note is that “open source” systems might be more vulnerable
to this kind of attack than systems that provide “security by obscurity”. Advocates of
“open source” development have long argued that their systems are safer because the
code is audited by hundreds of people and implementation defects are hence more eas-
ily spotted and removed. Our attack, however, does not depend on any implementation
defect, but only on the underlyingalgorithm, which is publicly exposed in open-source
development. Hence, the open-source process simultaneously increases the vulnerabil-
ity to attacks such as ours while making it impossible to quickly react to an exposed
vulnerability by changing the underlying algorithm.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The next section gives a short
introduction to mobile code verification, followed by a description of the current state
of Java security (Section 3). This chapter also discusses successful earlier attacks and
the related countermeasures that have been taken. Section 4 presents a whole class of
new attacks based on complexity. A summary concludes our paper (Section 5).
2 Mobile Code Verification
Staticmobile code verification was introduced as an alternative to thedynamicchecking
of type safety properties at runtime through dynamic execution monitors. The basic
ingredient of every JVM bytecode verifier is an abstract interpreter that works ontypes,
rather thanvalues.
Leroy [19] lists the minimal conditions for bytecode to be accepted by the verifier:




2: while todo = true do
3: todo← false
4: for all i in all instructions of a methodo
5: if i was changedthen
6: todo← true
7: check whether stack and local variable types
match definition ofi
8: calculate new state afteri
9: for all s in all successor instructions ofi do
10: if current state fors 6= new state derived fromi then
11: assume state afteri as new entry state fors






Fig. 1.The standard verification algorithm found in Sun Microsystem’s JVM implementations.
– No stack overflow or underflow. A method must never pop a value from the empty
stack or push a value onto the largest stack specified for that method.
– Code containment. The program counter must always stay within the code limits of
the current method and must always point to the beginning of an instruction.
– Local variable initialization. Variables must be initialized before being used.
– Object initialization. Whenever an object of a classC is created, one of the class’
constructors must be called.
Except for code containment, all of these conditions require tracking the types of
values as they are pushed onto and popped from the Java stack and written to and read
from local variables. The Java specification provides an outline of a data-flow algorithm
that can be used for this purpose. A simplified description of this algorithm is shown in
Figure 1.
All Java Virtual Machine implementations that we are aware of, including Sun’s
own CVM [27] and HotSpot virtual machines [26], use (slight variations of) this al-
gorithm to perform bytecode verification. The verification algorithm is performed sep-
arately for every method in a Java program. For each method, it iterates over all in-
structions of that method until no more operand type changes are observed. For each
instructioni, the verifier checks whether the abstract data associated withi has changed.
If so, it checks whether the current abstract local variable and stack content allow the
execution ofi and computes the new local variable and stack content. Finally, this new
abstract state is propagated to all successors ofi.
3 The Current State of Java Security
The Java Virtual Machine and its security architecture have been under intense scrutiny
since their release. Over the years, several errors on different levels have been unveiled.
Figure 2 gives an overview of the structure of the Java bytecode-execution framework
and references to some of the reported flaws and shortcomings in either the implemen-
tation or the architecture. The whole security concept of Java collapses at the moment at
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Fig. 2. High-level structure of a bytecode-execution framework. The call-outs on the right-hand
side refer to successful attacks and implementation flaws found in the JVM, the call-outs on the
left-hand side to attempts to enhance the security and reliability of the virtual machine.
which justoneof the components is compromised. Below, we will give a brief overview
over some of these attacks. It is noteworthy that all of these attacks are based onimple-
mentationerrors rather thanconceptualflaws. This is in contrast to the attack presented
in this paper, as its enabling property is the bytecode verification algorithm itself and
not a specific implementation thereof.
Beside the work described in this section, there has also been intensive research on
how to actually secure the transport and the execution of mobile-code programs. Ap-
proaches include enhanced transport formats [1, 21, 6], host based intrusion-detection
systems [2, 10], auditing systems [25], stack inspection [11], and extensions to the ac-
tual execution unit [3, 7, 17]. All of these approaches either try to rescue what already
has been lost—the system is no longer dependable due to probable implementation
faults—or try to replace the current verification scheme with mechanisms that are hope-
fully easier to implement and prove correct.
3.1 Implementation-Based Attacks
In attacking a mobile-code execution framework, the verifier is one of the obvious tar-
gets. The verifier has the obligation to prohibit any execution of unsafe code, where
unsafeis defined with respect to the criteria defined in the respective framework. Due
to its importance, verification can not be interrupted by the user without shutting down
the whole virtual machine. Obviously, for attacking a virtual machine it is of impor-
tance to bring a hostile applet through the verification process. Since the verifier has
the obligation to prohibit exactly this, this task requires profound inside knowledge and
usually profits from implementation errors.
Sohr [23] presents an example for the exploit of faulty implementations. In this
attack, the verifieroverlookscertain code sequences that are passed on for execution
without having been verified. This, in turn, allows to construct methods that use the
unverified code to return objects of one type that by the type system are believed to
be of another type. In later work, Sohr [24] reports on a similar problem in a version
of Microsoft’s bytecode verifier [20], based on incorrect handling of values of local
variables in the verifier.
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Freund et al. [12] exploit another flaw in a certain implementation of the verifier,
which is based on the handling of subroutines and uninitialized objects in the verifier.
By creating several uninitialized objects of a class and only initializing one of them, the
virtual machine can be made to invoke methods on uninitialized objects. This fault is
enabled by incorrect handling of initialization of newly created objects in the verifier.
Hopwood [18] presents another exploit demonstrating that certain versions of the
verifier could be made to load classes with absolute class names instead of relative ones.
Thus, a class could first be uploaded to a client without verification and afterwards be
dynamically loaded in the virtual machine. However, since it would be loaded from
the local host, there would not be any verification. This trust in local files is applied
to avoid repeated re-verification of locally installed classes such as the pre-installed
system classes of the APIs of mobile-code execution frameworks.
The actual hardware running the virtual machine can also be attacked, e.g. by raising
the probability of a bit error [16]. In contrast to the exploits described so far, this is
an area of attack that can not be handled by means of the virtual machine itself, but
by taking hardware measures to minimize the probability of an uncorrectable memory
error.
3.2 Class Loader-Based Attacks
The first attack that included the Java Virtual Machine itself was thePrinceton Class
Loader Attack[9]. It exploited a combination of flaws—an erroneous implementation
of the verifier and the class loading mechanism that implements dynamic loading of
classes in the JVM. The faulty implementation allowed the attacker to overwrite system
classes with malicious code. The loaded classes were actually verified as valid while
they should have been rejected, and the methods where later on called in place of the
overwritten methods. The whole concept of dynamic class loading is one of the funda-
mental weak spots in the Java security architecture [8].
4 Complexity-based Attacks
The techniques presented in the previous section illustrate some of the documented
approaches of attacking a Java Virtual Machine. We consider the complexity-based ver-
ifier attack to be more severe than these attacks, because it is enabled by the fundamen-
tal design properties of the Java bytecode execution framework, and not by errors in its
implementation. The code sequences used in this exploit arelegal andcorrect mobile
code programs and as such not rejectable by the verifier. While Microsoft’s .NET plat-
form addresses some of the shortcomings that allow such complexity-based attacks to
occur, it still uses fundamentally very similar verification algorithms and is very likely
susceptible to similar kind of attacks.
4.1 Complexity of Verification
Regarding the complexity of verification, the analysis of straight-line code is inexpen-
sive, since the abstract interpreter only propagates type information through the instruc-
tions and computes the abstract stack state after each instruction.
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Fig. 3. Verification of Java bytecode through iterative data-flow analysis. The verifier traverses
the method from the first instruction to the last. The example code shown here contains no back-
ward branches, and hence the analysis can be completed in a single iteration.
The runtime of such a data-flow analysis is significantly increased if the code con-
tains jumps, exception handlers, or subroutines, which introduce forks and joins in the
control-flow graph. When separate control flows are merged together, an instruction’s
predecessors may have different abstract stack or variable types. After merging the state
information of the two incoming control flows, the data-flow analysis has to be repeated
for all instructions which are reachable from this point in the control flow of the method.
For simplicity, the standard Java verifier repeats the entire data-flow analysis for every
instruction of a method until there are no more changes.
For average Java programs, the verification algorithm quickly reaches a fixed point
after only a few iterations. For straight-line code or code that contains only forward
branches, the verification algorithm terminates already after a single iteration (Figure 3).
It is obvious that—in theory—the Java verifier could need up ton iterations over the
method, withn being the number of instructions in the method. Since for each iteration
the verifier might have to visit all instructions, the overall complexity is at leastO(n2).
Such quadratic runtime behavior does not only exist in theory. In fact, simple Java pro-
grams can expose the worst-case scenario in practice. Figure 4 shows a very simple Java
program that does nothing but store an integer into a local variable and jump backwards
through the code until it eventually returns.
Due to the order in which the verification algorithm visits instructions, information
is forwarded immediately to instructions that come syntactically after the current in-
struction. To instructions that come syntacticallybeforethe current instruction, the new
abstractions will only be forwarded in the next iteration. Once an instruction has been
visited for a particular iteration, it will not be visited again, even if new information
about the operand types of that instruction is computed. For the example in Figure 4,
the verifier is forced to perform an iteration for every backwards jump.
The simplistic approach of the standard Java bytecode verification algorithm to it-
erate over the bytecode until a fixed point is reached simplifies the generation of attacks
like the one shown in Figure 4, but any other iteration order would also exhibit a partic-
ular (probably different) worst-case behavior for which a malicious program could be
constructed.
4.2 Exploiting the Worst-Case Behavior
We have measured the verification time for two malicious programs designed to exhibit
the worst-case performance of the Java verifier using the Sun Microsystems Java 2
HotSpot Client VM [13, 15].
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iconst 0; ifeq L3
return
goto L0
iconst 0; istore 1
goto L2
iconst 0; ifeq L2
goto L1























Fig. 4. Java bytecode program that takesn iterations to be verified using Sun’s standard DFA
verifier approach. The entry state for each basic block depends on the successor basic block. The
type of the first local variable is displayed for each iteration of the DFA. It is initially assumed
to be of unknown type and is discovered to be an integer (I) during successive iterations. Shaded
























worst case data flow with empty basic blocks
worst case data flow
Fig. 5.Verification time for verifying a single method containing a worst-case data-flow scenario.
Thex-axis indicates the length of the method bytecode in bytes, which is proportional to the num-
ber of basic blocksN used to construct the code. The arrows indicate for comparison purposes
the code size for path lengthN = 3000.
Figure 5 shows the verification time for a single method containing bytecode with
an increasing maximum data-flow path of lengthN . This time includes only the time
it takes the verifier to prove safety. The code is never actually executed or compiled to
executable code. The first curve shows the verification time for a worst-case path length
problem with empty basic blocks. The second curve in the graph shows the maximum
flow path problem with some additional code added to each basic block, which further
slows down the verifier. Both curves clearly show quadratic growth.
All measurements were taken on a 2.53 GHz Pentium 4 and the Sun HotSpot VM
1.41. The maximum verification time we observed on this machinefor a single method
was approximately 40 seconds. Since the size of method code in Java is limited, this
time can not be increased. However, to achieve even longer verification times, an at-
tacker could hide more than just one of these methods in the code. Just including 20
methods instead of one would already increase the verification time to approximately




































JAR archive size (bytes)
verification time
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Fig. 6. Compression of constructed code examples using the standard JAR archive format. The
code is extremely well compressible as it repeats identical code patterns. While the verification
times increases by over factor 5000, the JAR file merely grows by less than 200 bytes.
The standard JAR archive format can be used to drastically reduce the apparent size
of the malicious code. The code patterns used in the presented scenarios lend themselves
for compression due to their very regular structure. Figure 6 indicates the compressed
size for different problem lengthsN . While the verification times increases by over
factor 5000, the JAR file merely grows by less than 200 bytes. The JAR archive format
thus represents another example of a well-meant algorithm with appropriate average-
case performance, which however exhibits very unexpected worst-case behavior.
We have used the two algorithmic shortcomings described here to construct a ma-
licious applet [14] that disables the Java VM of web browsers for several minutes. The
applet is 10kb in size and indistinguishable from regular applet code, because in the end
it is a still legal and correct Java program.
Short of disabling Java applets, the user cannot prevent or interrupt the loading
of this applet. In fact, existing browsers do not even allow the user to interrupt the
verification because the browser implementor never considered the verification time to
be costly enough. Some browsers, including some versions of the Microsoft Internet
Explorer, allow the verifier to continue the verification silently and continue to hog the
CPU in the background even if the user leaves a website containing an applet that takes
an excessive amount of time to verify.
4.3 Attacking the Compilation Pipeline
Denial-of-service attacks are not limited to bytecode verification, which is executed
early in a bytecode execution framework. Any algorithm applied to mobile code dur-
ing its path from a portable bytecode format to natively executable machine code is
vulnerable at its point of worst-case complexity. This applies in particular to compiler
optimization algorithms, which are traditionally chosen for speed in the average case
but not for worst-case performance, and some of which use heuristics to solve problems
like graph coloring and instruction scheduling that are known to be NP-complete.
An example for such an attackable optimization algorithm is register allocation.
Register allocation is an important component of any JIT compiler that strives to achieve
good code quality. The classic register-allocating algorithm is structured after Chaitin’s
graph coloring allocator [5, 4]. Many improvements and variants have been proposed,
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but most of this research was focused on improving the average-case performance. Po-
letto et al. showed that register allocation using graph-coloring has a quadratic worst-
case complexity for certain pathological cases [22] and proposed a linear-scan algo-
rithm for register allocation. This algorithm is not guaranteed to find the optimal reg-
ister allocation for any given problem, but has a linear worst-case performance. To
truly harden the virtual machine against complexity-based denial-of-service attacks,
this principle of trading off some code quality in return for linear time complexity has
to be extended to the entire code processing pipeline.
5 Conclusion
Future software-application architectures are moving to Grid- and service-based archi-
tectures, in which computations are sent to hosts for execution. Soon, these service-
based execution frameworks will be omni-present, making the actual network-based
execution mechanism invisible to the user. In these architectures, efficient algorithms
for each step in the chain fromreceiving mobile codeto compiling it to native codeand
executing itwill be needed to protect against complexity-based attacks. The threat of
these subtle denial-of-service attacks has been neglected, apparently because it does not
occur in daily average-case use of mobile code. In the case of an unsupervised server
at the heart of a service-based framework, however, having the framework verifying,
analyzing, compiling, and executing many mobile-code programs in parallel will make
each and every phase in the framework vulnerable to complexity-based attacks.
With the currently widespread mobile-code execution frameworks in place, there
is no quick fix to this problem. Instead, we will need to rethink the architecture of
those systems—while current systems place verification as a hurdle for incoming code
and after that use fine tuned algorithms that have been selected for their average case
behavior, we will need to construct systems where each step has a provableworst-
casebehavior. Until these systems are in place, open-source code development actually
worsens the situation. Instead, security by obscurity actually works.
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Abstract. Nested procedures are common in imperative languages like
Algol, Pascal or Modula 2. From a programming viewpoint, procedure
nesting allows for information hiding, which is one key principle in soft-
ware engineering. However, in modern object oriented languages, like
C++ or Java, procedure nesting has been dropped like in C in favor of
open subroutines and flat program structure. This is very often seen as a
major drawback of object oriented languages, and the more recent Java
versions reintroduce nesting on class level as a principle feature; we still
do not find procedure nesting, though.
We know that procedure nesting has an important impact on the expres-
sive power of Algol-like procedure concepts, at least from a theoretical
point of view. It enables irregular calling trees if we assume the usual
static scoping discipline. Even uninterpreted programs can simulate Tur-
ing machines, or more precisely, two tape pushdown automata, whereas,
just by using procedures and scoping, flat programs cannot.
Computational completeness of uninterpreted programs with procedure
nesting renders many formal decision problems undecidable, like e.g. for-
mal reachability. Hence, it is an interesting question if or not the Java
class nesting feature is as powerful as procedure nesting in Algol-like pro-
grams. We will give a positive answer and define a simulation of nested
Algol procedures by nested Java classes. Interestingly enough, this might
have a major impact on the decidability of formal Java-program proper-
ties.
1 Introduction and Motivation
The work presented in this paper is mainly motivated by an ongoing discus-
sion on the relations between classical imperative and modern object oriented
programming languages. In particular, procedure nesting and formal procedures
as we find them in Algol, Pascal or Modula-2, have been left out in languages
like C or Java in favor of unnested open subroutines. Moreover, the concept
of late binding (dynamic scoping) for method invocation does not really facili-
tate the understanding of conceptual relations between Java-like object oriented
languages and Algol-like procedural languages.
The procedure concept of imperative languages with procedure nesting and
formal procedures with static scoping is well understood since quite a long time.
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A whole bunch of work has been done since more than 30 years to understand
and to formalize the semantics of Algol-like languages, and to develop correct
and even verified implementation techniques.
From a software engineering viewpoint, nesting is a key technique for in-
formation hiding: It reduces the number of global dependencies and helps to
excapsulate and to more abstractly handle implementation decisions. More re-
cent versions of the Java language reintroduce nesting at least on class level
It is well-known that object oriented programs can be simulated by impera-
tive languages. Late binding can either be implemented by generic procedures,
which perform a runtime dispatch on the type of message receiver objects [2],
or by procedure variables (i.e. formal procedures) as part of the receiver’s class
object [1]. C programmers often use the techniques of pointers, structures and
runtime dispatch in large programs to simulate objects and message passing.
Thus, Algol-like programs are sufficiently expressive to support the simulation
of object oriented programs.
On the other hand, we do not directly find formal and nested procedures
in languages like Java, in particular not with a similar static scoping discipline.
Nesting and static scoping in Algol have a major impact both with respect
to correct implementation (we need a static procedure chain in order to address
global variables) and with respect to formal program properties. So, for instance,
the problem of formal reachability is undecidable in full Algol, whereas it is
decidable for unnested open subroutines [3, 4]. The main reason is, that calling
trees can be irregular in full Algol, but with open (unnested) procedures (and
thus without global formal variables) programs can only construct regular calling
trees.
As a consequence, full Algol procedures are formally Turing-complete, whereas
programs without procedure nesting are not. For many reasons, it is interesting
to ask if Java-like object oriented programs, the other way around, can simulate
full Algol programs as well. We will give a positive answer in this paper.
If people view at object oriented languages as an alternative for classical
imperative languages, in particular because they find the concept of nested and
formal procedures with static scoping quite hard to understand, this paper is
kind of a bad news. Unfortunately, Java programs in general are not at all easier
to understand.
2 Nested and Formal Procedures in Algol
Let us look at the following Algol-like program, which we want to use as a protag-
onist, as a running example of a (terminating) program which is programmable
in Java with class nesting. Our program has nested procedures and global for-
mal parameters, i.e. b. The program is formally terminating, but nevertheless
recursive. It does not have the formal most-recent property. In general, such pro-
grams may have irregular calling trees, and we are not able to construct formally
equivalent programs without procedure nesting.
12
proc p (proc f, boolean b) {




Since the Algol procedure concept does not support higher order procedures
or partial evaluation, the standard technique of transforming global parameters
to regular procedure parameters does not help in order to construct a formally
equivalent program without procedure nesting. Within the body of p, the proce-
dure q depends on the global formal parameter b. Therefore, q(b) would denote
the procedure with the global binding for b, but the corresponding partial eval-
uation is not allowed in Algol-programs:
proc p (proc f, boolean b)
{ f(q(b), false); }
proc q (boolean b, proc g, boolean c)
{ print(b); }
From [3, 4] we learn that it is in general impossible to formally equivalently
transform full Algol-programs to programs without procedure nesting and global
formal parameters. In full Algol the so-called macro property (or formal termi-
nation) is undecidable, whereas it is decidable for programs without procedure
nesting. The proof shows, that (uninterpreted) full Algol programs can effec-
tively simulate 2-tape pushdown automata, which in turn can simulate Turing-
machines. Moreover, the simulating automaton has an explicit stop-instruction
and the construction thus also shows, that formal reachability is undecidable
in full Algol, whereas it is decidable in an Algol without procedure nesting or
global formal parameters.
proc p (proc f, boolean b) {




{ proc q’ (proc g, boolean c) { print(true); } p(q’, false); }
{ proc q’’ (proc g, boolean c) { print(false); } q’(q’’, false); }
print(true);
Intuitively, the main reason is that full Algol-programs can construct irregu-
lar calling trees (the procedures called again and again differ with respect to
the bindings of their global formal parameters), whereas for programs without
nested procedures the calling trees can at most be regular, and a program is
formally non-terminating if and only if it is formally recursive. Our protagonist
is a formally recursive, but nevertheless terminating program, which makes it
interesting as an example for our transformation of nested Algol-procedures to
nested Java-classes.
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3 Classes as Procedures
Typically, methods play the rôle of procedures or functions in an object oriented
language like Java. However, since methods are called using dynamic scoping
(late binding), methods are not really useful to simulate Algol-procedures in our
setting. Although recent Java versions allow for class nesting (local and inner
classes), methods still are kind of unnested; there is no support of global formal
method parameters. Classes can refer to instance variables of embracing classes,
but in general not to parameters of embracing method declarations (unless they
are declared final, so that the implementation can copy their values into the
statically preceeding object).
But we can look at classes as procedures, and at instantiations as procedure
calls. That is to say, nested Java classes can play the rôle of nested Algol pro-
cedures (actually of type declarations for corresponding procedure incarnations
or activation records). Each Algol-procedure p is transformed to a correspond-
ing Java class Cp, local procedures become local classes, and procedure calls of
p(e1, ..., en) are transformed to instantiations new Cp(e1, ..., en). Con-
sequently, procedure bodies transform to constructor bodies in Java. Here is a
simple example:
if (x == 0) print(y); else fac(x−1, y*x);
proc fac (int x, int y) {
class Cfac {
Cfac (int x, int y) {
if (x == 0) print(y); else new Cfac (x−1, y*x);
}
}
... fac(3, 1); ...
}
... new Cfac (3, 1); ...
3.1 Parameter Passing
In general, parameter passing in Java is call-by-value and there is no direct
counterpart to the call-by-reference parameter passing of Algol-like procedures.
But classes are reference types, and we can simulate call-by-reference parameter




varT (T value) { this.value = value; }
}
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and replace each variable declaration T x = v; by varT x = new varT (v);
and each reference to x by a reference to x.value. Using this transformation,
our factorial program from above would become
}
}
varint x = new varint (3); varint y = new varint (1);
new Cfac (x,y); print(y);
if (x != 0) { y=y*x; x=x−1; fac(x,y); }
proc fac (var int x, var int y) {
class Cfac {
Cfac (varint x, varint y) {
}
var int x = 3, y = 1; fac(x, y); print(y);
if (x.value != 0) {
}
y.value = y.value * x.value;
x.value = x.value − 1;
new Cfac (x, y);
Although it is not so important for the present paper, we want to make clear that
there is no principle problem to transfer formal program properties expressed by
a copy-rule-based (or term rewriting) semantics of Algol-programs to the corre-
sponding Java-program. In order to define such a copy rule for Algol-programs
we need procedure calls to be replaced by modified procedure bodies, and it is
much more convenient to base such a definition on call-by-reference parameter
passing, i.e. the textual replacement of formal procedure parameters by actual
parameter variables (with an apporpriate renaming to avoid name clashes).
3.2 Class Nesting and Procedure Nesting
Procedure nesting does not as easily transform to class nesting as we might
expect. The reason is, as mentioned before, that in Java local classes in general
cannot refer to method parameters of embracing methods:
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proc q () { print(x); }
class Cp {
Cp (int x) {
class Cq {





From an implementation point of view we have a static chain of objects i.e. an
object of a local class contains a pointer to the (necessarily instantiated) object
of the embracing class. But this static chain of objects does not include method
incarnations nor constructor incarnations of course. There are no global formal
parameters. But we need them in order to program Algol-procedures. Therefore,
we need parameters and local variables of methods to become instance variables
of the corresponding embracing class.









Cp (int x) {
int x;
class Cq {
Cq () { print(x); } }
this.x = x; new Cq ();
The solution is to model procedure parameters and local variables as additional
instance variables of the procedure classes. Since the constructor models pro-
cedure calls, it additionally sets these (local) variables, so that procedure class
instances play the rôle of Algol procedure incarnations:
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Tk+1 y1 = v1; ... ; Tk+n yn = vn;
proc p (T1 x1, ... , Tk xk) {
class Cp {




Tk+1 y1 = v1; ... ; Tk+n yn = vn;   // local variables
Cp (T1 x1, ... , Tk xk) {   // constructor
this.x1 = x1; ... ; this.xk = xk;
}
}
3.3 Procedures as Parameters
For each procedure we additionally generate a procedure type FCp in order to
model procedure objects.
T’1 y1 = v1; ... ; T’n yn = vn;
proc p (T1 x1, ... , Tk xk) {
class FCp implements proc_T1_..._Tk {




new Cp (x1, ... , xk);
}
A corresponding interface declaration allows for passing procedures as parame-
ters. For each procedure type we generate an appropriate interface declaration,
and for each procedure (p) we generate a pair of class declarations; one (Cp) for
procedure incarnations (activation records) and one (FCp) for the corresponding
(formal) procedure objects. The call-method of the latter is used to express
formal procedure calls.
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T’1 y1 = v1; ... ; T’n yn = vn;
proc p (T1 x1, ... , Tk xk) {
interface proc_T1_..._Tk {





Each Algol-procedure is transformed to a pair of Java class declarations,
– one for procedure incarnations, and
– one for procedure objects, with an appropriate call-method.
Procedure calls become constructor calls (instantiations), and, for technical rea-
sons, we define an interface type for each procedural type. Thus, our protagonist
proc p (proc f, boolean b) {




transforms to the following Java program:
interface proc proc boolean {
public void call (proc proc boolean f, boolean b);
}
class FCp implements proc proc boolean {





proc proc boolean f; boolean b;
public Cp (proc proc boolean f, boolean b) {
this.f = f; this.b = b; f.call(new FCq(), false);
}
class FCq implements proc proc boolean { ... }
class Cq { ... }
}
and the main program tranforms to
class main {
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public static void main (String[] argv) {
new Cp(new FCp(), true);
}
}
5 Conclusions and Future Work
Java programs with class nesting can simulate the full Algol-procedure concept.
As a consequence, also for Java programs formal termination and formal reach-
ability are undecidable. This might have harmful consequences for byte code
verification. Moreover, since nested procedures cannot simply be flattened, it re-
mains an interesting question if nested classes can be defined by corresponding
unnested (flattended) classes.
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Abstract. With-loops are versatile array comprehensions used in the
functional array language SaC to implement aggregate array operations
that are applicable to arrays of any rank and shape. We describe the
fusion of with-loops as a novel optimization technique to improve the
data locality of compiled code. Several experiments show the significance
of with-loop fusion for achieving runtime performance figures that are
competitive with those of low-level machine-oriented approaches.
1 Introduction
SaC (Single Assignment C) [1] is a purely functional array processing language
designed with numerical applications in mind. Image processing and computa-
tional sciences are two examples of potential application domains. The language
design of SaC aims at combining generic, high-level specifications of array-
based algorithms with a runtime performance that is competitive with low-level,
machine-oriented languages both in terms of execution time and memory con-
sumption.
The programming methodology of SaC essentially builds upon the principles
of abstraction and composition [2–4]. Unlike other array languages, SaC provides
only a very small number of built-in operations on arrays, mostly for querying
an array’s shape, its rank, or individual elements. Aggregate array operations,
e.g. subarray selection, element-wise extensions of scalar operations, rotation and
shifting, or reductions, are defined in SaC itself using with-loops, verstile SaC-
specific multi-dimensional array comprehensions. SaC allows us to encapsulate
these operations in abstractions that are universally applicable, i.e. applicable
to arrays of any rank and shape. More complex array operations are not to be
defined by with-loops, but by composition of simpler array operations. Again,
they are encapsulated in functions that may abstract from concrete ranks and
shapes of argument arrays as far as possible and useful.
Following this technique, entire application programs typically consist of var-
ious logical layers of abstraction and composition. This style of programming
leads to highly generic implementations of algorithms and provides good op-
portunities for code reuse on each abstraction layer. As a very simple example,
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consider a function MinMaxVal that yields both the least and the greatest ele-
ment of an argument array. Rather than implementing this functionality directly
using with-loops, our programming methodology suggests to define the func-
tion MinMaxVal by composition of two simpler functions MinVal and MaxVal
that yield the least and the greatest element, respectively:
int, int MinMaxVal( int[*] A)
{
return( MinVal( A), MaxVal( A));
}
Direct compilation of programs designed on the principles of abstraction and
composition generally leads to poor runtime performance. Massive creation of
temporary arrays as well as repeated traversals of the same arrays are the main
reasons. Computing the minimum and the maximum value of A individually
requires the processor to load each value of A into a register twice. Whereas
this is fairly efficient for small arrays that entirely fit into the processor-local
cache memory, larger arrays lead to expensive 2nd-level cache or even more
expensive main memory transactions. With increasing discrepancy between pro-
cessor and memory speeds, the above implementation of MinMaxVal results in
a performance penalty that approaches a factor of two with respect to a direct
implementation that computes both values in a single sweep.
Our programming methodology represents a classical trade-off between mod-
ular, reusable code design on the one side and runtime performance on the other
side. Whereas in many application domains a performance degradation of a fac-
tor of 2 or more in exchange for improved development speed, maintainability,
and code reuse opportunities may be acceptable, in numerical computing it is
not. Hence, in practice abstraction and composition are only useful to the extent
to which accompanying compiler optimization technology succeeds in systemat-
ically transforming programs from a representation amenable to humans into a
representation that is suitable for efficient execution on computing machinery.
In the past, we have developed two complementary optimization techniques
that avoid the creation of temporary arrays at runtime: with-loop folding [5,
6] and with-loop scalarization [7]. In our current work we address the problem
of repeated array traversals, as illustrated by the example above. We propose
with-loop fusion as a novel technique to avoid costly repeated array traversals at
runtime. To make fusion of with-loops feasible, we extend the internal represen-
tation of with-loops in order to accomodate computation of multiple values by a
single with-loop, named multi-operator with-loop. We introduce with-loop fu-
sion as a high-level code transformation on intermediate SaC code. The essence
of fusion is formally defined in a very restricted setting. Additional preprocessing
techniques that systematically generate optimization cases are outlined.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
introduction into with-loops. In Section 3 we extend the internal representation
of with-loops to multi-operator with-loops. The base case for with-loop fusion
is described in Section 4. More complex cases are reduced to the base case using
techniques described in Section 5. Section 6 reports on a series of experiments
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evaluating with-loop fusion while Section 7 concludes and outlines directions of
future research.
2 With-loops in SAC
General introductions to SaC and its programming methodology may be found
in [2, 1, 3]. Here, we restrict ourselves to the explanation of with-loops, more
precisely with-loop expresssions. Their syntax is defined in Fig. 1.
WithLoopExpr ⇒ with [ Generator : Expr ]+ Operation
Generator ⇒ ( Expr <= Identifier < Expr [ Filter ] )
Filter ⇒ step Expr [ width Expr ]
Operation ⇒ genarray ( Expr [ , Expr ] )
| fold ( FoldOp , Expr )
Fig. 1. Syntax of with-loop expressions.
A with-loop consists of three parts: a generator, an associated expression and
an operation. The operation determines the overall meaning of the with-loop.
There are two variants: genarray and fold. With genarray( shp, default)
the with-loop creates a new array of shape shp . With fold( foldop, neutral)
the with-loop specifies a reduction operation. In this case, foldop must be the
name of an appropriate associative and commutative binary operation with neu-
tral element given by the expression neutral .
The generator defines a set of index vectors along with an index variable rep-
resenting elements of this set. Two expressions, which must evaluate to integer
vectors of equal length, define lower and upper bounds of a rectangular index
vector range. For each element of this set of index vectors the associated expres-
sion is evaluated. Depending on the variant of with-loop, the resulting value is
either used to initialize the corresponding element position of the array to be
created (genarray) or it is given as an argument to the fold operation (fold).
In the case of a genarray-with-loop, elements of the result array that are not
covered by the generator are initialized by the (optional) default expression in
the operation part. For example, the with-loop





0 0 0 0 0
0 2 3 4 0
0 3 4 5 0
1
A while the with-loop
with ([1,1] <= iv < [3,4]) : iv[0] + iv[1]
fold( +, 0)
evaluates to 21. An optional filter may be used to further restrict generators to
periodic gridlike patterns, e.g.
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1
A .
Furthermore, a single with-loop may consist of multiple generators defining
pairwise disjoint index sets, each being associated with a different expression.
3 Multi-operator with-loops
The aim of with-loop fusion is to compute multiple values in a single sweep
in order to avoid the repeated traversal of identical argument arrays. Hence, a
major prerequisite for the fusion of with-loops is the ability to represent the
computation of multiple values by a single with-loop. Regular with-loops, as
described in the previous section, always compute either a single new array or a
single reduction. To overcome this limitation we extend the internal representa-
tion of with-loops to multi-operator with-loops:
MultiOpWL ⇒ with [ Generator : Expr [ , Expr ]* ]+ [ Operation ]+
Internal multi-operator with-loops differ from language-level with-loops
essentially in two aspects. First, each generator is associated with a comma-
separated list of expressions rather than a single expression. Second, a single
with-loop may have a sequence of operations rather than exactly one. All gen-
erators must be associated with the same number of expressions, and this num-
ber must match the number of operations. More precisely, the first operation
corresponds to the first expression associated with each generator, the second
operation corresponds to each second expression, etc. For example, computing
both the minimum and the maximum element of an argument array of any rank
and shape can be specified by the following multi-operator with-loop:
int, int MinMaxVal( int[*] A)
{





In this case, the multi-operator with-loop yields two result values, which
must be bound to two variables using simultaneous assignment. While this sim-
ple example only uses fold operations, fold and genarray operations are gen-
erally mixed. We do not feature multi-operator with-loops on the language level
because they run counter the idea of modular generic specifications. We consider
the above representation of MaxMinVal the desired outcome of an optimization
process, not a suitable implementation.
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4 With-loop fusion — the base case
In the following we describe with-loop fusion as a high-level code transforma-
tion. The optimization base case is characterized by two with-loops that have
the same sequence of generators and no data dependence, i.e., none of the vari-
ables bound to individual result values of the first with-loop is referred to within
the second with-loop. A formalization of with-loop fusion for this base case is
shown in Fig. 2.
We define a transformation scheme WLFS that describes the context-free
substitution of a SaC intermediate code pattern by some other intermediate
SaC code provided that certain guard conditions are met. In the example of
Fig. 2 guard conditions for the application of the transformation schemeWLFS
are the absence of data dependences as mentioned before and the additional
property that all genarray operations create arrays of the same shape. The fact
that all generators must be identical as well, is expressed by using the same
identifiers in the pattern part of the transformation scheme. We assume that
sequences of generator/expressions pairs are sorted in some systematic way to
avoid explicit handling of permutations. Furthermore, we have simplified the
definition of WLFS by leaving out step and width specifications in with-loop
generators.
With-loop fusion systematically examines intermediate SaC code to identify
pairs of suitable with-loops. They do not need to be adjacent in code as is
indicated by the dots in between the two with-loops in the upper part of Fig. 2.
If the required conditions are met, WLFS takes two assignments with with-
loops on their right hand sides and concatenates
1. the sequences of assigned identifiers,
2. the sequences of expressions associated with each generator, and
3. the sequences of operations.
Since with-loop fusion can be applied repeatedly, we define the transformation
scheme WLFS on multi-operator with-loops and simply interpret the initial
single-operator with-loops as a special case.
In general, index variables introduced by with-loops are likely to have dif-
ferent names. In fact, preceding steps in the SaC compilation process transform
code into a variant of static single assignment form [8]. Hence, in the intermedi-
ate code representation relevant for with-loop fusion index variables of different
with-loops are guaranteed to have different names. In the transformation scheme
WLFS we address this issue by taking the index variable of the first with-loop
and a systematic α-conversion of all associated expressions that originally stem
from the second with-loop. In Fig. 2, this is denoted by [expr]ivaivb meaning that
all free occurrences of iva in expr are replaced by ivb.
5 Enabling with-loop fusion
The transformation scheme WLFS, as outlined in the previous section, is only
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(a) < ub1 ) :
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∀i, j ∈ {1 . . . n} :
operationi ≡ genarray(shapei)
∧ operationj ≡ genarray(shapej)








FV( expr(b)i,j ) = ∅
Fig. 2. Basic with-loop fusion scheme.
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erator sets is difficult to meet in practice. Hence, many useful optimization cases
are not handled appropriately so far. Instead of extending our existing transfor-
mation scheme to cover a wider range of settings, we accompany WLFS by a
set of preprocessing code transformations that create application scenarios for
WLFS. Due to the limitation of space we here only sketch out some of the
preprocessing steps.
– We make the default case in genarray-with-loops explicit. Rather than
having a default rule that implicitly covers all index positions of the new
array not covered explicitly by one of the generators, we add additional
generator/expression pairs so that eventually each legal index of the array
to be created is covered by exactly one generator.
– If the generator set of a fold-with-loop is a subset of that of a genarray-
with-loop, we introduce the missing generators to the fold-with-loop with
the neutral element of the folding operation as associated expression. Special
care is taken in the code generation phase to avoid costly execution of the
folding operation at runtime in these cases.
– We unify generator sets of two with-loops by systematically computing in-
tersections of each pair of generators from the first and the second with-loop.
A threshold value sets limits to the number of generators actually created
in this way and, hence, avoids explosion of the number of generators in in-
dividual with-loops.
– We eliminate data dependencies between two with-loops which we find use-
ful to fuse by replacing all references to the first with-loop found in the
second with-loop by the corresponding computation.
6 Experimental evaluation
We have conducted several experiments in order to quantify the impact of with-
loop fusion on the runtime performance of compiled SaC code. Our test system
is a 1100MHz Pentium III based PC running SuSE Linux, and we used gcc 3.3.1








Fig. 3. Impact of with-loop fusion on program execution times for computing mini-
mum and maximum element values (MinMaxVal) of matrices of varying size.
26
The first experiment involves our initial motivating example: computing min-
imum and maximum values of an array. Fig. 3 shows runtimes for three different
problem sizes with and without application of with-loop fusion. As expected,
there is almost no improvement for very small arrays The benefits of fusion in
this example are twofold. We do save some loop overhead, but our experiments
show this to be marginal. Therefore, the main advantage of fusion in this ex-
ample is that we can avoid one out of two memory accesses. However, as long
as an argument array easily fits into the L1 cache of the processor, the penalty
turns out to be negligible. As Fig. 3 shows, this situation changes in steps as the
array size exceeds L1 and later L2 cache capacities. In the latter case, with-loop
fusion reduces program execution time by almost 50% since with frequent slow
main memory accesses the application becomes totally memory-bound.




A = relax( B);
}
while (continue( A, B, eps));
return( A);
}
Fig. 4. Convolution with convergence criterion.
Our second benchmark program is a convolution algorithm with convergence
test, as sketched out in Fig. 4. Without with-loop fusion this implementation
of convolution essentially leads to two array operations for each iteration of
the outer sequential loop: the convolution step relax yielding a new value A
and the evaluation of the convergence criterion continue whose result either








Fig. 5. Impact of with-loop fusion on program execution times for computing convo-
lution with convergence test (Fig. 4) on vectors of varying length.
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we must reload the corresponding elements of A and B into registers, although
both have been stored in registers already during computation of the convolution
step. Applying with-loop fusion combines both the convolution step and the
convergence criterion in a single step. The experimental data displayed in Fig. 5
backs these considerations. For a small problem size fusion again has no visible
impact on performance, but with growing problem size a 25% reduction can be








Fig. 6. Impact of with-loop fusion on the SPEC benchmark tomcatv for varying prob-
lem sizes.
The last experiments are based on a SaC implementation of the SPEC float-
ing point benchmark tomcatv. As shown in Fig. 6 substantial performance gains
can be observed for this benchmark with growing problem size. The background
for improvements of up to 80% by with-loop fusion for this benchmark is the
fact that in contrast to the preceding examples more than two with-loops are
fused showing the full potential of this optimization.
7 Conclusion and future work
Engineering application programs based on the principles of abstraction and
composition, as propagated by SaC, leads to well-structured and easily main-
tainable software. However, the downside of this approach is that it requires
non-trivial compilation techniques which systematically restructure entire appli-
cation programs into a form that allows for efficient execution on real computing
machinery.
In the current work, we have described with-loop fusion as one mosaic
stone of this code restructuring compiler technology. With-loop fusion takes
two with-loops without a data dependence and transforms them into a single
generalized variant named multi-operator with-loop, which we have intoduced
as a compiler internal intermediate code representation for exactly this purpose.
The positive effect of with-loop fusion is to avoid repeated traversals of the
same array and replace memory load and store operations by equivalent but
much faster register accesses.
In several experiments we have demonstrated the potential of with-loop
fusion to achieve substantial reductions of execution times. With-loop fusion
28
has proved to be one important prerequisite to make the modular programming
style of SaC feasible in practice.
In the future, we plan to expand the applicability of with-loop fusion to
additional cases, e.g. to fusion of genarray-with-loops that define arrays of
non-identical but similar shape. In this situation we could create a joint with-
loop that operates on the convex hull of the individual with-loop’s iteration
spaces. A special value none or noop would be used as “initialization” value
for index positions that do not exist in one or the other target array. Another
subject of future research is the guided selection of with-loops that may be
fused. Since fusion of two with-loops may prevent further fusion with a third
with-loop, we plan to develop heuristics that guide the sequence of fusion steps
based on a cost model.
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Abstract. The basic idea of open types is to separate the definition of types
from the definition of their constituents, i. e., their base types (or superclasses to
use object-oriented terminology) and their data members (or fields). This is in
complete contrast to traditional record types and object-oriented classes, which
are closed in the sense that the set of their constituents is fixed once the type
has been defined. It will be shown, however, that this alternative approach opens
the door to greatly enhanced expressiveness and increased flexibility. Even
though the concept of open types is presented in this paper as a language exten-
sion for C++, the basic principles are actually language-independent and could
be incorporated into any imperative programming language.
1 Open Types
1.1 Type and Attribute Definitions
An open type is defined by declaring its name with the keyword typename, e. g.:
typename Person;
typename Car;
Afterwards, a single-valued attribute such as name − corresponding to a data field in
record notion − can be defined by declaring it as a kind of mapping from Persons to
strings:
Person −> string name;
Here, the right hand side of the definition (string name;) looks identical to a C++
(member) variable definition.
Similarly, a multi-valued attribute such as gnames (given names) − corresponding
to a data field whose type is an array or container type − is defined by using a double
instead of a single arrow to indicate the multi-valuedness:
Person −>> string gnames;
1.2 Constructors and Mutators
To create, initialize, and modify objects of an open type T, the following constructors
and mutators are provided.
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The parameterless constructor T(), which might either be called explicitly or is
called implicitly for variables of type T which are not initialized explicitly [8], returns
the null object of type T, i. e., actually no object. In contrast, the attribute-
initialization constructor T(@attr, val) creates a distinct new object of type T,
i. e., an object that is different from null and any other object, and initializes its at-
tribute attr with value val.
Similarly, the attribute mutator obj(@attr, val) sets the value of attribute attr
of object obj to val (if attr is a single-valued attribute) or adds val to obj’s values
of attribute attr (if attr is a multi-valued attribute) and returns the object obj. This
allows straightforward combinations of a constructor call with one or more mutator
calls to create an object with multiple initial attribute values, e. g.:
Person p = Person(@name, "Hoare")(@gnames, "Charles")
(@gnames, "Anthony")(@gnames, "Richard");
Here, the constructor call Person(@name, "Hoare") creates a new Person object,
initializes its attribute name with the string "Hoare", and returns the object. This ob-
ject is directly used in the mutator call ...(@gnames, "Charles") which initializes
its attribute gnames with "Charles" and returns the same object. This is again used
in and returned by the subsequent mutator calls ...(@gnames, "Anthony") and
...(@gnames, "Richard") which in turn add the strings "Anthony" and
"Richard" to the values of attribute gnames. Finally, the object returned by the last
mutator call is assigned to the Person variable p.
To create an empty object, i. e., a distinct object which is different from null and
any other object, but does not possess any attribute values yet, the Boolean construc-
tor T(flag) can be used. If the Boolean value flag is true, a unique empty object
is created, while otherwise a null object is returned, i. e., T(false) is equivalent to
just T(). On the other hand, a call T(@attr, val) to the attribute-initialization con-
structor is actually just a shorthand for T(true)(@attr, val), i. e., a call to the
Boolean constructor followed by an appropriate mutator call.
In addition to these predefined constructors of open types, it is possible to define arbi-
trary user-defined constructors, e. g.:
// Create person with given name g and name n.
Person (string g, string n) {
return Person(@name, n)(@gnames, g);
}
In contrast to normal C++ constructors (and constructors in other object-oriented pro-
gramming languages) which must be defined (or at least declared) inside their class
and must not explicitly return anything, but rather initialize the implicitly available
object this, user-defined constructors of open types are much like ordinary (global)
functions whose result type and name coincide (and therefore only one of them is
specified in their definition). In particular, there is no implicitly available object this,
and the constructor must explicitly (create and) return an object, typically by calling
one of the predefined constructors. Furthermore, just like attributes, constructors can
be defined successively on demand.
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1.3 The Attribute Inspection Operator @
To inspect the attribute values of a given object, the attribute inspection operator @
can be used, quite similar to the way the dot operator is used to access class members
in C++ and other languages, e. g.:
string n = p@name;
For a single-valued attribute such as name, its current value is returned, i. e., the value
that has been set for this attribute by the most recent mutator (or attribute-
initialization constructor) call for this object. If none of these operations has been ex-
ecuted for the object yet, i. e., the attribute does not possess any value, a well-defined
default value is returned that is obtained by calling the parameterless default con-
structor of the attribute’s type (i. e., string in the current example). Ideally, this con-
structor should return null to indicate the absence of any real value [2], but in princi-
ple any value (e. g., an empty string or zero for numeric types) is acceptable.
If a multi-valued attribute such as gnames is inspected with the @ operator, the val-
ues added to this attribute by all mutator (and attribute-initialization constructor) calls
performed for this object so far are returned as an ordered sequence. Even though it is
possible to grasp such a sequence as a whole, it is typically processed element by ele-
ment using a tailored iteration statement, e. g.:
for (string g : p@gnames) cout << g << " ";
This prints p’s giv en names in the order in which they hav e been added, i. e.,
Charles Anthony Richard. Alternatively, it is possible to directly inspect individu-
al values of such a sequence by applying the well-known index operator, e. g.:
string g2 = p@gnames[2];
to obtain the second given name of p, i. e., "Anthony". Similarly to inspecting the
value of a non-existent single-valued attribute, inspecting a non-existent value of a
multi-valued attribute by using an out-of-range index yields a well-defined default
value that is obtained in the same way as described above. Therefore, expressions
such as p@gnames[0] or p@gnames[4] will return a null string in the current exam-
ple.
It should be noted that the attribute inspection operator always returns an R-value [8],
i. e., a value which must not occur on the left hand side of an assignment operator.
Therefore, attribute update operations must only be performed by mutator calls, not
directly by assignments such as:
p@name = "Hoare"; // Syntax error!
1.4 Inspecting and Modifying Null Objects
Trying to inspect or modify a member of “object null,” i. e., the “object” referenced by
a null pointer, is illegal in C++ and many other languages and usually leads to a run
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time error such as a SIGSEGV (segmentation violation) signal or a NullPointerEx-
ception, since a null pointer actually does not refer to any object.
In contrast to that, inspecting and modifying attributes of open types is well-defined
ev en for null objects: While inspecting such an attribute is equivalent to inspecting a
non-existent attribute, i. e., returns the attribute’s default value, modifying such an at-
tribute simply has no effect. The main reason for these unusual definitions is con-
venience, since they allow to omit many otherwise necessary checks. To test, for ex-
ample, whether p’s name is "Hoare", one can simply write if (p@name ==
"Hoare") − instead of if (p && p@name == "Hoare") − even if p might be null; if
it actually is, p@name is null, too, and therefore, as expected, different from "Hoare".
Simultaneously, programs tend to become more robust since inadvertently omitted
checks will not lead to run time errors, but usually merely to unsatisfied conditions.
Similarly, the definition that mutator calls on null objects are silently ignored fre-
quently reduces the need to explicitly distinguish between real and null objects, and
again, inadvertently omitting such distinctions does not lead to run time errors (cf.
[2]).
1.5 Object Deletion
In contrast to normal C++ objects, which must be explicitly deleted by the program-
mer to reclaim their storage, objects of open types are automatically garbage-
collected when they hav e become unreachable, quite similar to objects of classes in
Java, Eiffel, Smalltalk, and many other programming languages.
In addition to and independently from this automatic storage reclamation, it is also
possible to explicitly delete objects − even while they are still referenced. Although
this might appear strange at first sight, there are reasonable practical examples where
this is useful. If, for instance, a car has been scrapped, it does not exist anymore, even
though it might still appear in the list of all cars of its (previous) owner.
In contrast to C++, however, where the deletion of an object might lead to danger-
ous dangling pointers, deletion of an open type object causes all remaining references
to the object to become null immediately and automatically. By that means, it is al-
ways possible to reliably detect that an object has been deleted. Furthermore, since
null objects can be safely inspected and modified, too, neither run time errors nor un-
defined behaviour will occur if deleted objects are used without care. Since object
deletions might be performed unexpectedly, this is another strong argument for the
definitions given in Sec. 1.4.
2 Bidirectional Relationships
Basically, a bidirectional relationship between two types is also a kind of mapping
from one type to the other, with the additional possibility to directly access the inverse
mapping. Since both of these mappings might be either single- or multiple-valued,
there are four different kinds of relationships altogether, one to one, one to many,
many to one, and many to many, expressed by corresponding bidirectional arrow sym-
bols <−>, <−>>, <<−>, and <<−>>, respectively. Furthermore, there are two special
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kinds, i. e., symmetric one-to-one and many-to-many relationships, where the inverse
mapping is equivalent to the original mapping.
For example, a one-to-many relationship between Person and Car called cars resp.
owner can be defined as follows:
Person owner <−>> Car cars;
Reading this from left to right (and omitting the name on the LHS) yields a multi-
valued attribute of type Person:
Person −>> Car cars;
while reading from right to left (and omitting the name on the RHS) yields a single-
valued attribute of type Car:
Car −> Person owner;
representing the inverse mapping. However, only by combining both attribute defini-
tions into a single relationship definition as shown above, they are actually treated as
mutually inverse mappings, which means that a call to one of the mutators automati-
cally implies a corresponding call to the other mutator with reversed roles.
For example, a mutator call such as p(@cars, c) adding c to p’s sequence of cars,
implies the call c(@owner, p) assigning p as c’s owner, and vice versa. Furthermore,
if c already possesses another owner q when either such call is made, c is first re-
moved from the sequence of q’s cars.
3 Anonymous and Automatic Attributes and Relationships
3.1 Basic Principles
If the name of a single-valued attribute is omitted, it implicitly possesses the name of
its target type, e. g.:
typename Address;
Person −> Address;
Person p = Person(@Adress, Address(...));
Address a = p@Adress;
Similarly, it is possible to omit one or both names of a bidirectional relationship.
If the arrow in an attribute declaration is followed by an exclamation mark, the at-
tribute might be applied automatically on demand to perform an implicit type conver-
sion from its source type (left of the arrow) to its target type (right of the arrow), e. g.:
Person −>! int pid;
This declares an int attribute pid of type Person which can be used just like any
other attribute, with the additional property that an expression of type Person is im-
plicitly convertible to an int value by automatically applying this attribute.
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Similarly, it is possible to declare automatic relationships by adding an exclamation
mark before or after the bidirectional arrow, depending on which direction of the rela-
tionship should be automatically applicable.
3.2 Modeling Type Hierarchies
Automatic one-to-one relationships can be exploited to model object-oriented type hi-
erarchies with subtype polymorphism without requiring any additional mechanisms.
For example, a new type Student (with a regular attribute number denoting the ma-
triculation number) might be defined as a “subtype” of Person by declaring a one-to-
one relationship between these types that is automatically applicable from the derived
type to the base type:
// Declare Student as a "subtype" of Person.
typename Student;
Student −> string number;
Student <−>! Person;
Typically, but not necessarily, such “subtype” relationships are anonymous.
A typical constructor for Student might be defined as follows:
// Create student with given name g, name n,
// and matriculation number m.
Student (string g, string n, string m) {
// Create person subobject.
Person p = Person(@name, n)(@gnames, g);
// Create and return student object connected with p.
return Student(@Person, p)(@number, m);
}
Now, a student named Peter Clark with matriculation number 777 can be created and
used as follows:
// Create student.
Student s = Student("Peter", "Clark", 777);
// Print name and matriculation number.
cout << "Name: " << s@name << endl;
cout << "Number: " << s@number << endl;
Because the relationship between Student and Person is applied automatically on
demand, the subexpression s@name is actually replaced by s@Person@name. Further-
more, all functions accepting Person arguments can be called with Student objects,
too, and finally, a Student object can be used polymorphically as a Person object.
The fact that the relationship between Student and Person is bidirectional can be
exploited to check whether a given Person object “is” actually a student (i. e., to per-
form a dynamic type test) and to access its student attributes if appropriate (i. e., to
perform a downcast):
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// Polymorphically use a student as a person.
Person p = Student("Peter", "Clark", 777);
// Check whether p is actually a student s ...
if (Student s = p@Student) {
// ... and access its matriculation number.
cout << "Number: " << s@number << endl;
}
This corresponds roughly to a dynamic_cast in C++ which returns a valid pointer to
an object of a derived class if the cast has been successful and a null pointer other-
wise.
By employing automatic relationships to model object-oriented type hierarchies, the
traditionally distinct or even conflicting concepts of aggregation and inheritance have
been merged into a single coherent concept. Furthermore, the fact that relationships
can be defined incrementally, allows “supertypes” of a type to be declared later on,
e. g.:
// Declare Vehicle as a "supertype" of Car.
typename Vehicle;
Car <−>! Vehicle;
Despite its practical usefulness, such a possibility is missing in most object-oriented
programming languages.
3.3 Multiple Inheritance
Of course, it is possible to use automatic relationships to model type hierarchies with
multiple inheritance, too. For example, one might define a type EmployedStudent
that is derived from both Student and another type Employee:
// Declare Employee as a subtype of Person.
typename Employee;
Employee <−>! Person;
// Attributes and constructors of Employee.
Employee −> string company;
Employee (......) { ...... }
// Declare EmployedStudent as a




Since both of these types in turn “inherit” from Person, the typical question arises
whether an EmployedStudent object should possess one or two Person subobjects,
i. e., whether Person is, in C++ terminology, a virtual base type or not. In C++, the
corresponding decision must be taken when the types Student and Employee are
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defined, even though it does not make any difference for these types. Therefore, it
would be much more logical to answer the question when EmployedStudent is de-
fined, because only for this type (and possible subtypes of it) the distinction is rele-
vant. However, the concept of automatic relationships does not provide a way to spec-
ify the difference at the level of declarations: The four <−>! relationships between
the types Person, Student, Employee, and EmployedStudent merely specify that
there are two ways to convert an EmployedStudent to a Person, either via Stu-
dent or via Employee, but they do not specify whether these ways lead to the same
destination, i. e., to the same Person object, or not. Even though this appears to be
disadvantageous at first sight, it will turn out to be the most flexible approach possi-
ble.
To actually distinguish between virtual and non-virtual inheritance, one simply cre-
ates either one or two Person “subobjects” when creating an EmployedStudent ob-
ject in a constructor, e. g.:
// Create employed student with given name g, name n,
// matriculation number m, and company c.
EmployedStudent (string g, string n, string m, string c) {
Person p = Person(@name, n)(@gnames, g);
Student s = Student(@Person, p)(@number, m);
Employee e = Employee(@Person, p)(@company, c);
return EmployedStudent(@Student, s)(@Employee, e);
}
Here, a single Person object p is created that is passed to both the Student and Em-
ployee constructors to create Student and Employee objects s and e, respectively,
which share the subobject p. Afterwards, an EmployedStudent object with subob-
jects s and e is created and returned. Therefore, converting an EmployedStudent
object created by this constructor to type Person always yields the same Person
subobject, no matter whether the conversion is done via Student or via Employee.
3.4 Dynamic Object Evolution
The fact that an object of a derived type such as Student or EmployedStudent is
actually a network of interconnected subobjects − even though this remains invisible
except when constructing the objects −, can be exploited in a straightforward manner
to implement dynamic object evolution. For example, it is almost trivial to transform
an object that has been initially created as a bare person into a student, an employee,
or even an employed student later, by simply creating additional associated subob-
jects, e. g.:
// Create a person object p.
Person p = Person("Peter", "Clark");
// "Transform" p to a student.
p(@Student, Student(@number, 777));
Conversely, it is also possible to delete subobjects to transform a specialized object to
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a more general one, e. g.:
// "Transform" p back to a person.
delete p@Student;
Here, it does not matter whether p has been originally created as a Person or a Stu-
dent (or something else).
By explicitly deleting the student subobject associated with p, all “student refer-
ences” to this person automatically become null. Otherwise, if only the association
between p and its student object would have been cut, these references would remain
valid, but refer to a degenerate student object that does not possess an associated per-
son object anymore. (According to the rules given in Sec. 1.4, accesses to this person
object and its attributes would still be well-defined, however.)
It is even possible to create “hybrid” objects, such as a person that is both a student
and an employee, even if no common “subtype” of these types (such as Employed-
Student) would exist.
4 Related Work
Aspect-oriented programming languages such as AspectJ [4] or AspectC++ [7] pro-
vide so-called inter-type member declarations or introductions to retroactively extend
existing data structure definitions without needing to change the code of the original
definitions. Nevertheless, some kind of recompilation or “weaving” is required by all
these approaches: While the AspectC++ compiler needs the source code of the origi-
nal definition together with all extension code to produce a new definition that is actu-
ally compiled by a C++ compiler, the AspectJ compiler is able to perform the combi-
nation on the byte code level. Frameworks such as JMangler [5] are even able to delay
the final composition until load time, but in either case a class remains fixed once it
has been loaded. Open types, on the other hand, allow attributes to be loaded dynami-
cally, even for types which have already been instantiated.
Actually, aspect-oriented approaches still adhere to the traditional concept of
records as fixed data structures and only make their definition more flexible, while
open types support truly flexible objects whose storage size might vary over time.
The Common Lisp Object System (CLOS) [3] (and other languages based on similar
ideas) deviate from the typical object-oriented approach that everything belonging to a
class must be defined (or at least declared) in the class, by allowing methods (of so-
called generic functions) to be defined separately and incrementally. Howev er, the set
of data fields making up a class must still be defined at once and cannot be extended
later, except by redefining the whole class. In contrast, open types apply the “generic
function principle,” i. e., the possibility to define methods separately and independent-
ly, to data fields, too.
Description logic systems such as Classic [1] and Loom [6] provide data models
which are very similar in nature to open types and have in fact influenced some of
their ideas. They provide concepts (corresponding to open types) and roles (corre-
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sponding to attributes and relationships), which are defined separately and indepen-
dently, and roles might possess inverse roles. Furthermore, a running system can be
extended by new definitions at any time.
However, since description logic systems are actually AI tools, providing powerful
reasoning capabilities such as subsumption checking, automatic instance classifica-
tion, and truth maintenance, using them as bare data models of a programming lan-
guage would mean to break a fly upon the wheel. Therefore, open types might be
viewed as the result of reducing a description logic system to a simple data represen-
tation system by stripping off all AI functionality.
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Abstract. Assertions test expected properties of run-time values without disrupting
the normal computation of a program. Here we present a library for enriching pro-
grams in the lazy language Haskell with assertions. Expected properties are written
in an expressive pattern logic that combines pattern matching with logical opera-
tions and predicates. The presented assertions are lazy: they do not force evaluation
but only examine what is evaluated by other parts of the program. They are also
prompt: assertion failure is reported as early as possible, before a faulty value is used
by the main computation. The implementation is based on lazy observations and
continuation-based coroutines.
1 Introduction
Large programs are composed of algorithms and numerous (more or less) abstract data types
which interact in complex ways. A bug in the implementation of a basic data structure can
result in the whole program going wrong. Such a bug can be hard to locate, because the
faulty data structure may not be part of the wrong result, it may just be an intermediate
data structure. Even worse, the program may produce wrong results for a long time before
the user even notices.
Testing abstract data types exhaustively is difficult. However, interesting test cases often
occur when data structures are used within other algorithms. Hence it is a good idea to
check for bugs in basic data structures and functions during the execution of larger pro-
grams. Using assertions is a common approach to do so (e.g., see [3]). The programmer
specifies intended properties of data structures and functions by writing assertions. During
program execution, these assertions are tested and failure of an assertion is reported to
the programmer. Examples of assertions are restricting the square root function to positive
arguments or the property of being sorted for a search tree.
Recently, in functional programming languages assertions became famous in form of
assertion-based contracts for Scheme [2]. Also the Glasgow Haskell Compiler (ghc) provides
the possibility to define assertions:
assert :: Bool -> a -> a
The first argument is the asserted property. If this property evaluates to True, then assert
behaves like the identity function. Otherwise, an error is reported with detailed information
about the source code position of the failed assertion. For example, consider an assertion
that checks whether a list is sorted:
checkSorted :: Ord a => [a] -> [a]
checkSorted xs = assert (sorted xs) xs
sorted :: Ord a => [a] -> Bool
sorted (x:(y:ys)) = x<=y && sorted (y:ys)
sorted _ = True
Unfortunately assert is strict in its boolean argument which clashes with Haskell’s
laziness. The asserted property is evaluated and the tested data structure is evaluated as
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far as necessary to decide the property. Hence, programming with assertions will result in
strict programs with loss of the expressive power of laziness, e.g., the use of infinite data
structures.
We conclude that assertions in lazy languages should respect laziness. They should only
be evaluated as far as possible, i.e., the assertion should only be checked for that part of
the data structure which is evaluated during the computation. A first approach for lazy
assertions is [1]. There, an assertion is introduced by
assert :: String -> (a -> Bool) -> a -> a
The first parameter is a label which names the assertion. When an assertion fails the com-
putation aborts with an appropriate message that includes the assertion’s label. As further
parameters, assert takes the property and the value on which it behaves as a partial iden-
tity.
To prevent an assertion from evaluating too much, the property has to be defined as
predicate on the tested data structure. The context in which the application of assert
appears determines how far the tested data structure is evaluated, and only the evaluated
part is passed as argument to the predicate.
We can redefine checkSorted as follows: checkSorted xs = assert "sorted" sorted xs
Applying checkSorted to the list [1,3,2,4] yields:
Assertion (sorted) failed: 1:3:2:_
The failure is reported as early as possible, before the whole list is evaluated. However, the
approach has a major drawback. If we evaluate only the tail of the observed list, no failure
occurs:
> tail (checkSorted [1,3,2,4])
[3,2,4]
The reason for this behaviour is that (&&) is sequentially defined. The assertion is suspended
on checking the sorted property for the first two elements of the list. The conjunction is never
evaluated to False, although there are two elements in the evaluated part, which are not in
order.
In practice, many lazy assertions are suspended exactly for this reason. Many asserted
properties may not hold for evaluated parts of data structures, but the assertions do not fail
and hence, the programmer wrongly believes their program to be correct. Lazy evaluation
does involve a sequential evaluation order.
In this paper we introduce a new approach for lazy assertions. The basic idea is to define
assertions by means of a pattern logic instead of arbitrary Haskell functions. In this logic,
we express properties with parallel versions of (&&) and (||). If any of the arguments of
such a parallel operator makes the whole assertion fail, then this is reported independently
of the other parts of the assertion.
Although this approach may in some cases be more complicated than defining assertions
within the programming language Haskell itself, there is also an opportunity. Our pattern
logic is more a specification language than a programming language. Hence, properties are
asserted in a completely different style to ordinary programs. So it is unlikely that program-
mers will make the same mistakes in the assertions as in the program, which may happen
easily using the same language for programming as for specifying properties.
Beside reporting failed assertions, reporting how many and which assertions have suc-
ceeded may also be useful. We collect succeeded assertions in a file, so that the programmer
can later analyse which assertions succeeded. However, not every assertion is supposed to
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succeed in the presence of laziness. The user must be aware, that in many cases checking
assertions suspends and cannot be decided on the evaluated parts of the data structures.
This behaviour is even required when a property shall be tested on a never fully evaluated
infinite data structure. However, if an assertion fails because of any part of an evaluated
data structure, then this is reported immediately.
Our assertions have the following properties:
– they do not modify the lazy behaviour of a program
– whenever some part of a data structure is evaluated and this part violates an asserted
property, this is promptly reported to the programmer
– assertions are implemented as a library and do not need any compiler or run-time mod-
ifications
– the only extension to Haskell 98 used for the implementation are unsafePerformIO and
IORefs.
2 Programming with Assertions
In the following subsections we introduce our pattern logic step by step and justify our
design decisions through several examples.
2.1 Patterns
Pattern matching is a powerful feature of modern functional languages. The pattern is a
kind of prototype of a function’s argument. For example, it allows a simple definition of a
function that tests whether a list has exactly two elements:
hasTwoElements :: [Int] -> Bool
hasTwoElements (_:_:[]) = True
hasTwoElements _ = False
We can define a function that is basically the identity function on lists but additionally
asserts that the argument has exactly two elements as follows:
twoElements :: [Int] -> [Int]
twoElements = assert "two elements" (p_ <:> p_ <:> pNil)
So what are the new functions used in this definition? We cannot use built-in pattern
matching for prompt lazy assertions and we do not want to extend the language Haskell.
Therefore, we implement our pattern logic using an abstract type constructor Pat. We
provide functions for constructing Pats:
p_:: Pat a is the wildcard pattern that matches anything;
pNil :: Pat [a] and (<:>) :: Pat a -> Pat [a] -> Pat [a] construct patterns that
match the two data constructors of the list type. Using these pattern constructors
we can write p_ <:> p_ <:> pNil to express a Pat similar to the pattern : :[]
used in the definition of hasTwoElements.
Whereas hasTwoElements forces the evaluation of the list constructors of its argument
to perform pattern matching, twoElements is lazy: the argument is only evaluated as far as
its result is demanded by the caller of twoElements.
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In many cases it will be useful to combine patterns by means of the logical conjunction
and disjunction operators:
(|||) :: Pat a -> Pat a -> Pat a (&&&) :: Pat a -> Pat a -> Pat a
For instance, we can now define an assertion which expresses that a list contains less than
two elements:
shortList :: [a] -> [a]
shortList = assert "length less than two" (pNil ||| p_ <:> pNil)
2.2 Context Patterns
When specifying properties of large data structures, it is not sufficient to match a finite
initial part of the data structure. We would like to be able to match patterns in arbitrarily
deep contexts, for example, to select an arbitrary element of a list. Hence we provide context
patterns within our pattern logic. The pattern constructor pListC :: Pat [a] -> Pat [a]
matches an arbitrary sublist of a list. For example
oneTrue :: [Bool] -> [Bool]
oneTrue = assert "True in list" (pListC (pTrue <:> p_))
asserts that there exists an element True in the argument list.
2.3 Universal and Existential Quantification
Why does the preceding example assert that there exists an element True? Could it not mean
that all elements should be True? Indeed we will sometimes want to assert a property for
all sublists and sometimes want to assert that there exists a sublist with a given property.
Hence we introduce the quantifier patterns: forAll :: Pat a -> Pat a and exists :: Pat
a -> Pat a which change the meaning of context patterns within their scope. So exists
(pListC (pTrue <:> p_)) asserts that there exists an element True whereas forAll (pListC
((exists pTrue) <:> p_)) asserts that all list elements are True.
Why is there a nested exists in the last example? Because quantifiers do not only change
the semantics of context patterns, but also of normal patterns. Within the scope of forAll a
constructor pattern such as pTrue matches any other constructor. Because of the quantifier
forAll the context pattern pListC has to match all sublists with its argument pattern. In
any finite list one sublist will be []. We could list this alternative in our definition:
forAll (pListC (pTrue <:> p_ ||| pNil))
This is acceptable for lists, but not for more complex types with more constructors, such
as abstract syntax trees. We would have to add a disjunction for every constructor and
the size of assertions would blow-up unacceptably. Therefore we decided that within the
scope of forAll a pattern built from (<:>) also matches the empty list. In contrast, in an
existential context the pattern describes which structure is supposed to exist. Hence, non-
matching sub-data-structures should not match the pattern inside exists. So within the
scope of forAll the pattern (exists pTrue) <:> p_ matches both the empty list and a
non-empty list that does start with True.
The function assert implicitly surrounds its pattern by exists. Hence in the preceding
subsection the pattern context is existentially quantified.
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2.4 Unary Predicates
Pattern matching cannot express properties of primitive types, such as a number being posi-
tive or a number being greater than another. For expressing such properties, Haskell enriches
standard pattern matching with guards, in which the programmer specifies restrictions for
the bound variables.
Because we cannot define a new variable binding construct within Haskell, we cannot bind
normal variables in our patterns. Instead, we introduce a new pattern val that represents
binding a value to a variable. To check a property of such a “variable” we provide a function
check.
For example, we define an assertion checking whether a number is positive:
posInt :: Int -> Int
posInt = assert "positive" (check val (>0))
We can define a more complex assertion that checks whether all elements of a list are
positive:
allPos :: [Int] -> [Int]
allPos = assert "all positive" (forAll (pListC ((check val (>0)) <:> p_)))
2.5 Predicates with several Arguments
Unary predicates are not very expressive. For instance, it is not possible to compare two
elements of a data structure, as is necessary to express the property of being sorted. Hence
we extend the function check so that values from different vals can be compared in a
predicate:
sortedList :: [Int] -> [Int]
sortedList = assert "sorted" (forAll (check (pListC (val <:> (pListC (val <:> p_))))
(<=)))
We select two elements within a list (respecting their positions in the list) by means of two
list contexts, and check whether these two elements are in order. The assertion is checked
for every possible combination of elements in the list. Evaluating sortedList [2,4,6,3,5],
the following failure is reported:
Assertion (sorted) failed: 2: 4 :6: 3 :_
The result of the application is the list itself. For printing this list, the list has to be evaluated
from left to right. When the list element 3 is evaluated the assertion fails. The list elements
which cause the assertion to fail are highlighted. Because the remaining list is not evaluated
at all, an underscore is presented to the user for the unevaluated tail of the list. With
a different evaluation order of the values within the list other failure positions may be
reported. However, our assertions are prompt. When an assertion fails during the evaluation
of a data structure, this is reported to the user. The data structure is not evaluated any
further.
Checking sortedList is expensive in time (O(n2), where n is the length of the list).
Using the transitivity of (<=), we can define a linear version instead:
sortedLin :: [Int] -> [Int]
sortedLin = assert "sortedLin" (forAll (check (pListC (val <:> val <:> p_)) (<=)))
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However, assertions should be seen as high-level specifications for which it is more impor-
tant to be understandable and correct than to be efficient. Furthermore, this more efficient
implementation has another drawback. If only every second element of the list is evaluated,
then sortedLin cannot be checked, i.e., for a list which is only evaluated to 1: :2: :1:
sortedLin does not fail, whereas the less efficient assertion sortedList would fail. On
the other hand, in practice evaluation orders like this one are uncommon and failure of
sortedLin will in most cases be detected as early as failure of sorted.
2.6 The Pattern Type
When introducing predicates with more than one argument, we have to extend he definition
of patterns (Pat) as well. Applying check to a pattern and a predicate function, we have
to guarantee that the predicate takes as many arguments as vals occur in the pattern.
Furthermore, the type of each value matched by val and the corresponding argument of the
predicate must agree. In other words, check should have a type like
check :: Pat a (b1,...,bn) -> (b1->...->bn->Bool) -> Pat a ()
where b1,...,bn are the types of the values matched by vals. How can such a type be
expressed within Haskell 98? We want check to work with predicates of any arity. Even a
set of check functions indexed by arity would not do as a first take at the type of a simple
constructor pattern demonstrates:
(<:>) :: Pat a (b1,...,bn) -> Pat [a] (bn+1,...,bm) -> Pat [a] (b1,...,bm)
How shall we handle all these varying numbers of arguments collected by val for the
predicate tested by check? The solution is to extend the type Pat not by one but by two
type arguments. The first is the type of a predicate passed as input to the pattern and the
second it the type of a predicate resulting from the pattern. We revise the types as follows:
check :: Pat a (b1->...->bn->Bool) Bool -> (b1->...->bn->Bool) -> Pat a Bool Bool
(<:>) :: Pat a (b1->...->bm->Bool) (bn+1->...->bm->Bool) ->
Pat [a] (bn+1->...->bm->Bool) Bool
-> Pat [a] (b1->...->bm->Bool) Bool
These are still not Haskell 98 types, but they are instances of types that we can use:
check :: Pat a b Bool -> b -> Pat a c c
(<:>) :: Pat a b c -> Pat [a] c d -> Pat [a] b d
So the second type argument of Pat is the type of a value passed into the pattern and the
third type argument is the type of a value passed back out of the pattern, if the pattern
matches. We always use patterns for which these passed values are predicates or simply
boolean values.
The type of check expresses that the predicate of type b has to be applied to all its
arguments in the pattern to return a boolean value. The variable bindings within check are
encapsulated. Also, while check tests the predicate for its argument pattern, it also accepts
a predicate as input which it passes unchanged back, if the pattern matches.
We have the following type for the variable pattern:
val :: Pat a (a -> b) b
This type expresses that the input function is applied to the matched value and the result
passed back.
To make our assertions lazy, val can only be performed if the selected data structure
is fully evaluated. Otherwise, the predicate would be tested on partially evaluated values,
which could involve further evaluation destroying the laziness of our assertions. The pattern
val is usually used for values of primitive types, which cannot be evaluated partially at all.
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2.7 Example: Equal Sets
Let’s define the property that two sets (implemented as unordered lists without repeated
items) contain the same elements. A simple way to describe this property would be the
following:
For each element of the first list, there exists an equal element in the second list and
for each element of the second list, there exists an equal element in the first list.
Using our quantifiers, the first of these two assertions can easily be defined as follows:
equalSets :: ([Int],[Int]) -> ([Int],[Int])
equalSets = assert "already subset" (check (pTuple (forAll (pListC (val <:> p_)))
(exists (pListC (val <:> p_)))) (==))
The quantifiers are nested with respect to the order in which they appear within the linearly
written formula. Hence, for every element of the first list an equal element within the second
list has to exist. Expressing the other direction is more difficult, because the nesting of
quantifiers (∀∃) has to be applied in the reverse order of the tuple elements. We need to first
select any element of the second list and then check whether there exists the same element
within the first list. This can be expressed by matching the same data structure twice, by
means of a modified conjunction operator
(+++) :: Pat a b c -> Pat a c d -> Pat a b d
which applies both argument patterns to the same data structure and collects all vals within
the two argument patterns (all combinations — like a product) to apply a predicate to these
by means of check. Using this operator, we can define the complete assertion as:
equalSets :: ([Int],[Int]) -> ([Int],[Int])
equalSets = assert "equal sets" (check (pTuple (forAll (pListC (val <:> p_)))
(exists (pListC (val <:> p_))))
&&& (pTuple p_ (forAll (pListC (val <:> p_)))
+++ pTuple (exists
(pListC (val <:> p_))) p_))
(==))
Evaluation of equalSets ([1,2,3],[3,2,2,1]) just yields the tuple of sets, whereas the
call equalSets ([1,2,3],[3,2,4,2,1]) aborts with the message:
Assertion (equal sets) failed: (1:(2:(3: [] )),3:(2:( 4 :_)))
For the element 4 of the second list, no element was found in the first list. In the presence
of existential properties it is not so easy to show the programmer where an assertion failed.
The first list does not contain the element 4. Marking the first list completely would present
the reason for the failure of the existentially quantified part. However, this would often mean
that the whole data structure is marked. Hence, we decided to mark only that part of the
data structure, at which the failure of the existential pattern is observed. To distinguish
these sub-terms from those causing failure of a universally quantified val we use a lighter
colour for marking. In this application, the lists were evaluated from left to right. As a
consequence, the empty list made the decision that the assertion fails possible and we mark




So far, our approach allows programmers to annotate arbitrary data structures with as-
sertions. However, where should a programmer add such assertions? To express pre- and
post-conditions, it would be nice to add assertions directly to functions. Furthermore, in
a higher order language, it should be possible to add assertions to functional arguments,
functional return values, and functions within data structures as well.
In our pattern logic, we handle functions just like any other data structure. The idea is
that a function can be seen as a set of argument/result pairs, which are matched by the
function pattern
(-->) :: Pat a c d -> Pat b d e -> Pat (a -> b) c e
The first argument of (-->) is matched against the argument the function is applied to.
The second argument is matched against the function result. An assertion for functions will
usually contain predicates relating arguments and results. Hence, its type is similar to any
pattern constructor of arity two.
As b can again be a functional type, patterns for functions with higher arity can be
defined by nested (-->) applications. As an example we consider the greatest common
divisor (gcd) of two numbers. A reasonable assertion for gcd is that the result is a factor of
both arguments:
gcd :: Int -> Int -> Int
gcd = assert "result is factor of arguments"
(forAll (check (val-->val-->val) (\x y res -> mod x res==0 && mod y res==0))) gcd’
gcd’ :: Int -> Int -> Int
gcd’ n m = let r = n ‘mod‘ m in if r == 0 then m else gcd n r
The algorithm is implemented by the function gcd’. For the assertion, we add a wrapper gcd
which checks every application of gcd’. The function works correctly for many arguments,
but we finally get a report like:
Assertion (result is factor of arguments) failed: 6 -> 9 -> 6
The function gcd applied to the arguments 6 and 9 yields 6, which is wrong, because 6 is
not a factor of 9. The reason is the wrong argument of gcd in the recursive call to gcd: we
wrote n instead of m. After fixing the bug, the assertion is always satisfied.
In contrast to data structures, which are only evaluated once during the computation,
functions can be applied many times. The assertion is checked for each application and any
failure is reported to the programmer.
The definition of gcd demonstrates how programmers should add assertions to their
functions. The defined function is renamed (here to gcd’) and a wrapper with the original
name (gcd) is defined.
Because (-->) is just a standard pattern constructor, its usage is not restricted to top-
level function definitions. We can also use it for asserting properties of functional arguments
and results as well as for functions occurring within data structures.
2.9 Negation and Implication
Finally we add negation to the logic: neg :: Pat a b Bool -> Pat a b Bool
We restrict negation to boolean formulas, because using values selected by both negated
and non-negated patterns in the same predicate does not make sense. We can, for example,
define implication in the common way:
(==>) :: Pat a b Bool -> Pat a b Bool -> Pat a b Bool
(==>) pat1 pat2 = neg pat1 ||| pat2
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2.10 Defining new Patterns
Using our library does not come for free. The user has to define pattern constructors for their
own data types. For each algebraic data type they usually have to define: a context pattern,
pattern constructors for all its constructors, and an instance for the class Observable,
defined in our library.
To make these definitions as simple as possible, we provide a set of combinators.1 As an
example, we introduces a data type Tree for polymorphic trees and show the definitions the
programmer has to write for the pattern logic:
data Tree a = Node (Tree a) a (Tree a) | Empty
instance Observe a => Observe (Tree a) where
observe (Node lt n rt) = o3 Node "Node" lt n rt
observe Empty = o0 Empty "Empty"
pNode :: Pat (Tree a) b c -> Pat a c d -> Pat (Tree a) d e -> Pat (Tree a) b e
pNode = pat3 (\t -> case t of Node tl n tr -> Just (tl,n,tr)
_ -> Nothing)
pEmpty :: Pat (Tree a) b b
pEmpty = pat0 (\t -> case t of Empty -> Just ()
_ -> Nothing)
pTreeC :: Pat (Tree a) b c -> Pat (Tree a) b c
pTreeC = patContext (\t -> case t of Node tl n tr -> [(0,tl),(2,tr)]
Empty -> [])
First, the programmer has to define an instance of the class Observe: for each constructor,
they have to define an observation function. We provide generic observers for constructors of
any reasonable arity. These observers have to be applied to the constructor function itself, a
string representation of the constructor and the arguments obtained from pattern matching.
The programmer also has to define the pattern constructors. Again, we provide generic
versions for pattern constructors (patn) for each arity. The only argument of these generic
patterns is a function which makes pattern matching a total function by means of a Maybe
type and a tuple of the same arity as the constructor. Finally, the programmer has to define
the context pattern for their new type. They should use the generic function patContext,
which takes a function that determines all arguments in which the type is recursive. We
encode these arguments as a list of the argument number and the corresponding actual
argument. Note, that descending within a data type only makes sense for arguments of the
same data type. Whenever descending another type, it is necessary to add a context of this
type. For instance, consider a tree of lists of Ints. An arbitrary Int within this tree can be
selected by the pattern
pTreeC (pNode p_ (pListC (val <:> p_)) p_)
2.11 Positions in Data Structures
For tree-like data structures it can be useful to compare positions of selected values in the
structure. We provide positional information by means of
1 Alternatively, all definitions could easily be derived by a tool like DrIFT or various generic
programming extensions of Haskell. Here we show that even without such tools or language
extensions the required effort is reasonable.
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valPos :: Pat a ((Pos,a) -> b) b
where Pos is an abstract data type which can be compared by functions such as
moreLeft :: Pos -> Pos -> Bool above :: Pos -> Pos -> Bool
p1 ‘moreLeft‘ p2 is true iff in an in-order traversal of the data structure p1 is reached
before p2 is reached. p1 ‘above‘ p2 is true iff position p2 is within the substructure at
position p1.
For example, using positions, the property of being sorted can be defined as follows:
sortedPos = assert "sortedPos"
(forAll (check (pListC (valPos <:> p_) +++ pListC (valPos <:> p_))
(\ (p1,x1) (p2,x2) -> p2 ‘moreLeft‘ p1 || x1<=x2))
We non-deterministically select two elements of the list and compare them taking their
positions into account.
2.12 Deactivating Assertions
Any system supporting assertions in some language enables the programmer to easily deac-
tivate assertions. Hence we provide a module AssertWithoutCheck with a function assert
that is just implemented as the identity function on its third argument and does not check
any assertion. To deactivate assertions the programmer replaces in their program import
Assert by import AssertWithoutCheck.
While it may be advisable to leave simple assertions (“argument greater zero”) in produc-
tion code, our pattern logic encourages the formulation of properties of large data structures.
Testing these properties is inherently time consuming. For example, it is infeasible in prac-
tice to check in a compiler after every update of the symbol table that the whole table is
sorted with respect to a key.
3 Conclusions
We have presented a new approach for assertions in lazy functional programming languages
such as Haskell. Our assertions do not modify the run-time behaviour of the lazy execution
(unless a predicate fails to terminate). Assertions are implemented by means of a pattern
logic, a high level, abstract specification language. Assertions provide a parallel implemen-
tation of conjunction and disjunction, which makes it possible to report failure of assertions
promptly, before faulty values can effect the rest of the computation. Our approach is im-
plemented as a library, without any modification of the compiler or the run-time system,
and only needs common extensions of Haskell 98.
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1    Einleitung 
Thema dieses Berichts ist eine grundlegende formale Sprache, mit der sich die räum-
liche Struktur und die Funktionalität aller natürlichen diskreten Systeme beschreiben 
lassen. Diskrete Systeme sind solche, die sich aus Komponenten zusammensetzen. 
Die Komponenten können dynamisch oder statisch sein. Sind sie dynamisch, d.h. 
produzieren sie materielle Objekte oder werten sie Funktionen aus, dann sind sie 
zeitlich gerichtet. Sind sie statisch, dann lässt sich der Menge der Komponenten eine 
Aufbauordnung zuweisen, die ebenfalls eine zeitliche Richtung induziert.  
Abstrahiert man ein diskretes System, beispielsweise einen Computer, von seiner 
Metrik, dann bleibt ein dreidimensionales Netz der Funktionen übrig, die in den 
Komponenten ausgeführt werden können. Abstrahiert man ein diskretes System, 
wieder beispielsweise einen Computer, von seiner Funktionalität, dann bleibt ein 
dreidimensionales Netz von Bausteinen übrig, die die Abmessungen der Komponen-
ten haben. Abstrahiert man zugleich von Metrik und Funktionalität, dann bleibt ein 
dreidimensionales Netz von Knoten übrig. Dieses Knotennetz ist das Skelett, auf 
dessen Beschreibung die formale Sprache aufbaut. 
Die formale Sprache wird Aktonalgebra genannt, wobei die Bezeichnung "Algeb-
ra" bedeutet, dass auf ihr funktionserhaltende Transformationen möglich sind. In 
ihrem Kern beschreibt sie das Skelett, auf das sich alle diskreten Systeme durch 
metrische und funktionale Abstraktion reduzieren lassen. Auf diesem Skelett können 
durch Hinzufügung von speziellen semantischen Eigenschaften formale Sprachen zu 
jedem funktionalen und/oder metrischen diskreten System generiert werden.   
Die Klasse der diskreten Systeme ist ausserordentlich gross. Um zu verdeutlichen, 
was alles dieser Klasse zuzuordnen ist, nennen wir einige Beispiele: Programmier-
sprachen jeglicher Provenienz; neuartige Sprachen für die Beschreibung des Layout 
und der Funktionalität analoger oder digitaler Schaltungen, neuartige Sprachen zur 
vollständigen Beschreibung der physikalischen Struktur und der Funktionalität von 
Rechnern und Rechnernetzen; Sprachen zur algorithmischen Beschreibung mathema-
tischer Systeme wie der Booleschen Algebra oder der klassischen Arithmetik; forma-
le Sprachen für Verwaltungs-, Planungs- und Produktionssysteme; formale Sprachen 
für Molekülstrukturen, darunter insbesondere eine Sprache zur gemeinsamen Be-
schreibung von Aminosäureketten und der daraus gebildeten Proteine.   
Die Aktonalgebra wurde ursprünglich als Programmiersprache für Rechnernetze 
entwickelt. Seit längerer Zeit ist erkannt, dass Aktonalgebra mit verschiedenen 
Semantiken ausgestattet werden kann und so z.B. die Eigenschaften einer klassischen 
Programmiersprache, einer Programmiersprache für digitale oder analoge Schaltun-
gen oder einer Layout-Sprache annehmen kann. Unklar war bisher, wie die gemein-
same Basis aller dieser Anwendungssprachen formal erfasst werden kann. Mit diesen 
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Grundlagen, in denen der dreidimensionale Raum eine fundamentale Bedeutung hat, 
befasst sich dieser Bericht. 
Obgleich das abstrakte räumliche Knotennetz eine einheitliche Basis aller diskre-
ten Systeme darstellt, ist es - nach Kenntnis des Autors - bisher nicht wissenschaftlich 
untersucht worden. Dies ist besonders erstaunlich, da das abstrakte Knotennetz in der 
Informatik, dem wichtigsten technischen Wissensbereich der heutigen Zeit, eine 
besondere Rolle spielen sollte. Bildet es doch eine Brücke zwischen der Datenverar-
beitung auf der eine Seite und der physikalischen Struktur der Maschinen, auf denen 
die Datenverarbeitung stattfindet, auf der anderen. Bisher fand dieser Zusammenhang 
offenbar keine weitere Beachtung. Z.B. enthält das Knotennetz genau die Strukturin-
formation, die ein optimales Layout von elektronischen Schaltungen ermöglicht. 
Bisher verzichtet man aber auf diese Strukturinformation und versucht stattdessen, 
diese mit ausserordentlich aufwändigen spieltheoretischen Verfahren angenähert zu 
rekonstruieren.   
In der Vergangenheit hat es einige Ansätze gegeben, die Struktur elektronischer 
Schaltungen formal zu beschreiben, wobei zwischen der Funktionsstruktur und der 
Layout-Struktur zu unterscheiden ist. Alle diese Ansätze beschränken sich auf die 
Beschreibung planarer Strukturen. Beschrieben werden also nicht die realen räumli-
chen Strukturen, sondern nur deren Projektion auf eine Ebene, was erhebliche Infor-
mationsverluste mit sich bringt.  
Ein früher Ansatz [2] beschränkt sich auf die formale Beschreibung rechtwinkli-
ger Layouts, die mit Hilfe eines Nord/Süd- und eines Ost/West-Operators aus quadra-
tischen Verdrahtungsbausteinen zusammengefügt werden. Eine Beziehung zum 
Knotennetz der Aktonalgebra besteht damit nur implizit und partiell.  
Ruby [1] ist ein Ansatz, der neben der Funktionsbeschreibung auch die Anord-
nung der Funktionskomponenten in der Fläche einbezieht. Ruby ist eine relationale 
Programmiersprache, die Zustandsautomaten beschreibt und auf die Beschreibung 
synchroner Hardware-Schaltungen beschränkt ist. Die zunächst nur funktionale 
Beschreibung wird im Nachhinein semantisch in ein zweidimensionales Bezugssys-
tem eingebettet, was als Layout-Eigenschaft interpretiert wird. Ruby wird dadurch 
vergleichsweise kompliziert und schwerfällig.  
Ein dritter Ansatz, zu dem es eine Vielzahl von Publikationen gibt, verzichtet 
ganz auf die formale Beschreibung des Layouts und beschränkt sich auf die funktio-
nale Beschreibung dynamischer Netze. Das Thema wird im Buch "Network Algebra" 
von G. Stefanescu systematisch und umfassend behandelt [3]. Network Algebra 
basiert auf einer regulären Sprache, in der schwarze Kästen, die über einen Input und 
einen Output verfügen, verknüpft werden können. Zu den schwarzen Kästen gehören 
insbesondere die parametrisierten Strukturelemente Kreuzung, Verzweigung, Verei-
nigung und Rückkopplung, die zur Übertragung von Strings dienen. Network Algeb-
ra kommt darin der Aktonalgebra nahe, auch wenn sie wegen der fehlenden Raum-
semantik dreidimensionale Strukturen nicht analytisch beschreiben kann und dadurch 





2.  Topologisches Bezugssystem und homöomorphe Abbildung  
Eine formale Sprache dient zur Erstellung von Texten. Texte sind Zeichenfolgen, die 
einen Anfang und ein Ende haben und Zeichen für Zeichen, d.h. zeitlich geordnet, 
gelesen werden. Abstrakt ausgedrückt sind Texte geordnete eindimensionale Struktu-
ren. Seiner zeitlichen Ordnung wegen kann ein Text als Anweisungsfolge sowohl 
zum schrittweisen und damit konstruktiven Aufbau eines Systems als auch zur 
schrittweisen Änderung von lokalen Zuständen, z.B. der Auswertung von Funktio-
nen, verstanden werden.  
Die formale Sprache der Aktonalgebra bildet die dreidimensionale gerichtete 
Struktur eines dynamischen diskreten Systems auf die geordnete eindimensionale 
Struktur eines Textes ab. Der Kern der Aktonalgebra beschreibt das abstrakte Kno-
tennetz, d.h. die topologische Struktur, die sich ergibt, wenn man ein dynamisches 
diskretes System von allen Funktionen und Abmessungen befreit. Die Abstraktion auf 
ein Knotennetz ist in Abbildung 1 am Beispiel eines RS-Flipflops demonstriert.  
Das RS-Flipflop dient in dieser Arbeit als "running example". Es wurde einerseits 
deshalb gewählt, weil es mit seiner zyklischen Struktur bisher mit keiner Sprache 
annalytisch beschreibbar war und andererseits, weil es alle Basisstrukturen enthält, 
auf denen die Aktonalgebra aufbaut.   
Links in der Abbildung 1 ist das Schaltbild gezeigt, das von der Metrik des realen 
Systems abstrahiert, rechts ein Layout, das von der Funktion abstrahiert. Beide 
münden bei weiterer Abstraktion in das in der Mitte gezeigte Knotennetz. Die Knoten 
sind die dimensionslosen Abstraktionen der Systemkomponenten, wobei zu beachten 
ist, dass auch jede physikalische Verbindung zwischen Systemkomponenten selbst 
eine Komponente ist. Die in den bildlichen Knotennetzen gezeigten Richtungspfeile 






Abbildung 1: Knotennetz als Abstraktion von der Schaltung (links) und der Metrik (rechts).  
 
Das Knotennetz, was im allgemeinen Fall räumlich ist, kann sodann homöomorph 
und damit bijektiv auf die eine Dimension eines Textes abgebildet werden. Die 
homöomorphe Abbildung lässt nicht nur die Dehnung und Streckung des Knotennet-
zes zu, sondern auch das Hinzufügen von funktionslosen Knoten und deren Aufspal-
tung in Knotenpaare.   
Da das abstrakte Knotennetz keine Metrik hat, kommt für die Beschreibung seiner 
räumlichen Eigenschaften nur ein topologisches Bezugssystem in Betracht. Ein 
solches lässt sich mittels eines Beobachters definieren, der in natürlicher Weise Raum 
in den Relationen rechts bzw. links, oben bzw. unten und vorne bzw. hinten wahr-
nimmt. Der in der westlichen Welt üblichen Leserichtung entsprechend wird Zeit in 
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diesem Bezugssystem als Bewegung von links nach rechts interpretiert, womit links 
zusätzlich die Bedeutung früher erhält und rechts die Bedeutung später. 
Die homöomorphe Abbildung der dreidimensionalen Raumstruktur des Knoten-
netzes auf die eindimensionale Struktur des Textes geschieht in zwei Schritten: Im 
ersten Schritt erfolgt die Abbildung auf eine Beobachtungsebene zwischen dem 
Beobachter und dem Knotennetz, im zweiten die Abbildung der ebenen Struktur auf 
die lineare Struktur des geordneten Textes.  
Die Abbildung des Knotennetzes auf die Beobachtungsebene beinhaltet die Pro-
jektion der Raumstruktur unter Orientierung aller Knoten von links nach rechts 
(Abbildung 2). Dabei können, wie im betrachteten Beispiel, Kreuzungen entstehen. 
Diese sind Überbleibsel der ursprünglichen Raumstruktur und müssen so umgeformt 
werden, dass die Darstellung des Knotennetzes insgesamt planar ist. Dies lässt sich 
dadurch erreichen, dass die untere der beiden kreuzenden Verbindungen aufgeschnit-
ten und die Schnittenden durch ein Knotenpaar ersetzt werden, das die Verbindung 
symbolisiert. In der Abbildung 2 ist das Knotenpaar mit einer gepunkteten Linie 
verbunden.  
Ein ähnliches Knotenpaar ist erforderlich, wenn Zyklen oder andere planare 
Strukturen aufgeschnitten und orientiert dargestellt werden sollen. Dieses Knotenpaar 
kann aber auch zur willkürlichen symbolischen Teilung einer Struktur in Teilstruktu-
ren verwendet werden. In der Abbildung 2 ist ein solches Knotenpaar durch eine 
gestrichelte Verbindungslinie gekennzeichnet. Sind alle Kreuzungen und Zyklen auf 
diese Weise umgeformt, hat man die angestrebte orientierte ebene Struktur.  
 
 
Abbildung 2: Zweistufige homöomorphe Abbildung: 1. Orientierung des Knotennetzes in der 
Beobachtungsebene von links nach rechts, 2. Geordnete Linearisierung der Knoten 
   
Die Abbildung der ebenen Struktur auf die lineare Struktur des Textes geschieht 
durch Aufreihung aller Knoten auf der Links/Rechts-Achse. Dies erfolgt unter der 
Vereinbarung, dass obere Knoten bzw. Knotenstrukturen nach links und untere 
Knoten bzw. Knotenstrukturen nach rechts auseinander gezogen werden. Es gibt 
jedoch spezielle Basisstrukturen, so genannte traversierte Maschen, bei denen diese 
Linearisierung nicht direkt möglich ist. Sie werden aber linearisierbar, wenn sie wie 
Zyklen aufgeschnitten werden. Das Resultat ist eine Kette, die aus Gruppen unabhän-
giger und abhängiger Knoten besteht. 
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Die formalen Mittel zur Planarisierung bzw. Linearisierung der drei Basisstruktu-
ren Kreuzung, Zyklus und traversierte Masche werden im folgenden Abschnitt näher 
behandelt. 
 
3.  Operatoren der Aktonalgebra 
In dem Bezugssystem definieren wir zunächst zwei orthogonale binäre Operatoren, 
die zur algebraischen Beschreibung von unmittelbaren Nachbarschaften in der Beo-
bachtungsebene dienen. Der erste Operator, Next genannt und durch das Trennzei-
chen "-" dargestellt, beschreibt die Links/Rechts- bzw. Früher/Später-Beziehung. Der 
Ausrichtung des Knotennetzes im Bezugssystem entsprechend beschreibt Next eine 
Beziehung zwischen abhängigen Elementen. Der Ausdruck e1-e2 bedeutet, dass e2 
unmittelbar auf e1 folgt. Der zweite Operator, Juxta genannt und durch den Schräg-
strich "/" dargestellt, beschreibt eine Oben/Unten-Beziehung und damit eine Bezie-
hung zwischen unabhängigen Elementen. Der Ausdruck e1/e2 bedeutet, dass e1 
unmittelbar oberhalb von e2 liegt. 
Als weitere Grundlage zur Formalisierung der Knotennetze definieren wir die 
Netzknoten. Netzknoten bilden die Konstanten (0-Operatoren) der Aktonalgebra: 
• Jeder Knoten besteht aus einem Eingang, einem Ausgang und einem knoten-
internen Netzwerk, das Ein- und Ausgang verbindet.  
• Die Ein- und Ausgänge sind Schnittstellen, d.h. linear geordnete Listen 
(strings) endlicher Länge. Innerhalb des Bezugssystems sind die Schnittstel-
lenelemente von oben nach unten geordnet. Dazu dient der Juxta-Operator.  
• Die Schnittstellen werden aus drei Sorten von Elementen gebildet:  
p (pin) für Kontakte in der Beobachtungsebene, 
v (via) für Kontakte unterhalb der Beobachtungsebene und  
λ als Platzhalter für nicht vorhandene Kontakte.  
• Eine leere Schnittstelle, d.h. eine Schnittstelle ohne Kontakte, enthält min-
destens einen Platzhalter. Formalsprachlich bilden p, v und λ das Alphabet, 
über dem die Schnittstellen generiert sind. 
• Die knoteninternen Netzwerke werden aus drei Sorten gerichteter Struktur-
elemente gebildet 
link (1,1-Verbindung), fork (1,2-Verbindung) und join (2,1-Verbindung) 
• Knoteninterne Netzwerke sind irreflexiv, asymmetrisch und intransitiv. 
• Primitive Knoten sind solche, die genau ein link, fork oder join enthalten. 
• Knoten und ihre funktionalen oder metrischen Konkretisierungen werden 
Aktonen genannt. 
 
Betrachtet man das Knotennetz des RS-Flipflops, dann findet man darin alle Sor-
ten primitiver Knoten, mit denen sich jedes beliebige Knotennetz beschreiben lässt. 
Insgesamt gibt es 8 Sorten primitiver Knoten , die mit Entry, Exit, Up, Down, Link, 
54
Fork, Join und AS (vollständiges Akton-System) bezeichnet werden. Sie bilden die 
Basismenge für die mehrsortige Aktonalgebra.  
Die Basismenge der Aktonen wird mit A0 bezeichnet, die Basismenge der Schnitt-
stellen mit I0 und die Basismenge der knoteninternen Netzwerke mit R0. 
Die 8 Knotensorten unterscheiden sich zum einen durch ihre interne Netzstruktur 
und zum anderen durch ihre Eingangs- und Ausgangsschnittstellen. Die primitiven 
Knoten sind in Tabelle 1 definiert: 
Tabelle 1: Die Basisaktonen der 8 Knotensorten 
Entry Exit Up Down Link Fork Join AS 
λ link p p link λ v link p p link v p link p p fork (p/p) (p/p) join p λ link λ 
 
Die Bezeichner der internen Netzstrukturen werden im Unterschied zu den teil-
weise gleichnamigen Aktonen klein geschrieben.  
Down- und Up-Aktonen treten immer paarweise auf. Sie dienen dem Zweck, 
Kreuzungen als orientierte planare Strukturen darzustellen. Das geschieht dadurch, 
dass jede unterhalb der Beobachtungsebene liegende Verbindung aufgetrennt und 
durch ein Down/Up-Paar ersetzt wird. Mit Down taucht die Verbindung über ein Via 
im Ausgang aus der Beobachtungsebene ab und mit dem Up taucht die Verbindung 
über ein Via im Eingang an anderer Stelle wieder auf. Der Eingang von Down ist 
gleich dem Ausgang von Up. Ein Down/Up-Paar hat damit die äusserlichen Eigen-





















a b c Ex1En1
Kreuzung Zyklus Traversierte Masche
 
Abbildung 3: Linearisierung von Basisstrukturen durch Schnitte 
 
In gleicher Weise lassen sich auch Verbindungen, die in der Beobachtungsebene 
liegen, durch gleichindizierte Exitj/Entryj-Paare symbolisch beschreiben. Die Gleich-
indizierung bedeutet dabei Gleichheit des Eingangs von Exitj und des Ausgangs von 
Entrji. Ein gleichindiziertes Exit/Entry-Paar hat damit wie ein Down/Up-Paar eben-
falls die äusserlichen Eigenschaften eines Link. 
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Gleichindizierte Exit/Entry-Paare dienen zum einen dazu, Zyklen symbolisch auf-
trennen und so in eine orientierte lineare Darstellung überführen zu können Zum 
anderen gibt es spezielle planare Strukturen, sogenannte traversierte Maschen, die 
durch ein Exitj/Entryj-Paar aufgetrennt werden müssen, um aktonalgebraisch be-
schreibbar zu werden. 
Abbildung 3 zeigt die drei gerichteten Basisstrukturen, die sich nur mit Hilfe von 
Down/Up- bzw. gleichindizierten Exit/Entry-Paaren linearisieren lassen. Oben darge-
stellt sind jeweils die Ausgangsstrukturen, in der folgenden Zeile die orientierte 
planare Struktur und unten die orientierte lineare Struktur des algebraischen Aus-
drucks. Die räumliche Kreuzung links wird durch ein Down/Up-Paar planarisiert. Die 
planaren aber nichtorientierten Basisstrukturen Zyklus und traversierte Masche lassen 
sich durch ein Exitj/Entryj-Paar in linearisierbare orientierte Strukturen überführen. 
 
 4.  Definition der Aktonalgebra 
Seien  
{I,/} eine Schnittstellensprache, 
{R,/,-} eine Vernetzungssprache und 
{A,/,-} eine Relationensprache (Aktonsprache), 
I, R, A sind durch Komposition erweiterbare Mengen von Konstanten, die auf den 
bereits im letzten Abschnitt eingeführten Basismengen der Schnittstellen I0, der 
internen Vernetzungen R0 und der Aktonen A0 aufbauen, d.h.  
I ⊇ I0, I0={(p/p),p,v,λ},  
R⊇R0, R0={link fork,join},  
A⊇ A0 , A0={Link,Fork,Join,Entry,Exit,Up,Down,AS} 
Zu den oben definierten Sprachen lassen sich jeweils die algebraischen Universen 
I+, R+ und A+ generieren, d.h. die Mengen aller Strings über I, R und A. 
Alle drei Sprachen enthalten den Juxta-Operator, die beiden letzten zusätzlich den 
Next-Operator. Juxta und Next sind irreflexiv, asymmetrisch und intransitiv. Da sie 
zueinander orthogonal sind, sind I+, R+ und A+ freie Halbgruppen.  
Ein Akton a ist über A, R und I definiert, d.h. durch 
a = (ina ra outa), mit a∈A, ra∈R und ina,outa∈I 
Ein Aktonterm x ist über A+, R+ und I+ definiert, d.h. durch 
x = (inx rx outx), mit x∈A+, rx∈R+ und inx,outx∈I+ 
Aktonen und Aktonterme sind gültige Relationen zwischen einem Input und ei-
nem Output. 
Die Verknüpfung von primitiven Aktonen zu Aktontermen führt zu weiteren Sor-
ten. Die Zahl der Aktontermsorten ist daher grösser als die der primitiven Aktonen. 
Die Gesamtzahl der Aktontermsorten ergibt sich aus der folgenden Betrachtung:  Jede 
Schnittstelle i∈I+ enthält eine endliche Zahl von Elementen aus der Menge {p,v,λ}. 
Enthält sie weder p- noch v-Elemente, dann zumindest einen Platzhalter λ. Neben 
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Platzhaltern kann sie nur p-Elemente, nur v-Elemente, beide gemeinsam oder keine 
von beiden enthalten. Bezüglich p und v gibt es damit 4 Sorten von Schnittstellen.  
Für einen Aktonterm ergeben sich mit einem Input und einem Output 4*4=16 
Sorten. Im Input und Output eines Aktonterms zugleich auftretende v-Elemente 
stammen von Down/Up-Paaren, deren v-Elemente sich gegenseitig kompensieren und 
daher nach aussen nicht in Erscheinung treten. Diese v-Elemente müssen daher aus 
den Schnittstellen entfernt und durch Platzhalter ersetzt werden. Das reduziert die 
Zahl der Sorten eines Aktonterms um 4, d.h. die Zahl der Aktontermsorten auf 12.  
Um alle v-Elemente in den Schnittstellen eines Aktonterms durch Platzhalter zu 
ersetzen, führen wir eine Funktion v-del ein:  
v-del: I+→ I+     del: i→ i  
v-del(i)=∀ v∈i. del(v)     del(v)=λ, del(p)=p, del(λ)=λ 
Wir haben damit alle Mittel verfügbar, um die Aktonalgebra  
〈A+,{A,/,-}〉 
zu definieren: 
A basiert auf der Menge der Knotensorten A0 
A⊇ A0, A0 = {Link,Fork,Join,Entry,Exit,Up,Down,AS} 
Juxta verknüpft zwei Aktonterme, die keine gemeinsame Schnittstelle haben.  
Juxta : A+× A+→ A+  
(x/y) = ((inx/iny) (rx/ry) (outx/outy)) if ¬(∃ v∈in(x/y) ∧∃ v∈out(x/y) ) 
         else (v-del(inx/iny) (rx/ry) v-del(outx/outy))   
Next verknüpft zwei Aktonterme, die eine gemeinsame Schnittstelle haben, die 
mindestens ein p enthält. 
Next : A+× A+→ A+ 
(x-y) iff (outx≡iny ∧∃ p∈outx) 
(x-y) = (inx (rx-ry) outy) if ¬(∃ v∈in(x/y) ∧∃ v∈out(x/y) ) 
       else (v-del(inx) (rx-ry) v-del(outy)) 
Um Klammern einzusparen, wird festgelegt, dass Juxta stärker bindet als Next. 
Schliesslich führen wir noch eine Funktion compose ein, mit der sich die Basis-
menge A der Akronalgebra erweitern lässt. Mit Hilfe von compose kann im Prinzip 
jeder aus zwei Aktonen bestehender Aktonterm zu einem Akton verkapselt und die 
Darstellung von Aktonstrukturen damit beliebig vergröbert werden. Diese Eigen-
schaft ist unentbehrlich für die hierearchische Beschreibung komplexer Systeme. Die 
Funktion compose verschmilzt jeweils zwei Juxta- oder Next-verknüpfte Aktonen zu 
einem Akton. Sie ist definiert durch:   
compose ◦ Juxta: A× A → A, 
compose(a/b)=c mit (ina/inb )=inc, (ra/rb)=rc, (outa/outb)=outc, 
compose ◦ Next: A× A → A, 





5.  Funktionsinvariante Strukturtransformationen 
Diskrete Systeme lassen sich im Allgemeinen strukturell modifizieren, ohne dass 
dabei die Funktionen des Systems verändert werden. In der Aktonalgebra geschieht 
das durch Termersetzungsregeln, die in der Tabelle 2 aufgeführt sind. Die Termerset-
zungsregeln ersetzen die Axiome, mit denen Algebren mathematisch definiert wer-
den. Axiome sind aber lediglich zulässig, wenn es nur um Funktionen geht. In der 
Aktonalgebra dagegen werden die physikalischen Strukturen beschrieben, die für die 
Ausführung bestimmter Funktionen erforderlich sind, d.h. genau die Strukturen, von 
denen in der Mathematik abstrahiert wird.  
Jede Termersetzungsregel besteht aus zwei durch eine horizontale Linie getrennte 
Aktonterme. Die Pfeile geben an, in welcher Richtung die Aktonterme ausgetauscht 
werden dürfen. Ist Austausch nur unter einer Bedingung zulässig, dann ist diese 
neben dem Pfeil ausgewiesen. Würde man von der physikalischen Struktur abstrahie-
ren, dann wären die bedingten Termersetzungsregeln Implikationen und alle beidsei-
tig unbedingten Termersetzungsregeln Äquivalenzen.   
 







































Die unter a., b. und c. aufgeführten Regeln sind unmittelbar verständlich: Die Re-
geln a. besagen, dass ein Term x durch ein Link erweitert werden kann, wenn die 
betreffende Schnittstelle mindestens ein p enthält. Umgekehrt können vorstehende 
oder nachfolgende  immer beseitigt werden. Regeln b. besagen, dass ein Term ver-
doppelt wird, wenn er mit einem nachfolgenden Fork (vorstehenden Join) vertauscht 
wird und umgekehrt. Die Regeln c. definieren Assoziativität für Next und Juxta.  
Die Distributivregel d. findet man in vielen Veröffentlichungen, jedoch immer 
ohne die einseitige Bedingung. In Abwärtsrichtung beschreibt sie die Aufspaltung 
von zwei Juxta-verknüpften Next-Termen in zwei Next-verknüpfte Juxta-Terme. 
Diese Strukturtransformation lässt sich zur Sequentialisierung der parallelen Terme 
x/y nutzen: Dazu erweitert man den Parallelterm x/y zunächst unter Anwendung der 
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beiden Regeln a. zu dem Term (x-Lk)/(Lk-y), aus dem durch Anwendung von Regel d. 
(x/Lk-Lk/y) wird. Die Terme x und y sind darin Next-geordnet, d.h. sequentialisiert. 
Die umgekehrte Strukturtransformation, die im behandelten Beispiel einer Paralleli-
sierung entspricht, ist dagegen nur zulässig, wenn die Schnittstellen zwischen den 
Termen x und u identisch sind und ebenso die zwischen den Termen y und v, was 
nicht der Fall sein muss.  
Die Bindungsregel e. erlaubt die Vereinigung von zwei p-unabhängigen Termen 
zu einem Term. Die Umkehrung hat die gleiche Bedingung wie Aufwärtsbedingung 
in d.. Die Chiralitätsregel f. erlaubt die Änderung des Drehsinns einer Kreuzung. Der 
Drehsinn ist eine physikalische Kreuzungseigenschaft, die nur in Erscheinung tritt, 
wenn Kreuzungen als Projektionen im Raum betrachtet werden.  
Die Cut&Glue genannten Regeln g. sind ein wesentlicher Bestandteil der homöo-
morphen Abbildung, die der Aktonalgebra zugrunde liegt. Sie können in der gleichen 
Weise verwendet werden, um ein gegebenes diskretes System beliebig zu partitionie-
ren.  
 
6.  Beschreibung realer diskreter Systeme 
Aktonalgebra ist nicht nur zur Beschreibung abstrakter Knotennetze geeignet, son-
dern auch zur Beschreibung realer diskreter Systeme. Dies lässt sich lediglich da-
durch erreichen, dass die 8 Konstanten der Aktonalgebra als Sortenbezeichner inter-
pretiert werden und damit den Charakter von Variablen annehmen. Jede der 8 Sorten 
ist dann eine Menge spezieller Elemente, die die Struktureigenschaften der Sorte 














Abbildung 4: Spezifikation einer speziellen Aktonalgebra zur Schaltbildbeschreibung. 
                  Darunter die struktural und funktional vollständige Beschreibung des  
RS-Flipflop-Schaltbildes 
 
Will man es als Schaltung, d.h. funktional spezifizieren, dann ist Link der Sorten-
bezeichner für alle elektronischen 1,1-Elemente, die in der Schaltung entweder 
Leitungen oder Inverter sein können. Formal ist das durch Link∈{Wire,Not} darstell-
bar. In der gleichen Weise lassen sich alle anderen Sorten spezifizieren. Für das RS-
Flipflop genügt z.B. die Join-Spezifikation Join∈{And}. Entry und Exit sind im 
Beispiel freie Leitungsenden, können aber ebenso auch Steckkontakte oder vielleicht 
sogar Funkverbindungen sein. Abbildung 4 zeigt die Spezifikation aller 8 Aktonsor-
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ten für eine primitive Schaltbildsprache, und darunter das Schaltbild des RS-Flipflop 
zusammen mit der akton-algebraischen Beschreibung seiner Funktion und Topologie. 
Im Prinzip reicht diese primitive Schaltbildsprache bereits aus, einen Rechner voll-
ständig zu spezifizieren. 
In der gleichen Weise lässt sich auch das Layout des RS-Flipflops beschreiben. 
Der Einfachheit halber nehmen wir an, dass das Layout in ein quadratisches Raster 
eingebettet ist. Dann lässt sich definieren Link∈{Ws,Wl,Wr} und Fork∈{Fksl,Fksr,Fklr}, 
wobei die Indizes s, l und r straight, left-turn und right-turn bedeuten sollen. Jedes 
dieser Elemente belege genau ein quadratisches Rasterelement. Um ein gewünschtes 
Layout zu erreichen, müssen im Allgemeinen sehr viele W-Elemente Next-verknüpft 
werden. Zur Schreibvereinfachung wird deshalb eine Abzählkonvention eingeführt. 
And und Not werden beim Layout zu Flächenelementen, die ein rechteckiges Vielfa-
ches des Rasters belegen. Für Up und Down wird in Anlehnung an die Realität eine 
2×2-Rasterfläche angenommen. Damit gibt es für Up und Down zwei verschiedene 
Schnittstellen (p/λ) und (λ/p), je nachdem, ob die p-Verbindung oben oder unten 
liegt. Im Layout von Abbildung 5 haben Up und Down beide die Ausgangs- bzw. 
Eingangsschnittstelle (p/λ). Wo erforderlich, können die Schnittstellen der Aktonen 
auch explizit in die Beschreibung aufgenommen werden. Hier verzichten wir darauf.  
Abbildung 5 zeigt die Spezifikation der Layoutsprache und darunter die Beschrei-















Abbildung 5: Spezifikation einer speziellen Aktonalgebra zur Layout-Beschreibung. 
             Darunter ein Layout zum RS-Flipflop-Beispiel 
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1 Introduction
The importance of formal software verification is growing steadily. Software com-
panies that develop safety- or security-critical applications start to introduce for-
mal verification into their software production processes [ACL03,BRL03]. Usu-
ally, special-purpose theorem provers are used for this task. The vast majority
of these provers has not been formally verified for various reasons. This is a huge
drawback because these tools are not formally trustworthy. The work presented
in this paper shows how this drawback can be circumvented. The approach pre-
sented here increases the credibility of the verification of programs performed by
unverified proof tools, without having the need to formally verify these tools. The
basic idea is to transform a proof that has been performed in an unverified prover
to a description of the proof that can be checked by a trusted proof checker. To
further increase the credibility of this approach, different trusted checkers can
be used. The approach is applied to the Jive tool as unverified prover and to
Isabelle/HOL as trusted proof checker to demonstrate its usability.
2 Formal Result Checking
It is highly desirable that a verification process yields a trustworthy result. In
order to achieve this, a first näıve approach might be to verify the verification
tool itself. This immediately requires to verify other tools and libraries involved
in the verification, to verify the operating system, and to verify the hardware.
This poses the first problem because the verification tool alone usually is already
a large application, perhaps with a graphical interface. To verify such a system is
very expensive and may take a long time. To verify a whole standard operating
system like Windows or Linux currently seems infeasible. An annoying side-effect
of the verification process is that further development of any component of the
system is blocked because if the code is being changed, the verification usually
has to be repeated at least partially. – But even if we assume that we are able to
handle this task, the second problem arises: What would be a good and usable
specification? A desired specificaton might be “All proofs are correct.”. But how
is this expressed in terms of pre- and postconditions of single methods? How
can we make sure that the specification of a certain method adds to this goal
if the method, say, displays a dialog that allows the user to enter a formula?
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– But even if we assume that we are able to handle this task as well, a third
problem appears: How should we prove this specification? We can (a) prove the
specification of the proof tool in the proof tool itself, but this proof does not give
us the desired result because errors in the tool may produce faulty proof trees
that are incorrectly accepted as valid; (b) prove it in another proof tool, but
then we would have to formally verify the other tool, which brings us back to
the beginning; (c) prove it in a formal theorem prover, but then we would have
to prove that the formalization of our proof tool in the formal theorem prover
is related to our implementation of our tool; or (d) prove it manually, which
imposes the same problem as (c) and is less credible than (c) for many people.
Thus, none of these approaches is feasible in practice. – But even if we assume
that we are able to handle this task, too, we may want to find a cheaper way of
assuring the trustworthiness of the proof result.
The work presented in this paper shows how we can circumvent the problems
above and at the same time drastically reduce the cost. The credibility of the
proof results performed by unverified proof tools is increased without requiring
to formally verify these tools. The basic idea is to use an unverified proof tool to
perform a proof task. We then add an independent proof checker. It is a general
observation that in many cases, the effort to solve a problem is much higher than
it is to check whether a certain solution for a problem is correct. For example,
it is much harder to determine the solution of a linear equation system than to
check whether a given solution is correct. In theorem proving, this discrepancy
is even more drastic because not every step of the proof process is decidable,
thus there cannot exist a fully automatic proof generator that proves all given
problems. To check an existing proof, on the other hand, is fairly trivial compared
to that because one only has to ensure that all proof rule applications have been
performed correctly. The mechanization of such a checker is straightforward.
In order to be used in our approach, the proof checker needs to have a for-
malization of the underlying logic of the unverified prover. Each proof goal of
the unverified prover is transformed into a proof goal for the checker. This trans-
formation should be as marginal as possible. This way, it is possible for a human
verification engineer to ascertain that the semantics of the proof goal of the orig-
inal prover is carried over to the proof checker without alterations. Each of the
proofs that have been performed in the unverified prover is then translated by
a proof transformer tool to some proof description for the checker, e.g. a proof
script. Finally, this proof description is checked with the trusted checker. This
way, the checker’s only task is to check whether the proof produced by the trans-
former tool is valid for the transformed proof goal. It is neither required that
the source proof that was performed in the unverified prover is correct nor that
the transformer tool works correctly. As a result, we know that the transformed
proof goal holds if the checker succeeds. The only transformation step that must
be correct is the transformation of the proof goal. That is why we require the
transformed proof goal to be as similar to the original goal as possible. This
allows to compare both proof goals with simple means, e.g. by inspecting them
visually or by applying simple tools such as textual comparison tools. If we can
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ensure that the semantics of the transformed proof goal is identical to the se-
mantics of the original proof goal, we know that the original proof goal holds as
well, even though we do not know whether the original proof is correct. Fig. 1
shows how the unverified prover, proof transformer and trusted checker interact














Fig. 1. Interaction of the various tools and proof representations
This approach seems to impose a hen and egg problem at first sight be-
cause now we need a trusted checker instead of a trusted verification tool. The
advantage is that the proof checker can be much smaller than the verification
tool because there is no need for a graphical user interface, for automatic proof
generation support, for proof manipulation etc. Therefore, it might be feasible
to perform a verification of this proof checker with reasonable cost to achieve a
high level of trust. Another approach is to embed such a checker into a formally
rigorous theorem prover which is considered trustworthy in a certain community.
To further increase the credibility of this approach, different trusted checkers,
implemented by different people in different programming languages or theorem
provers, running on different operating systems and different hardware, can be
used.
A highly positive effect of this approach is that it does not impose a problem
on the process if the unverified theorem prover is being modified at some point in
time. In contrast to this, if we had performed a verification of the tool, we would
be required to repeat at least parts of those proofs. Therefore, our approach can
even be used for verification tools that are still under development. Changes to
the prover, e.g. optimizations, can immediately be validated. Thus, our approach
is also a valuable aid in testing the prover during development if the process of
generating a checker script is already established during the development process.
In certain settings, the unverified prover might even act as a user-friendly
interface to the proof checker, e.g. if the unverified prover has a sophisticated
graphical user interface and the proof checker is embedded into a formally rig-
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orous theorem prover with just a text-mode user interface. Using both in com-
bination, the user can produce proofs in the checker although only interacting
with the more convenient unverified prover.
In the following, we use an unverified Hoare-logic program verification tool
and a checker that has been embedded into a formal theorem prover to demon-
strate the application of our approach. Nonetheless, the approach can be adapted
to any kind of proof tool and trusted checker.
Related Work. Runtime result checking has first been introduced by Blum
[WB97]. It was introduced as a means of assuring software reliability by adding
runtime error-identification and possibly error-correction. Their focus is on check-
ing the critical parts of a program and asserting their correctness. This was ex-
tended by Goerigk, Gaul and Zimmermann [GGZ98]. They combined verification
and runtime checking techniques to prove the correctness of a program. They
argue that program parts that are checked at runtime need not be verified if the
checker is correct. Thus, their approach partly substitutes program verification
by runtime checking. The approach presented here lifts the runtime checking
approach to the next level: not the result of a program is checked but the result
of the verification of a program. Verification is enhanced by checking to improve
the credibility of verification results that are produced by an unverified tool.
3 The Jive Tool
Jive [MPH00] is a verification system that is being developed at the University
of Kaiserslautern and at the ETH Zürich. It is an interactive special-purpose
theorem prover for the verification of object-oriented programs on the basis of a
partial-correctness Hoare-style programming logic. Jive operates on Java-KE
[PHGR05], a desugared subset of sequential Java which contains all important
features of object-oriented languages (subtyping, exceptions, static and dynamic
method invocation, etc.). It is written in Java and currently has a size of about
40,000 lines of code.
Jive is able to operate on completely unannotated programs, allowing the
user to dynamically add specifications. It is also possible to preliminarily anno-
tate programs with invariants, pre- and postconditions using the specification
language JML [LBR99]. In practice, a mixture of both techniques is employed,
in which the user extends and refines the pre-annotated specifications during the
verification process. The program to be verified, together with the specifications,
is translated to Hoare sequents. Program and pre-annotated specifications are
translated during startup, while the dynamically added specifications are trans-
lated whenever they are entered by the user. Hoare sequents have the shape
A
∣∣B { P } pp { Q } and express that for all states S that fulfill P, if the ex-
ecution of the program part pp terminates, the state that is reached when pp
has been evaluated in S must fulfill Q. The so-called assumptions A are used to
prove recursive methods.
Jive’s logic contains so-called Hoare rules and axioms. The rules consist of
one or more Hoare sequents that represent the assumptions of the rule, and
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a Hoare sequent which is the conclusion of the rule. Axioms consist of only
one Hoare sequent; they do not have assumptions. Therefore, axioms represent
the known facts of the Hoare logic. To prove a program specification, the user
directly works on the program source code. Proofs can be performed in backward
direction and in forward direction. In backward direction, an initial open proof
goal is reduced to new, smaller open subgoals by applying a rule. This process
is repeated for the smaller subgoals until eventually each open subgoal can be
closed by the application of an axiom. If all open subgoals are proven by axioms,
the initial goal is proven as well. In forward direction, the axioms can be used
to establish known facts about the statements of a given program. The rules are
then used to produce new facts from these already known facts. This way, facts
can be constructed for parts of the program.
A large number of the rules and axioms of the Hoare logic is related to
the structure of the program part that is currently being examined. Besides
these, the logic also contains rules that manipulate the pre- or postcondition of
the examined subgoal without affecting the current program part selection. A
prominent member of this kind of rules is the rule of consequence1:
PP ⇒ P A
∣∣B { P } pp { Q } Q ⇒ QQ
A
∣∣B { PP } pp { QQ }
It plays a special role in the Hoare logic because it additionally requires impli-
cations between stronger and weaker conditions to be proven. If a Jive proof
contains an application of the rule of consequence, the implication is attached
to the proof tree node that represents this rule application; these attachments
are called lemmas. Jive sends these lemmas to an associated general purpose
theorem prover. The user is then required to prove them. Currently, Jive sup-
ports Isabelle/HOL as associated prover. It is required that all lemmas that
are attached to any node of a proof tree are proven before the initial goal of the
proof tree is accepted as being proven.
One of Jive’s main strengths is its dedicated user interface. At all times,
the user has full visual control over the whole proof process. Applicable proof
operations can be selected in menus. Powerful strategies allow for partial proof
automation. Jive features two representation modes for the proofs that are be-
ing performed: Tree view and text view. In the tree view, each node of the
tree contains a Hoare sequent that is to be proven. The goal of a proof repre-
sents the root of a proof tree, and the subgoals that are constructed during the
proof are represented as the child nodes of the proof tree. The leaves are either
open subgoals which still need to be proven, or subgoals that have been closed
(i.e. proven) by the application of an axiom. If a rule or axiom has been applied
to a node, the following information is stored in the node: the name of the rule
or axiom, any parameters that have been entered by the user, and any lemmas
1 In Jive, the rule of consequence is part of a larger rule which serves several purposes
at once. Since we want to focus on the rule of consequence, we left out the parts
that are irrelevant in this context.
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that are required to be proven (currently these are the implications that stem
from strengthening or weakening, but other lemmas might be attached by future
rules). In the text view, the program has a textual representation, just as in an
editor. The pre- and postconditions of the initial goal as well as of the open sub-
goals are inserted into this text. This way, the proof engineer can concentrate on
those program parts that still need to be proven, while the full program context
remains in view.
Internally, Jive is equipped with an encapsulated proof container [Sch04],
and only the Hoare rules are allowed to modify the proof state stored in this
container. But still there are many opportunities to invalidate the resulting proof,
e.g. in case there are bugs in the implementation of the Hoare rules in Jive. The
approach presented in this paper relieves us from the need to formally verify the
application in order to achieve trustworthy results.
4 Isabelle/HOL
Isabelle [Pau94] is an interactive generic theorem prover that can be instan-
tiated with numerous logics. Proof rules are represented as propositions of a
so-called meta-logic or logical framework. The object-logics are formalized in
this meta-logic. Isabelle/HOL is the instantiation of Isabelle with Church’s
Higher-Order Logic, a classical logic with equality that is based on typed λ cal-
culus. Isabelle has an LCF-style architecture, which means that the system has
a very small kernel, and only this kernel produces valid theorems. The system
is being developed since 1986, and since it is in the open source, we believe that
it is quite reliable because a number of persons have audited the code so far.
To use Isabelle/HOL as trusted checker, we enhanced it with a formal-
ization of Jive’s logical foundations. Jive is based on an object-oriented data
and store model [PH97]. The Isabelle/HOL formalization of this model is pre-
sented in [SR05]. In the store model, all types of the program are mapped to one
sort in Isabelle/HOL, called Value [PH97, p. 41]. The abstract syntax of the
programming language Java-KE is formalized as a number of datatypes. This
formalization is extended by a term-position algebra over these datatypes that
allows to distinguish different program positions, even if the program terms of
these positions are identical [PHR04]. The operational semantics and Hoare logic
of Java-KE are formalized according to Nipkow [Nip02] as inductive sets. For
the operational semantics, this set contains all valid combinations of program
parts, pre- and poststates 〈pp, s0〉 −→ s1. For the Hoare logic, the set contains
all valid combinations of assumptions, program parts, pre- and postconditions
A
∣∣B { P } pp { Q }.
5 Formal Checking of Jive’s Proofs
In this section we describe how Jive proofs are translated to Isabelle/HOL
proof scripts.
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In Jive, proofs are represented as trees where each proof tree node con-
tains the Hoare sequent which is being proven by the subtree originating from
that node, the name of the rule or axiom that was applied to that node, any
parameters that have been passed by the user such that the rule could be ap-
plied, and any lemmas that are required to be proven. In the translation to
an Isabelle/HOL proof script, it is sufficient to give the initial proof goal as
theorem to be proven, and then to apply the Hoare rules to this proof goal in
backward direction. During these backward proofs, it is not necessary to specify
any intermediate proof goal. Therefore, it suffices to translate the sequent that
is contained in Jive’s proof tree root to Isabelle/HOL. The other sequents
are not needed in the Isabelle/HOL proof script.
In Jive, Hoare logic rules and axioms can be applied in forward and back-
ward direction. The parameters the user enters if a rule is applied may depend
on whether the forward or the backward direction has been chosen. In an Is-
abelle/HOL proof script, the Hoare rules are always applied in backward di-
rection. Therefore, the parameters stored in the Jive proof tree nodes which
describe a forward application of a Hoare rule may need to be modified when
the rule application is translated to Isabelle/HOL.
In Jive, in the Hoare sequents the state is implicitly present. The semantics
of a Hoare sequent A
∣∣B { P } pp { Q } is given by
UC(∀S, SQ : P[S] ∧ rsem(N,S, pp, SQ) =⇒ Q[SQ])
where N is a logical variable2 not occurring free in P or Q, UC denotes the
universal closure over all logical variables except N , F [S] denotes a formula or
term in which each occurrence of a program variable v is substituted by the
application of the state S to v, and rsem is a big-step operational semantics re-
lation where the first parameter N captures the maximal depth of nested method
calls that is allowed during execution of the statement (for further details see
[PHGR05]). To represent the pre- and postconditions of the Hoare sequents in
Isabelle/HOL, we had to make the treatment of the state and the logical vari-
ables explicit. We represent the pre- and postconditions of the Hoare sequents
as functional abstractions over the state. Program variables occurring in the
conditions are replaced by the application of the state to them. To handle the
logical variables, we use an extended state space. The concept of an extended
state space was introduced by Apt and Meertens [AM80] and was adapted to
Hoare logic by Kleymann [Kle99]. We add a functional abstraction over this ex-
tended state space to our condition representation. Again, occurrences of logical
variables in the conditions are replaced by applications of the extended state
space to them. To give an example, the formula excV′ = null && b1 = true
is represented in Jive as
excV’ = nullV & aB b1 = True
while it is transformed to Isabelle/HOL as
2 Logical variables are also referred to as auxiliary variables, e.g. by Kleymann [Kle99].
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\<lambda> S. \<lambda> V. apply_v S excV’ = nullV
& aB (apply_l V b1) = True
In these translations, \<lambda> S and \<lambda> V denote the functional
abstractions over the state and the extended state space, respectively. The func-
tion apply v applies the state to a program variable, and apply l applies the
extended state space to a logical variable. Both functions return an element of
the store type Value. If this element represents a Java boolean value, it can be
mapped to Isabelle/HOL’s type bool by the abstraction function aB. excV’
denotes a special program variable that captures the current exception object;
otherwise it is null. Apart from the above-mentioned transformations, the for-
mulae are identical, thus the transformation satisfies the requirement of only
marginally changing the proof goal, as required above.
In Jive, the program is internally represented as abstract syntax tree. In
the graphical user interface, it is unparsed with Java concrete syntax. In Is-
abelle/HOL, it is again represented as abstract syntax tree. Jive is designed
to eventually handle a richer language, therefore the internal Jive AST is more
complex than the Isabelle/HOL AST. This does not change the program since
it must currently adhere to the smaller language Java-KE in order to be proven
in Jive. A technical detail is that statement sequences are represented differently
in the two abstract syntaxes (as a flat list vs. a combed list), but the transforma-
tion is straightforward. Therefore, compared to Jive’s internal representation,
the requirement of only marginally changing the program in the transformation
is fulfilled, too.
If a Jive proof tree contains nodes that have lemmas attached to them, Jive
requires the user to prove these lemmas in Isabelle/HOL; otherwise, the proof
tree is not accepted as proven. These lemma proofs are currently not recorded
in Jive. Since it is not possible in general to automatically produce proofs for
these lemmas, the lemmas are currently assumed as being valid in the checking
process. In the future, the lemma proofs will be recorded for each lemma and
stored with it in its proof tree node. Then, the checker can reuse the stored
proof. This does not check the correctness of the lemma proof, but this proof
has already been performed in Isabelle/HOL, and the goal of the checking
procedure described here is to check the results of Jive, not of Isabelle/HOL.
Nevertheless, it adds to the trustworthiness of the proof performed in Jive if we
repeat the lemma proofs in Isabelle/HOL and if we use these actually proven
lemmas in the checking of the Jive proof tree because then we can be sure that
Jive handled the lemmas and their proofs correctly and did not introduce errors,
e.g. by erroneously recording that a lemma has successfully been proven while
in fact it has not.
The proof tree transformer [Sch05] generates a number of Isabelle/HOL
theories. The first theory is called Preamble 〈file〉.thy. It contains the declara-
tions of all program variables and logical variables that appear in the program.
Additionally, all subterms of the program (including the whole program itself)
and all program positions of the term-position algebra that has been formalized
in Isabelle/HOL [PHR04] are explicitly assigned a name. This way, program
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parts and proofs related to them can be built up incrementally, using the pro-
gram part definitions and proofs of the subterms or parent positions. The theory
also contains helper lemmas for the terms and positions, e.g. proofs of defined-
ness. For each proof tree in the container, two theories are generated. The first
theory contains the lemmas for the implications. The second theory contains the
proof goal and its proof. This proof consists of the Hoare rule applications as
stored in the Jive proof tree. Most of the Hoare rules produce a new sugboal
and additional assumptions. The latter are solved by applications of the helper
lemmas generated in the preamble theory.
The approach is linear in the number of nodes in the program tree plus the
number of nodes in the proof trees. For a given program, each proof tree can have
arbitrary size because there are Hoare rules whose assumptions contain the same
program part as the conclusion. These rules can be applied an arbitrary number
of times (e.g. strengthening, weakening, assumption-introduction). In practice,
the number of nodes in a program tree will be dominated by the number of Hoare
rule applications that reduce the size of the program part. These rules can only
be applied once for each statement in the tree. For each rule application, the
number of helper lemma applications is limited by a constant factor. The length
of the helper lemma proofs is constant because there exists a helper lemma for
each program term or position, and the lemmas of the smaller structures are
used in the proofs of the lemmas of the larger structures. Thus, in practice the
number of nodes in one proof tree is of the order of the number of nodes in the
program tree. Thus we can state that in practice the approach is linear in the
number of nodes in the program tree times the number of proof trees.
6 Results
What do we gain from this technique? On the one hand, we are able to verify
specified properties of a program by using a special-purpose theorem prover like
e.g. Jive which has been designed to help the user in the verification process by
making the proof task easier and more convenient. On the other hand, we get
a fully formal proof script for a trusted proof checker like e.g. Isabelle/HOL.
This proof script is checked against a formalization of the Hoare logic which
has been formally proven sound in Isabelle/HOL against the formalization of
the underlying operational semantics. This way, we combine convenient proof
creation with formally rigorous proof checking.
And what about the details? If we generate an Isabelle/HOL theory that
contains a Hoare logic proof, and if this proof is accepted by Isabelle/HOL,
then we know that the program contained in this theory matches its specification
contained in this theory – provided that the formalization of the Hoare Logic
rules was correct (which can be verified by a correctness proof), and provided
that Isabelle/HOL is implemented correctly.
If we are very precise, we note that even if we assume that our checker is
correct, we do not know that our unverified prover is correct because we only
check the prover’s results, not the tool itself. Furthermore, we do not know that
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the proof that was created in the unverified prover is valid, because the prover
might be implemented incorrectly, and the check theory might be generated
incorrectly, in such a way that the faulty generator produces a correct proof
for the checker from the incorrect proof performed in the unverified prover. But
we do know that there exists a valid proof of the proof goal contained in the
generated theory, which is finally what we want to know.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a method to increase the confidence in results pro-
vided by unverified theorem provers. The method is derived from runtime result
checking. It implies creating a proof with an unverified prover and checking this
proof in a trusted proof checker. This approach renders the requirement of ver-
ifying the untrusted theorem prover unnecessary. We applied this approach to
the Jive tool as unverified theorem prover and used Isabelle/HOL as trusted
proof checker.
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Temporale Assertions mit AspectJ
Volker Stolz und Eric Bodden
Lehrstuhl für Informatik II, RWTH Aachen, 52056 Aachen
Zusammenfassung In diesem Artikel stellen wir ein Runtime Verifi-
cation Framework für Java-Programme vor. Eigenschaften können in Li-
near Time Logic (LTL) über AspectJ-Pointcuts spezifiziert werden. Die-
se Eigenschaften werden zur Laufzeit durch einen automatenbasierten
Ansatz überprüft, in welchem Zustandsübergänge durch Aspekte aus-
gelöst werden. Unser Ansatz benötigt nicht notwendigerweise den Java-
Quelltext der zu instrumentierenden Anwendung, da AspectJ auf dem
Bytecode arbeitet und somit auch Anwendungen Dritter instrumentiert
werden können.
1 Einführung
Viele Softwareprodukte enthalten sog. Assertions (Zusicherungen), welche an be-
stimmten Punkten in der Programmausführung Bedingungen testen und im Feh-
lerfall entweder die Ausführung abbrechen oder eine Fehlerbehandlung durch-
führen. Diese Assertions beschränken sich normalerweise auf das Testen von
Boolschen Ausdrücken. Oft wäre es jedoch praktisch, nicht nur über einen einzel-
nen Zustand argumentieren zu können, sondern über eine Folge von Zuständen.
Dies erlaubt dem Entwickler, Assertions über den Kontrollfluß und Ausführungs-
pfade zu formulieren.
In unserer vorherigen Arbeit [6] haben wir einen symbolischen Checker für
parametrisierte LTL-Formeln über endlichen Pfaden entwickelt, mit dem z.B.
ein in nebenläufigen Programmen häufiges Problem, das sog. lock-order reversal,
untersucht werden kann. Zur Laufzeit wird der Entwickler über (möglicherwei-
se) verletzte Assertions benachrichtig. Am Lehrstuhl wurde ein funktionsfähiger
Prototyp mit ähnlicher Funktionalität für Java-Anwendungen entwickelt. Die
Hauptneuheit ist, das wir eine alternative, effizientere Implementierung basie-
rend auf alternierenden Automaten benutzen [5].
Der Nachteil der vorherigen Version ist, dass die den Checker steuernden
Annotationen in den Quelltext der zu instrumentierenden Anwendung eingefügt
werden müssen. Für die Standardbibliotheken stellt das Werkzeug annotierte
Versionen bereit. Anwendungen müssen also neu übersetzt werden, um unter-
sucht werden zu können.
In objektorientierten Programmiersprachen haben Quelltext-basierte Instru-
mentierungsansätze außerdem das Problem, daß eine für eine Schnittstelle spezi-
fizierte Eigenschaft auch für Unterklassen gelten soll. Unser Ansatz wird diesem
Umstand gerecht, indem Spezifikationen für eine bestimmte Klasse automatisch
auch für Unterklassen überprüft werden. Entsprechendes gilt für Interfaces.
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Der Erfolg anderer Test-Werkzeuge wie etwa Valgrind [4] zeigt, das es deut-
lichen Bedarf an besserer Unterstützung beim Debugging gibt, im Gegensatz
zu
”
Offline“-Analysen wie Model Checking. Zwar wurde vor kurzem der Java
Pathfinder [7] freigeben, der von den Autoren der NASA erfolgreich eingesetzt
wurde, jedoch muß sich erst noch zeigen, inwiefern er sonstigen Einsatz findet.
2 Instrumentierung
Aspekt-orientierte Programmierung trennt Klassen-übergreifende Belange so auf,
das sie nicht an über den Quelltext verteilten Stellen behandelt werden, sondern
in einem separaten Modul gewartet werden können und dann mit dem Programm
an den entsprechenden Stellen
”
verwoben“ werden. Die zugrundeliegende Pro-
grammiersprache wird dabei durch eine Aspekt-orientiere Programmiersprache
erweitert, so daß durch deklarative Konstrukte beschrieben wird, welche Pro-
grammfragmente zur Laufzeit wann ausgeführt werden sollen.
Heutzutage ist die Erweiterung von Java zu AspectJ [2] die am weitesten
verbreitete Aspekt-orientierte Programmiersprache. Ursprünglich in den späten
90er Jahren in Xerox PARC entwickelt, tragen auch heute noch Firmen und
Wissenschaftler zur Weiterentwicklung bei. AspectJ ist auch Bestandteil großer
Produkionssysteme wie beispielsweise von IBM Websphere.
Der dynamische Kontrollfluß einer Anwendung zur Laufzeit wird durch eine
Menge von sog. Joinpoints gebildet. Ein Aspekt wird aus Pointcuts modelliert,
welche man als Prädikate mit Variablen über Joinpoints sehen kann. Folgende
Konstrukte und ihre Boolschen Verknüpfungen stehen zur Verfügung (weitere
Pointcuts adressieren beispielsweise Exceptions, sind für unser Werkzeug aber
nicht von Interesse):
Pointcut. . . adressiert. . .
execution(MethodSignature) Ausführung einer Methode
call(MethodSignature) Aufruf einer Methode
set/get(FieldSignature) Attributzugriff
cflow(Pointcut) Kontrollfluß innerhalb anderen Pointcuts
if(BooleanExpression) bei erfüllter Bedingung; der Ausdruck hat
Zugriff auf statische Java-Objekte und
durch den Pointcut gebundene Variablen
Mit Pointcuts ist es möglich, Punkte im dynamischen Kontrollfluß herauszu-
greifen. Wir setzen sie als Propositionen unserer Logik ein: Ein Pointcut gilt an
einem gegebenen Punkt genau dann wenn er den aktuellen Joinpoint matcht.
Platzhalter (wildcards) in Pointcuts können dazu benutzt werden, um von
bestimmten Teilen der zu matchenden Signatur zu abstrahieren. Damit ist es
möglich, Mengen von Joinpoints aufzusammeln, während die Anwendung läuft.
Um nun das Verhalten einer Anwendung zu verändern, wird ein Advice mit solch
einem Pointcut verknüpft. Immer wenn der Pointcut einen Joinpoint im dyna-
mischen Kontrollfluß matcht, wird der Advice zur angegebenen Zeit ausgeführt:
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pointcut auth(User u):
call(* Authentication.login(User)) && args(u);
after returning(): auth(User user) {
SecurityLog.log("User " + user.getId() + " logged in");
}
Abbildung 1. AspectJ Pointcut und Advice zur Protokollierung
Dies kann vor, nach oder statt dem Joinpoint sein. Abb. 1 zeigt ein Beispiel,
welches Authentifizierungen protokolliert.
Die in dem Beispiel zusätzlich verwendeten Pointcuts this, target und args
ermöglichen dem Advice Zugriff auf den aktuellen Zustand. Dies kann auch in
unserem Ansatz verwendet werden. Desweiteren sei noch angemerkt, daß das
Weben der Aspekte und des Advice normalerweise zur Compilezeit erfolgt.
3 LTL und der Zustandsraum eines Java-Programmes
Ein Lauf eines Java-Programmes ergibt einen Pfad, in dem jeder Schritt einem
Zustand der virtuellen Maschine entspricht. Diese Zustand beeinhaltet z.B. den
Befehlszähler, den aktuellen Stack und Heap (für eine detaillierte Beschreibung
s.h. [3]). Jede Bytecode-Instruktion (Attributzugriff, Methodenaufruf etc.) be-
wirkt einen Zustandsübergang.
Dieses Modell ist zu fein-granular, beispielsweise ist es nicht nötig, über den
tatsächlichen Wert des Befehlszählers Aussagen zu machen. Es reicht aus, wenn
wir uns auf die durch AspectJ-Pointcuts selektierbaren Zustände beschränken.
Damit können durch Boolsche Kombination von Pointcuts auch nicht zusam-
menhängende Zustandsmengen beschrieben werden. Im Allgemeinen gibt es kei-
nen direkten Zusammenhang zwischen Joinpoints und sowohl Bytecode-Instruk-
tionen als auch Quelltext-Positionen, was jedoch für unsere Argumentation keine
Rolle spielt.
Betrachten wir folgendes Beispiel einer temporalen Eigenschaft: Jeder Auf-
ruf einer Methode C.f() soll irgendwann von einem Aufruf von C.g() gefolgt
werden. Als LTL-Formel ausgedrückt:
G (call(C.f()) −→ F call(C.g()) )
Das äußere Globally sorgt dafür, daß die Formel auch bei jedem Aufruf von
C.f() überprüft wird, da sonst nur der Pfad zutreffen würde, in dem der Me-
thodenaufruf im ersten Schritt erfolgt.
4 Implementierung
Wir benutzen den abc-Compiler [1] zum Parsen der Formeln. Der abstrakte
Syntaxbaum wird dann auf Syntax- und Typfehler geprüft. Die Konvertierung
der Formel in einen Aspekt geht wie folgt von statten:
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1. Eine Variable enthält eine Referenz auf den aktuellen Zustand des sich aus
der LTL-Formel ergebenden Automaten [5]. Sie wird mit dem Anfangszu-
stand initialisiert.
2. Eine Tabelle wird aufgestellt, welche n + 1 Advice für n in der Formel
vorkommende verschiedene Propositionen (Pointcuts) enthält. Insbesonde-
re sind dies:
– Ein Advice für jede Pointcut-Proposition, welcher registriert, dass der
Pointcut matcht, also die Proposition im aktuellen Zustand gilt; und
– ein Advice, welcher alle obigen Propositionen matcht und die Zustands-
transition in den neuen Zustand mit den akkumulierten Propositionen
auslöst.
Dabei ist zu beachten, daß Advice in der Reihenfolge des Vorkommens im Aspekt
ausgeführt wird, d.h. der letzte Advice, der die Transition auslöst, wird auch
tatsächlich nach allen anderen ausgeführt.
Der generierte Aspekt wird dann mit der Anwendung verwoben. Abb. 2 gibt
einen Überblickt über die verschiedenen Bearbeitungsschritte.
Abbildung 2. Instrumentierungsschritte
4.1 Ausführung und Overhead
Damit die instrumentierte Anwendung überprüft werden kann, muss sie lediglich
ausgeführt werden. Sollte eine Formel verletzt werden, gibt das System eine
entsprechende Meldung aus. Es werden natürlich nur Programmpfade überprüft,
die auch tatsächlich durchlaufen werden. Deshalb ist es notwendig, diese Technik
mit anderen zu kombinieren, die während des Testens eine Abdeckung möglichst
vieler Pfade gewährleistet.
Jede Überprüfung zur Laufzeit (runtime verification) bedeutet notwendiger-
weise einen gewissen Overhead für die instrumentierte Anwendung, wenn eine
aktive Proposition
”
gefeuert“ wird. Dieser zusätzliche Aufwand ist linear zur
Anzahl der verwendeten Propositionen. Das Berechnen der Nachfolger eines Zu-
stands ist ungleich aufwändiger, außerdem kann jeder Zustand mehrere Nach-
folger haben.
5 Zusammenfassung
Wir haben ein Werkzeug vorgestellt, welches LTL-Formeln über AspecJ-Pointcuts
als Propositionen zur Laufzeit mit Hilfe alternierender Automaten überprüft.
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Aus einer Formel wird ein Aspekt generiert und mit der Anwendung verwoben.
Sollte eine Spezifikation zur Laufzeit verletzt werden, wird eine entsprechende
Meldung generiert. Der Prototyp mit dem Namen Java Logical Observer
(JLO) und weitere Informationen sind unter http://www-i2.informatik.rwth-
aachen.de/JLO/ zu finden.
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Spezifikation und Verifikation in regelbasierten Beratungssystemen auf
der Grundlage Hybrider Automaten





Zusammenfassung. Technische und verwaltungstechnische Prozesse, in denen Ereignisse im Zusammenhang
mit erwünschten bzw. kritischen Zeitbedingungen ihres Auftretens betrachtet werden, können problemadäquat
durch hybride Systeme auf der Grundlage hybrider Automaten modelliert werden. Hierbei entspricht die ana-
loge Größe der Zeit einer rein kontinuierlichen Komponente, welche ohne künstliche Diskretisierung mit dem
durch die Ereignisse beschriebenen diskreten Ablauf verbunden werden kann. Hybride Automaten ermöglichen
die Untersuchung von Prozessen aus sprachtheoretischer Sicht und den Nachweis von Eigenschaften auf der
Basis von Zeitwörtern, einer Folge von Tupeln, welche aus Ereignissen und der Zeit des Auftretens dieser Ereig-
nisse bestehen. Aus der Akzeptanz bzw. Nichtakzeptanz solcher Zeitwörter durch hybride Automaten werden
Schlussfolgerungen bezüglich zeitkritischer Eigenschaften der Systeme gezogen. Gegenstand des Artikels sind
Methoden einer nutzerfreundlichen Spezifikation hybrider Systeme zur Modellierung regelbasierter Anwen-
dungen mit beratender Funktion sowie Strategien zum Aufbau, zur Erweiterung und Änderung der hybriden
Systeme. Dabei werden Konzepte der Wiederverwendung und Verfeinerung als auch besondere Merkmale der
Spezifikation im Bereich regelbasierter Beratungssysteme herausgearbeitet. Eine für den Bereich regelbasier-
ter Beratungssysteme typische Klassifikation von Eigenschaften und Ansätze zur Formalisierung bilden den
Abschluss der Arbeit.
1 Einleitung
Hybride Systeme [ACHH93] auf der Grundlage hybrider Automaten [Hen96] haben sich als problemadäquate
Modelle für automatisierte technische Systeme, die stark in einer sich kontinuierlich verändernden Umwelt einge-
bettet sind, erwiesen [TKRE00]. Wie in der Arbeit gezeigt wird, stellen hybride Systeme auch für automatisierte
verwaltungstechnische Abläufe, welche entsprechend eines Regelwerkes mit zusätzlichen Plänen und Festlegun-
gen unter Beachtung zeitlicher Bedingungen ausgeführt werden, eine dem Problem sehr naheliegende Lösung
zur Modellierung dar. Zeitliche Einschränkungen, welche in Regelwerken wie Ordnungen, Verordnungen bzw.
Gesetzen auftreten, werden als absolute Zeitpunkte oder als in sich geschlossene, kontinuierliche Zeitabschnitte
definiert. Hierbei werden Informationen wie Pausenzeiten oder Nachtstunden, die für das menschliche Zusammen-
leben selbstverständlich sind, vernachlässigt und die künstliche Diskretisierung durch eine tageweise Betrachtung
vermieden. Die adäquate Modellierung von Prozessen, die Abläufe bezüglich der genannten Regelwerke und zuge-
hörigen Plänen und Festlegungen zulassen, muss die Zeit als rein kontinuierliche Komponente und die von der Zeit
abstrahierten Abläufe als diskrete Komponenten behandeln können. Hybride Automaten bieten die Möglichkeit,
die Zeit mit Lokationen zur Darstellung kontinuierlicher Verläufe und die von der Zeit abstrahierten Abläufe mit
Transitionen zur Darstellung diskreter Ereignisse ohne Zeitverzug zu beschreiben.
Soll ein automatisiertes verwaltungstechnisches System, wie zum Beipiel ein Studiensystem [STG01], eine bera-
tende Funktion zu Fragen bestehender Abläufe, möglicher Fortsetzungen von Abläufen, der Erstellung und Über-
einstimmung von Plänen und Regelwerken ausführen, so besteht die Notwendigkeit des Nachweises zeitkritischer
Eigenschaften. Durch hybride Automaten können zeitkritische Eigenschaften auf der Basis von Zeitwörtern mit
Hilfe der symbolischen Simulation [Rie95,RU95] nachgewiesen werden. Zeitwörter beschreiben eine Folge von
Tupeln, wobei die Tupel aus Ereignissen und der Zeit des Auftretens dieser Ereignisse bestehen. Die Menge al-
ler verwaltungstechnischen Abläufe, die als Zeitwörter von einem hybriden Automaten akzeptiert werden, bilden
eine formale Sprache, die das mögliche Verhalten eines verwaltungstechnischen Systems widerspiegelt. Aus der
Akzeptanz bzw. Nichtakzeptanz von Abläufen als Zeitwörter lassen sich Aussagen zu erwünschten und kritischen
Eigenschaften des modellierten Systems ableiten. Werden die Zeiten des Auftretens der Ereignisse in Abläufen
durch Variablen beschrieben, die eine unendliche Menge von Werten eines Zeitintervalls repräsentieren, so ent-
sprechen die Abläufe symbolischen Abläufen, die unendlich viele konkrete Abläufe zusammenfassen. Symboli-
sche Abläufe werden während der symbolischen Simulation ausgeführt. Die symbolische Simulation ist eine Art
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der automatischen Verifikation, welche wie das Model Checking [CGP99] die Frage beantwortet, ob ein gegebenes
zustandsbasiertes System eine in einem logischen Formalismus spezifizierte Eigenschaft erfüllt. Die symbolische
Simulation wird wie das Model Checking in unterschiedlichen Bereichen und mit unterschiedlichen Mitteln aus-
geführt. Während [Rie95,RU95] das zustandsbasierte System auf der Grundlage hybrider Automaten beschreiben,
werden in [BSW02] kontinuierliche Aktionssysteme zur Beschreibung des zustandbasierten Modelles verwendet.
[LC05] dagegen haben Zeiglers DEVS [Zei76] um symbolische Variablen erweitert und somit eine Möglichkeit
zur symbolischen Simulation geschaffen.
Um zu zeigen, wie die symbolische Simulation im Bereich regelbasierter Beratungssysteme eingesetzt werden
kann, wird in Kapitel 2 der Begriff des regelbasierten Beratungssystems und die Modellierung mittels hybrider
Systeme, welche durch unsere nutzerfreundlichen Sprachen MODEL-HS [TR99,Sik05] und VYSMO [TBR01]
unterstützt wird, genauer betrachtet. Im Kapitel 3 werden Konzepte der Abstraktion und Verfeinerung, ähnlich
[Hen00,AGH+00,AGLS01], im Zusammenhang mit besonderen Merkmalen der Spezifikation hybrider Systeme
im Bereich der regelbasierten Beratungssysteme behandelt. Die Klassifikation von Eigenschaften und deren For-
malisierung ist Thema des Kapitels 4. Abschließend erfolgt eine Zusammenfassung und ein Ausblick auf weiter-
führende Arbeiten.
2 Hybride Systeme als Modell regelbasierter Beratungssysteme
Im Mittelpunkt unserer Untersuchungen stehen Abläufe, welche eine Folge von Ereignissen verbunden mit der
Zeit ihres Auftretens bilden. Die Ereignisse und zugehörige Zeiten sind entweder durch Daten und Dokumente
manuell belegt oder über einen Regelmechanismus automatisch erzeugt. Auf diese Art und Weise ist jeder Ablauf
in einen Kontext eingebettet.
Begriff 21 Ein Kontext K zu einem Ablauf ρ ist ein 2-Tupel 〈P, ω〉, wobei:
P das Regelwerk als eine Menge von Produktionsregeln gültiger abstrakter Abläufe darstellt und
ω eine Menge von aktuellen Daten und Dokumenten, wodurch Instanzen der abstrakten Abläufe abgeleitet
werden, repräsentiert.
Das Regelwerk bildet theoretisch eine Zeitgrammatik [RU95], in der die Produktionsregeln diskrete Übergänge,
welche die Ereignisse eines Ablaufes und die Zeit des Auftretens der Ereignisse widerspiegeln, mit einem voraus-
gehenden, zeitlich kontinuierlichen Fortschritt kombinieren. Praktisch basiert das Regelwerk auf einer Hierarchie
von Regeln. Die oberste Stufe beinhaltet die Regeln der Rahmen- bzw. Metaordnungen, die mittlere Stufe die
Regeln der Ordnungen sowie Verordnungen und die unterste Stufe die Regeln der Durch- bzw. Ausführungsbe-
stimmungen. Sollen diese Regeln in einem konkreten Fall angewendet werden, so müssen weiterhin Daten und
Dokumente ω wie aktuelle Pläne und Termine, individuelle Durch- und Ausführungsentscheidungen als auch IST-
und SOLL-Abläufe berücksichtigt werden.
Beispiel 21 Ein Ablauf für das Erbringen eines Leistungsnachweises ’LN’ unter der Voraussetzung ’VS’ im Fach
’Mathematik’ kann in folgendem Kontext ausgeführt werden:
1. Regeln der Studien- und Prüfungsordnung:
<Start> →Tk, Tk.t ≤ 24, <VS>,<Rest>, Rest.t:= VS.t ; <Rest> →Tk, Tk.t ≤ 24 -Rest.t, 〈LN.b, TLNb〉
2. Regeln der Durchführungsordnung für die Voraussetzung als erfüllte Hausaufgaben ’HS’ oder bestandenes
Kurztestat (KT):
<VS> → 〈HS.b,THA〉, VS.t := THA.t ; <VS> → 〈KT.b,TKT 〉, VS.t :=TKT .t
3. Zeitraum und Art des Ablegens der Voraussetzung, die durch den Dozent festgelegt wurden:
Kurztestat im 11. oder 12. Monat zum Ende des 1. Studienjahres
Die angegebene Grammatik ist eine Zeitgrammatik, deren Regeln auf dem Wechsel von kontinuierlichen und dis-
kreten Anteilen im Zusammenhang mit Attributierungsregeln über einem Zeitwert ’t’ basieren. Tk stellt einen kon-
tinuierlichen Zeitraum dar, welcher in der Startregel kleiner oder gleich 24 Monaten (4 Semester) sein muss. Nach
einer bestandenen Voraussetzung ist in der Restfolge der Leistungsnachweis abzulegen. Aus Gründen der Verein-
fachung werden nur bestandene Leistungsnachweise erzeugt. Entsprechend ’Rest.t:= VS.t’ und ’Tk.t < 24 -Rest.t’
kann der Leistungsnachweis kann nur noch in der verbleibenden Zeit vom Bestehen der Voraussetzung bis zum En-
de des 24. Monats abgelegt werden. Die Voraussetzung kann als erfüllte Hausaufgaben zu einem Zeitpunkt ’THA’
oder als Kurztestat zu einem Zeitpunkt ’TKT ’ bestanden werden. Aus der Grammatik lassen sich 2 abstrakte Ab-
läufe ableiten: 1) Erst sind der Hausaufgaben innerhalb von 24 Monaten zu erfüllen und im verbleibenden Ablauf
bis zu vollen 24 Monaten ist der Leistungsnachweis abzulegen oder 2) Erst ist das Kurztestat innerhalb von 24
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Monaten zu erfüllen und im verbleibenden Ablauf bis zu vollen 24 Monaten ist der Leistungsnachweis abzulegen.
Der Dozent schränkt mit der gestellten Forderung die Ablaufmenge auf den 2. Ablauf ein und instantiiert Ablauf 2
durch die Bedingung, dass der Abschluss des Kurztestates zwischen dem 11. und 12. Monat vorgenommen werden
muss.
In der Arbeit dienen die regelbasierten Systeme dem Zweck einer beratenden Tätigkeit. Auf der Grundlage der
oben aufgeführten Regeln, aktuellen Daten und Dokumente sollen automatisch Empfehlungen erarbeitet werden,
die der Unterstützung von Benutzern bei der Durchführung von Abläufen, der Sicherung von Transparenz und der
Absicherung von Garantien dienen. Für ein Studiensystem können dabei zum Beispiel folgende Aufgaben gelöst
werden:
a) Berechnen und Anzeigen der IST-Studienabläufe von Studierenden,
b) Berechnen möglicher Fortsetzungen von Abläufen bezüglich gegebener Studien- und Prüfungsordnungen,
c) Unterstützung bei der Erarbeitung von Lehrplänen und Prüfungsterminen so, dass Abläufe in festgelegten
Zeiträumen durchführbar sind,
d) Beurteilung individueller Durchführungsentscheidungen von Dozenten sowie Vergleich von IST- und
SOLL-Abläufen,
e) Überprüfung der Konsistenz in Studien- und Prüfungsordnungen sowie Machbarkeit von Lehrplänen und
Prüfungsterminen in Bezug auf gegebene Studien- und Prüfungsordnungen, wodurch Garantien für sicher-
heits- und zeitkritische Eigenschaften, wie z.B. Einhaltung von Regelstudienzeiten, gegeben werden können.
Anwendungen regelbasierter Beratungssysteme bestehen in den Bereichen der Aus- und Weiterbildung, der Ver-
waltung, des Rechtswesens, der Polizei und zeitlich gebundener Abläufe der Industrie, welche aus einer Vertrags-
bindung entstehen. Im folgenden Verlauf werden alle Erkenntnisse am Beispiel eines Studiensystems dargelegt.
Ein Studiensystem besitzt verschiedene Nutzergruppen: i) die Verwaltung, ii) die Dozenten und iii) die Studieren-
den, welche unterschiedliche Ziele verfolgen und auf verschiedene Dokumente Zugriff besitzen. Die Verwaltung
nutzt Studien-, Prüfungs- und Durchführungsordnungen und erarbeitet Lehrpläne und Prüfungstermine. Die Do-
zenten beschäftigen sich mit Lehrplänen und Prüfungsterminen und gestalten individuell die Durchführung von
Lehrveranstaltungen. Die Studierenden sind an bereits vorliegenden Leistungen und an der möglichen Fortsetzung
der Studienabläufe unter gegebenen Bedingungen interessiert. Zur Unterstützung der genannten Aufgaben durch
automatisch erzeugte Empfehlungen müssen die Dokumente und Informationen in einer formalen Notation vor-
liegen. Da Studien-, Prüfungs- und Durchführungsordnung formalisiert einer Zeitgrammatik entsprechen, können
die Regeln dieser Ordnungen äquivalent mit Hilfe von Automaten beschrieben werden. Die zu einer Zeitgramma-
tik äquivalenten Automaten sind hybride Automaten, die durch sequentielle und parallele Komposition [AKY99]
hybride Systeme bilden. Lehrpläne und Prüfungstermine liegen als Daten in einer Datenbank vor. Individuelle
Durchführungsentscheidungen der Dozenten sind Regeln, welche als Verfeinerungen hybrider Automaten im Sin-
ne der sequentiellen Komposition spezifiziert werden. Die Gesamtheit der Leistungen eines Studierenden mit den
zugehörigen Zeitpunkten des Ablegens dieser Leistungen stellen den Studienablauf des Studierenden dar. Die Lei-
stung basiert dem Namen der Lehrveranstaltung, der Art des Leistungsnachweises (Prüfung, Beleg, Praktikum),
der Anzahl an Versuchen und dem Erfolg des Ablegens.
Die hybriden Automaten eines Studiensystems müssen in der Lage sein, eine Folge von Leistungen im Zusam-
menhang mit dem zeitlichen Auftreten der Leistungen zu akzeptieren. Wird von der Zeit abstrahiert, so kann ein
Prüfungsvorgang, der zum Ablegen einer Leistung führt, wie in Abbildung 1 mit einem endlichen Automaten be-
schrieben werden. Der endliche Automat zeigt den Ablauf von Prüfungsphasen als Zustände im Wechsel mit dem
Ablegen von Leistungen als Übergänge für das Fach Allgemeinmedizin aus dem 2. Abschnitt eines Medizinstudi-
ums. Hier wird am Anfang ein Zustand für einen Zeitraum reserviert, in welchem von einem Dozenten festgelegte
Voraussetzungen für die Zulassung zur eigentlichen Prüfung zu erfüllen sind.
Zur Verbindung des durch den endlichen Automaten beschriebenen Prüfungsablaufes mit der Zeit muss geklärt
werden, in welchen Zeiträumen, modelliert durch Lokationen eines hybriden Automaten, Leistungen laut Studien-
und Prüfungsordnung abgelegt werden müssen und zu welchen Zeitpunkten, modelliert durch Übergänge, Lei-
stungen laut festgelegten Prüfungszeiträumen abgelegt werden können. Entsprechend der Abbildung 2 kann ein
erfolgreicher Abschluss des Faches Allgemeinmedizin in der Zeit von Beginn des 46. Monats bis zum Ende des
72. Monats vorgewiesen werden. Durch Zusatzbedingungen wie i) das vorlesungsbegleitende Ablegen von Prü-
fungen, ii) Zeitbegrenzungen von Wiederholungen auf höchstens ein Jahr und iii) 2 Wiederholungen als maximale
Anzahl an Wiederholungen, wobei die 2. Wiederholung nur nach einer Genehmigung erfolgen darf, lässt sich das
Zeitintervall in mehrere kontinuierliche Abschnitte unterteilen. Diese Unterteilung führt zu den einzelnen Zeiträu-
men zwischen dem Ablegen und Zeitpunkten des Ablegens von Leistungen, die sich mit den Lokationen und



























Abb. 1. Endlicher Automat für den Prüfungsvorgang des Faches Allgemeinmedizin
Der hybride Automat wurde in unserer visuellen Notation VYSMO spezifiziert. MODEL-HS existiert als äquiva-
lente textuelle Notation zu VYSMO, so dass der Nutzer eine entsprechend gegebenen Fähigkeiten und Ressourcen
angepasste Spezifikation erstellen kann. Aus Platzgründen wird hier auf die textuelle Darstellung in MODEL-HS
verzichtet. Wie beim endlichen Automaten ist im Kopfteil des hybriden Automaten der Name des Faches ’All-
gemeinmedizin’ angegeben. Im darunterliegenden Abschnitt werden Parameter spezifiziert, welche für den durch
den hybriden Automaten beschriebenen Vorgang in der Umgebung festgelegt worden sind und sich während eines
Ablaufes nicht ändern. Das Fach ’Allgemeinmedizin’ besitzt keinen solchen Parameter. Der 3. Abschnitt dient der
Deklaration von Variablen. Die Uhrenvariable ’X’ ist für die ’Allgemeinmedizin’ mit dem Schlüsselwort ’Clock’
gekennzeichnet. Im 4. Abschnitt wird der Vorgang als Verhalten des Automaten beschrieben. Die Anfangslokation,
hier ’Voraussetzung’, ist durch einen auf diese Lokation zeigenden Pfeil gekennzeichnet, der von einem schwarz
gefüllten Kreis ausgeht, einer Wartelokation. Die Wartelokation ist nur dann von Bedeutung, wenn der Automat,
ähnlich kommunizierenden Automaten in UML, durch Synchronisationsbedingungen später als zu Beginn der glo-
balen Laufzeit des gesamten Systems aktiviert werden soll. Jede Lokation ist mit dem Namen, einer Invariante und
einer Aktivität gekennzeichnet. Die Invariante gibt an, in welchen Wertgrenzen der mit der Lokation verbunde-
nen kontinuierlichen Variablen das Verbleiben in der Lokation möglich ist. Nur in den angegebenen Wertgrenzen
darf die Lokation betreten werden bzw. muss verlassen werden, wenn die kontinuierlichen Variablen die Grenzen
unter- oder überschritten haben. Die Aktivitäten beschreiben als Differentialgleichungen den Fortschritt der konti-
nuierlichen Grössen je Zeiteinheit. Zum Beispiel muss die Lokation ’Voraussetzung’ entsprechend der gegebenen
Invariante ’0 ≤ X < 46’ vor dem Beginn des 46. Monats verlassen werden. Auch in der Lokation ’Kein Versuch’
ist die Invariante mit der unteren Grenze ’0’ angegeben. Ist die Menge der Voraussetzungen leer, so wird die Lo-
kation ’Voraussetzung’ ohne Zeitverzug mit der Leistung ’Voraussetzung.bestanden’ zur Lokation ’Kein Versuch’
verlassen. Da die Zeiteinheit in Monaten festgelegt ist, wird der Wert der Uhr ’X’ laut der Aktivitäten ’Ẋ = 1’ pro
Monat um 1 erhöht und beinhaltet somit die Anzahl der verstrichenen Monate.
Im Gegensatz zum endlichen Automaten bestehen beim hybriden Automaten im Zusammenhang mit der Zeit 3
statt vorher 2 Übergänge von einer Lokation zu folgenden Lokationen. Der 3. Übergang resultiert aus der Unter-
scheidung von Ereignissen, die durch die manuelle Bereitstellung der Daten und Dokumente in einem gegebenen
Zeitraum erzeugt wurden und Ereignissen, die automatisch bei Erreichen eines Zeitpunktes eintreten. Die manuell
erzeugten Ereignisse werden als empfangene Signale, gekennzeichnet durch einen nach unten gerichteten Pfeil,
und die automatisch auftretenden Ereignisse durch gesendete Signale, gekennzeichnet durch einen nach oben ge-
richteten Pfeil, symbolisiert. In der Lokation ’Voraussetzung’ kann einer der 3 Übergänge zu den Lokationen i)
’Kein Versuch’, wenn die Voraussetzung innerhalb des Zeitraumes bis zu Beginn des 46. Monats bestanden wurde,
ii) ’Erfolglos’, wenn die Voraussetzung innerhalb des Zeitraumes bis zu Beginn des 46. Monats nicht bestanden
wurde, und iii) ’Erfolglos’, wenn die Voraussetzung innerhalb des Zeitraumes bis zu Beginn des 46. Monats nicht
absolviert wurde, ausgeführt werden. Der Unterschied zwischen dem 2. und 3. Fall besteht in der Art der Ereig-
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Abb. 2. Zeiträume erfolgreicher Abschlüsse der Fächer des 2. Abschnittes der Ärztlichen Prüfung
durch einen in der Umgebung erfolgten manuellen Eintrag in eine Datenbank ausgelöst wurde, tritt der 3. Fall
genau dann ein, wenn der 1. und 2. Fall niemals vorlagen oder ausgeführt wurden und die Zeit den Beginn des 46.
Monats überschritten hat. Im Fall 3 kann der Übergang dann automatisch ausgelöst werden. Weitere Regeln von
Grundfächern lassen sich in der gleichen Weise wie die Regeln des Prüfungsablaufes des Faches ’Allgemeinme-
dizin’ formalisieren. Ein hybrides System kann bereits solch einem hybriden Automaten entsprechen bzw. durch
Synchronisation mehrerer Automaten, die selbst auf durch Synchronisation kombinierten Automaten bestehen und
verfeinert sein können, geschaffen werden..
3 Abstraktion und Verfeinerung
Abstraktion im Sinn der parallelen Komposition mittels Synchronisation wird in unseren Spezifikationen zum
Zweck der Erhaltung der Übersichtlichkeit, der Möglichkeit des Bottom-Up-Entwurfes und der Wiederverwen-
dung bestehender hybrider Automaten eingesetzt. Die Abläufe in Automaten können vollständig unabhängig von-
einander ausgeführt oder mit Hilfe empfangener oder gesendeter Signale synchronisiert werden. Dadurch wird
die gleichzeitige Ausführung von Ereignissen der Abläufe erreicht, welche eine angenommene Voraussetzung für
den Nachweis von Eigenschaften mit der symbolischen Simulation darstellt. Zum Aufbau eines Systemes, wie das
Studiensystem des 2. Abschnittes der Ärztlichen Prüfung, kann zu Beginn auf die genaue Beschreibung detaillier-
ter Prüfungsabläufe zu Grund- und Komplexfächern verzichtet werden. Der in Abbildung 4 dargestellte Automat
beschreibt einen in VYSMO spezifizierten, hybriden synchronisierenden Automat (HSA) für den 2. Abschnitt der
Ärztlichen Prüfung.
Ein HSA wird ähnlich einem hybriden hierarchischen Automaten (HHA), wie solch ein Automat in Abbildung 3
für das Fach ’Allgemeinmedizin’ gezeigt wurde, in 4 Abschnitte unterteilt. Der HSA ist jedoch im Namensfeld mit
doppelten Linien an den Seiten gekennzeichnet und anstelle der Verhaltensbeschreibung ist eine Synchroniations-
beschreibung hybrider Automaten aufgeführt. Die Synchronisationsbeschreibung enthält Automaten, welche auf
HSA oder auf elementaren HHA basieren und durch Verbindungen zur Synchronisation miteinander in Beziehung
stehen. Während hybride hierarchische Automaten die Möglichkeit zur Verfeinerung bieten, entstehen hybride
synchronisierende Automaten aus der Gruppierung von Automaten und der Schaffung von Synchronisationsbezie-
hungen zu anderen Gruppen von Automaten. Die Synchronisationsbeziehungen können durch Bedingungen zur
81
X := 1
X := 1X := 1
< <
<
>X    12
X := 1
Erfolglos
>X    12
<0     X
<0     X
>








0     X  <  46
Voraussetzung




0     X  <  12 0     X  <  12
1. Versuch.
nicht bestanden ,









nicht bestanden , X := 0
1. Wiederholung.












X    48
,bestanden
Allgemeinmedizin.







Voraussetzung. nicht bestanden X < 46, X := 0
Abb. 3. Hybrider Automat für den Prüfungsvorgang des Faches Allgemeinmedizin
Aktivierung eines Automaten oder einer Automatengruppe festgelegt werden und Zuweisungen zu Variablen ent-
halten.
Die Aktivierung des Gesamtsystems ’Studienverlauf’ wird durch einen Pfeil symbolisiert, welcher von einem
gefüllten schwarzen Kreis ausgeht. An dieser Stelle lassen sich Vorbedingungen und Initialwerte von Variablen
des Systems spezifizieren. Zum Beispiel wird in Abbildung 4 die Variable ’GF’ mit der Menge aller bestehen-
den Grundfächer initialisiert. Die Synchronisationsbeschreibung weist die Abstraktion aller Fächer, Fachgruppen
und Praktika auf, die zum erfolgreichen Absolvieren des 2. Abschnittes der Ärztlichen Prüfung beitragen. Dabei
existieren Automaten, wie der Automat der ’GF_I’ vom Typ ’Grundfächer’, die selbst Instanzen eines HSA und
Automaten, wie der Automat der ’Famu_I’ vom Typ ’Famulatur’, die Instanzen eines HHA sind. Hier besteht kein
notationeller Unterschied. Erst der detaillierte Typ lässt auf die Art des Automaten schliessen. Die Nachweise zu
den Fächern und Fachgruppen können je nach Synchronisationsbeziehung unabhängig parallel oder müssen nach-
einander folgend erbracht werden. Die Prüfungen zur Gruppe der Grundfächer, wozu auch ein durch den Parameter
’FLN’ festgelegter fachübergreifender Leistungsnachweis gehört, kann vollständig unabhängig von dem Absol-
vieren der Famulatur ausgeführt werden. Das Wahlfach dagegen kann entsprechend der Aktivierungsbedingung
’activ_WF’ nur dann unabhängig von der Gruppe der Grundfächer abgelegt werden, wenn das Fach Sportmedi-
zin oder Zahnmedizin/Mund-, Kiefer- und Plastische Chirurgie gewählt wurden. Ist das Wahlfach ’WF’ laut der
Bedingung an der Synchronisationsverbindung zwischen den Grundfächern und dem Wahlfach in der Menge der
Grundfächer ’GF’ enthalten, so muss das Grundfach erst bestanden sein, bevor das Wahlfach darauf aufbauend
abgelegt werden kann. Um das Praktische Jahr zu absolvieren, müssen laut Aktivierungsbedingung ’aktiv_PJ’ und
den Bedingungen an den Synchronisationsverbindungen alle Prüfungen bis auf die abschliessenden schriftlichen
und mündlichen Prüfungen bestanden sein. Aktivierungsbedingungen werden später in den detaillierten Automa-
ten als formale Parameter an den Eingangsübergängen festgehalten, so dass hier der aktuelle Wert mit zum Beispiel
’aktiv_PJ’ übergeben werden muss.
Verfeinerungen dienen der sequentiellen Komposition, wodurch in einem Top-Down-Entwurf das detaillierte Ver-
halten der Lokationen von hybriden hierarchischen Automaten beschrieben werden kann. Angenommen, ein für
das Grundfach ’Allgemeinmedizin’ verantwortlicher Dozent gestaltet die Voraussetzungen des hybriden Automa-
ten aus Abbildung 3 wie folgt:
Als Zulassungsvoraussetzung für die Prüfung der ’Allgemeinmedizin’ ist ein Leistungsnachweis in Form
von erreichten 60% der Punkte für erfolgreich gelöste Hausaufgaben oder eines Kurztestates, welches
einmalig innerhalb von 6 Monaten wiederholt werden darf, zu erbringen.
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Chirurgie.bestandenactiv_B1 = activ_B2 = Kinderheilkunde.bestanden Praktisches Jahr.bestandenactiv_SM =
activ_Q1 = Innere Medizin.bestanden /\ Dermatologie.bestanden /\ HNO−Heilkunde.bestanden
activ_Q2 = Arbeits− und Sozialmedizin.bestanden /\ Allgemeinmedizin.bestanden
activ_PJ = Frauen− und Geburtsheilkunde.bestanden /\ Urologie.bestanden /\ Augenheilkunde.bestanden
/\ Wahlfach.bestanden /\ Querschnittsbereich 1.bestanden /\ Querschnittsbereich 2.bestanden





























GF := [ Allgemeinmedizin, Arbeits− und Sozialmedizin, Augenheilkunde, Chirurgie, Dermatologie, Frauen−
Geburtsheilkunde, HNO−Heilkunde, Innere Medizin, Kinderheilkunde, Urologie]

































activ_WF = (WF = Sportmedizin \/ WF = Zahnmedizin / Mund−, Kiefer− und Plastische Chirurgie) \/ WF.bestanden
Abb. 4. Hybrider Synchronisierender Automat (HSA) zum 2. Abschnitt der Ärztlichen Prüfung
Unter dieser Annahme kann die Lokation ’Voraussetzung’ durch den hybriden hierarchischen Automaten aus Ab-
bildung 5 ersetzt werden. Technisch wird die Ersetzung als Instanziierung realisiert, wozu vorher im Automaten
für ’Allgemeinmedizin’ syntaktische Veränderungen vorgenommen werden müssen, die hier nicht ausgeführt sind.
Der Automat zur Verfeinerung der Voraussetzungen besitzt Merkmale, die an dieser Stelle kurz angesprochen wer-
den. Die Darlegung im Einzelnen erfolgt jedoch in weiteren Arbeiten. Die Lokation ’Voraussetzung’ des HHA
’Allgemeinmedizin’ ist mit der Invariante ’0 ≤ X < 46’ verbunden. Das bedeutet als 1. Merkmal, das Überschrei-
ten der Zeitgrenze von 46 Monaten ist nicht erlaubt, sonst muss die Lokation verlassen werden. Diese Invariante
gilt auch für den hybriden Automaten, der zur Verfeinerung der Lokation ’Voraussetzung’ dient. Alle Invarianten
von Lokationen und Bedingungen der Übergänge dürfen die Invariante ’0 ≤ X < 46’ nicht verletzen. Da dem Mo-
dellierer die Überprüfung manuell nicht zumutbar ist, kann nur ein automatisches Verfahren, wie die symbolische
Simulation, den Nachweis unterstützen. Das 2. Merkmal bezieht sich auf die Art der Modellierung von hybri-
den Systemen, wodurch Konflikte entstehen können. Wie in technischen Systemen, für welche die Aktionen des
Rechnersystems als diskretes Zustandsmodell und die zu überwachende und steuernde Umgebung als Menge von
Gleichungen und Ungleichungen über kontinuierlichen Variablen unabhängig voneinander beschrieben und da-
nach kombiniert werden, werden in regelbasierten Beratungssystemen Leistungen konkret festgelegter Zeiträume
und Zeitpunkte als diskretes Zustandsmodell und die Regeln von Ordnungen usw. als Menge von Gleichungen und
Ungleichungen über Uhrenvariablen unabhängig voneinander beschrieben und danach kombiniert. Daraus kann
sich ein Konflikt zwischen Übergangs- und Lokationsbeschreibungen ergeben. In Abbildung 5 führt zum Beispiel
die Bedingung ’Y ≥ 46’ an dem Übergang von Lokation ’Voraussetzung zu erfüllen’ zu ’Voraussetzung nicht er-
füllt’ dazu, dass die Lokation ’Voraussetzung nicht erfüllt’ mit der Invariante ’Y < 46’ gar nicht betreten werden
kann. Hier liegt eine Art des Zeno-Verhaltens [Yov97] vor, welches von der symbolischen Simulation erkannt wer-
den muss und eine Änderung des Modells erfordert. Die Änderung stellt aufgrund der Invarianten im Moment ein
offenes Problem dar. Das 3. Merkmal betrifft das Senden von Signalen an den umgebenden, verfeinerten HHA wie
’Voraussetzung.bestanden’ am Übergang von ’Voraussetzung zu erfüllen’ zu ’Voraussetzung erfüllt’ an den umge-
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Abb. 5. Hybrider hierarchischer Automat zur Verfeinerung der Lokation Voraussetzung des HHA für ’Allgemeinmedizin’
benden, verfeinerten HHA der ’Allgemeinmedizin’. Dieses Signal dient als Impuls, um das sequentielle Verhalten
des übergeordneten Automaten fortsetzen zu können.
4 Klassifikation von Eigenschaften und deren Formalisierung
Im Bereich der regelbasierten Beratungssysteme haben sich 2 Gruppen von Eigenschaften herausgebildet, zum
einen die Konsistenz bestehender (Ver-)Ordnungen und zum anderen die Machbarkeit konkreter Aussagen gegen-
über solchen (Ver-)Ordnungen. Die beiden Begriffe lassen sich wie folgt erklären:
Begriff 41 Eine (Ver-)Ordnung heisst konsistent, wenn genau diejenigen Abläufe akzeptiert werden, die gege-
benen Konsistenzbedingungen entsprechen. Als Konsistenzbedingungen gelten dabei Widerspruchsfreiheit in der
Logik der Regeln selbst, Regeln der Rahmen- und Durchführungsordnungen sowie Regeln aus Zusatzbestimmun-
gen.
Begriff 42 Die Machbarkeitsanalyse umfasst die Überprüfung der Kohärenz [STG01] von aktuellen Plänen und
Terminen gegenüber bestehenden Ordnungen, der individuellen Durch- und Ausführung gegenüber Regeln beste-
hender Ordnungen und die Überprüfung von SOLL-Abläufen gegenüber bestehenden Ordnungen und aktuellen
Regeln aus Plänen, Terminen, individuellen Durch- und Ausführungsentscheidungen.
Theoretisch werden beide Klassen von Eigenschaften auf der Basis von konkreten und symbolischen Abläufen
formalisiert.
Begriff 43 Ein konkreter Ablauf ρ ist ein Zeitwort: 〈Λ1, X1, ω1〉, 〈Λ2, X2, ω2〉, 〈Λ3, X3, ω3〉, ..., wobei:
Λi eine Menge von Leistungen L,
Xi eine Menge von Uhren, die die Menge von Zeitwerten T widerspiegelt, und
ωi eine Abbildung von Uhrenvariablen auf konkrete Zeitwerte mit i = 1,2,3,... darstellen.
Begriff 44 Ein symbolischer Ablauf R ist ein Zeitwort: 〈Λ1, X1, Ω1〉, 〈Λ2, X2, Ω2〉, 〈Λ3, X3, Ω3〉, ..., wobei:
Λi und Xi wie für den konkreten Ablauf definiert sind und
Ωi eine Abbildung von Uhrenvariablen auf Zeitintervalle unendlich vieler Zeitwerte mit i = 1,2,3,... darstellen.
Die Abläufe können dabei, wie im folgenden Beispiel gezeigt, als temporallogische Formeln beschrieben werden.
Beispiel 41 In einer übergeordneten Rahmenordnung sei folgende Regel für das Studium der Medizin enthalten:
♦Ti.Mathematik.LN.(bestanden|nicht bestanden) ∧
♦Tj .Physik.P rüfung.(bestanden|nicht bestanden) ∧ Ti < Tj < 4 wobei:
♦T.Leistung bedeutet: Irgendwann zu einem Zeitpunkt ’T’ in der Zukunft ist die ’Leistung’ nachzuweisen.
Die Regel ist eine Konsistenzbedingung für untergeordnete Studien- und Prüfungsordnungen, welche besagt, dass
innerhalb von 4 Semestern ein Leistungsnachweis im Fach Mathematik zu erbringen und danach eine Prüfung in
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Physik abzulegen ist. Die temporallogische Aussage spiegelt alle symbolischen Abläufe folgender Form wider:
〈{Leistungen}, T1, Bedingung für T1〉,..., 〈{Leistungen}, Ti−1, Bedingung für Ti−1〉,
〈{Mathematik.LN.(bestanden|nichtbestanden)}, Ti, Bedingung für Ti〉,
〈{Leistungen}, Ti+1, Bedingung für Ti+1〉,..., 〈{Leistungen}, Tj−1, Bedingung für Tj−1〉,
〈{Physik.P rüfung.(bestanden|nichtbestanden)}, Tj , Bedingung für Tj〉,... .
Die alte Studien- und Prüfungsordnung erforderte einen Nachweis je Fach Mathematik, Physik und Chemie:
1. Ein Leistungsnachweis ist im Fach Mathematik bis zum Ende des 4. Semesters zu erbringen.
2. Nach dem erfolgreichen Abschluss des Faches Mathematik sind unabhängig voneinander Prüfungen in den
Fächern Physik und Chemie bis zum Ende des 4. Semesters abzulegen.
In der neuen Studien- und Prüfungsordnung wurde bezüglich dieser Regel folgende Änderung vorgenommen:
1. In einer Gesamtprüfung müssen 2 der Fächer Mathematik, Physik und Chemie wahlweise abgelegt werden.
2. Danach ist das 3. Fach in einer separaten Prüfung abzulegen.
Die Änderung in der neuen Studien- und Prüfungsordnung führt zur Verletzung der Konsistenzbedingung aus der
Rahmenordnung.
Die Überprüfung der Machbarkeit basiert auf der Instantiierung von Regeln der Ordnungen, die eine Menge von
symbolischen Abläufen bilden, durch aktuelle Informationen, wie gegenwärtig gültige Pläne, festgelegte Termine,
individuelle Durchführungsentscheidungen und SOLL-Anforderungen.
Beispiel 42 Eine mögliche Anfrage nach der Machbarkeit eines Studienablaufes für einen Studierenden des Me-
dizinstudiums im 2. Abschnitt kann folgendermaßen formuliert werden:
machbar (Studien_Ablauf, S_P_Ordnung, Lehrplan, Immat)
:-
Studien_Ablauf = [Beginn, <´ASM.bestanden´,T1>,
Zwischen, <´Wahlfach.bestanden´,T2>, Ende],
Wahlfach = ASM,
52 =< T1 < 54 ,
Ende= [RestLeist,<Letzte,Tn>],
Tn < 75 .
S_P_Ordnung = Studien- und Prüfungsordnung,
Immat = Immatrikulationsdatum des anfragenden Studierenden
Der Studienablauf soll das erfolgreiche Bestehen des Grundfaches ’Arbeits- und Sozialmedizin’ (ASM) und des
vertiefenden Wahlfaches ’Arbeits- und Sozialmedizin’ enthalten. Entsprechend der Bedingung ’52 =< T1 < 54’
soll das Fach ’ASM’ innerhalb der 2 Monate vor Beendigung des 9. Semesters bestanden werden. Der gesamte
Studienablauf ist laut ’Tn < 75’ und Abbildung 2 innerhalb der Regelstudienzeit zu beenden. Aus der Studien-
und Prüfungsordnung ist bekannt, das ein auf einem Grundfach aufbauendes Wahlfach erst belegt werden kann,
wenn das Grundfach erfolgreich abgeschlossen worden ist. Der Lehrplan lässt jedoch die Belegung des Wahlfa-
ches ’ASM’ zur Zeit nicht zu. Alle Studierenden des jetzigen 10. Semesters, welche das Wahlfach ’ASM’ belegen
möchten, können das Studium nicht wie entsprechend der vorgegebenen Studien- und Prüfungsordnung innerhalb
der Regelstudienzeit beenden. Die Kohärenz zwischen Lehrplan und Studien- und Prüfungsordnung ist verletzt.
5 Zusammenfassung und Ausblick
In dem Beitrag wurde gezeigt, wie hybride Systeme zur problemadäquaten Modellierung verwaltungstechnischer
Abläufe, insbesondere in regelbasierten Anwendungen mit beratender Funktion, genutzt werden können. Verwal-
tungstechnische Abläufe werden dabei im Kontext zweier Bereiche ausgeführt, i) des Regelwerkes, welches aus
Ordnungen, Verordnungen und Gesetzen besteht und ii) den aktuellen Daten und Dokumente wie gegenwärtig gül-
tige Pläne und Termine, individuelle Durch- und Ausführungsentscheidungen als auch IST- und SOLL-Abläufe.
Das Regelwerk wird formal als Zeitgrammatik, welche die Ausführung der Regeln auf der Grundlage hybrider
Automaten zulässt, betrachtet. Die Regeln des Regelwerkes sind abstrakte Regeln, welche durch die Informatio-
nen der aktuellen Daten und Dokumente, wie in [TLR05], verfeinert und instantiiert werden. Die Kombination von
kontinuierlichem und diskretem Verhalten führt zur unabhängigen Beschreibungsmöglichkeit der Regeln des Re-
gelwerkes, zugehörigen Verfeinerungen und Instantiierungen auf der einen Seite und aktuell festgelegter Termine
und Zeiträume auf der anderen Seite. Die Regeln des Regelwerkes müssen eingehalten werden. In den festge-
legten Zeiträumen können Leistungen abgelegt werden. Mit Hilfe der symbolischen Simulation werden zeit- und
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sicherheitskritische Eigenschaften wie Konsistenz und Machbarkeit nachgewiesen, um eine beratende Tätigkeit
auszuführen. Da die symbolische Simulation auf einem sprachtheoretischen Ansatz basiert, müssen die hybriden
Systeme an allen Übergängen Signale zur Beschreibung abgelegter Leistungen aufweisen und jeder Automat muss
mit Endlokationen ausgestattet sein. Zur Ausführung der symbolischen Simulation in der constraint-logischen
Sprache PrologIV ist die Architektur eines Werkzeuges Rossy [TLR04] entstanden, wobei Anfragen und Pro-
gramme der nutzerfreundlichen Sprache MODEL-HS in PrologIV-Programme übersetzt werden. Anfragen, die als
Eingabeparameter das hybride System und erwünschte Bedingungen für den Ablauf erhalten, werden von einem
symbolischen Simulator gestartet, der als Ergebnis die Bedingungen berechnet, unter welchen das hybride System
den gegebenen Ablauf akzeptieren kann.
Aus theoretischer Sicht wird der Zusammenhang zwischen Zeitgrammatiken und hybriden Automaten in zukünfti-
gen Arbeiten anhand weiterer Beispiele vertieft. Aus Ergebnissen, welche bei der Ausführung hybrider Automaten
erreicht werden, sollen Schlussfolgerungen auf die Eigenschaften der Grammatik gezogen werden. Praktisch ist
die konzeptionelle Architektur von Rossy durch eine Implementation zu unterstützen, wodurch sich theoretische
Ergebnisse verifizieren lassen. Für die Nutzerfreundlichkeit sollen dazu bedienerfreundliche Oberflächen und An-
fragemasken [LTR03], die eine Auswahl aus gegebenen Listen ermöglichen, zur Verfügung gestellt werden.
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Abstract. The semantics of modelling languages are not always specified
in a precise and formal way, and their rather complex underlying mod-
els make it a non-trivial exercise to reuse them in newly developed tools.
We present a virtual machine-based approach for state space generation.
The virtual machine’s (VM) byte-code language is straightforwardly imple-
mentable, facilitating reuse and making it an adequate target for translation
of higher-level languages like the SPIN model checker’s Promela. As added
value, it provides executable and formal operational semantics for modeling
languages. Benchmarks show that a VM is competitive in speed for state
space generation.
1 Introduction
Common approaches in state-based model checking employ modeling languages
like CSP [13], LOTOS [5], Murφ [8], DVE [4], or Promela [14] to describe actual
state spaces. These languages are usually non-trivial: in addition to concepts found
in programming languages (scopes, variables, expressions etc.) they often provide
features like process abstraction, non-determinism, guarded commands, synchro-
nisation and communication primitives, timers, etc. Implementing an operational
model of such languages for use in verification tools is consequently not straightfor-
ward, even more so if the language is described informally only, and their static and
operational semantics are incomplete at best, outdated, or entirely unavailable.
That being said, when developing verification tools it is highly desirable to
reuse an already existing popular modeling language like e.g. Promela, which
has been used in a sizeable number of real-world case studies. These models can
be used to benchmark new tools against old ones in a fair way. Promela has
wide industry acceptance, allowing modelers to try out compatible tools without
having to re-specify models in yet another formalism. Lastly, since these tools are
developed for the application of formal methods, it is worthwhile and only fair to
treat them with the same rigor: a shared underlying virtual machine would make
it possible to compare different algorithms fairly and easier to test a new algorithm
for conformance against existing algorithms.
This begs however the question, why existing tools are not simply extended
and thus the whole static and dynamic semantics machinery is reused? The most
trivial answer is that new approaches might be implemented in a different pro-
gramming language, for a variety of reasons [16]. Also, many verification tools can
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be considered research prototypes which are not developed with extensibility first
in mind: modifications become more time-consuming. Furthermore, different ap-
proaches often admit different tool architectures: parallel and distributed model
checkers often need small mobile data structures, so that computations can be re-
located to other processors. Nevertheless, we stress that despite different designs
all these tools have in common the need for a state space generator component.
Another commonly found reuse pattern is the translation of other formalisms to
modeling languages like Promela [21, 10], using SPIN [12] as verification backend,
and hence restricting the choice of analyses to offerings of a single tool again, or
getting trapped in abstraction inversion (non-trivial encodings of constructs) [2].
It comes as no suprise that researchers often find it easier to invent their own
modeling language with informally specified semantics incompatible to existing
tools which, as argued above, puts additional burden on end-users to switch tools,
benchmark them, or consider them at all.
We strive to remedy current shortcomings by proposing a virtual machine-
based approach to state space generation, in which high-level modeling languages
are translated to byte-code instructions. Subsequent execution of such byte-code
programs with a virtual machine yields state spaces for further use in model check-
ing tools.
Contributions We describe a virtual machine model suitable for state space gener-
ation. The operational semantics of our virtual machine are straightforward, and
hence easy to derive an implementation from (indeed, this is exactly what we did,
cf. section 3). Moreover, our machine model can be augmented to handle timers,
probabilities etc., in a compositional way by adding instructions, and keeping the
rest of the model unchanged.
Most byte-codes are simple operations, and benchmarks show that our ma-
chine is competitive in state space generation to SPIN. For distributed state space
generation our machine offers additional benefits: it can be restarted from machine
state snapshots, which have a self-contained, contiguous and platform-independent
representation, and thus can be send across networks without further serialization
efforts.
Organisation In section 2 we describe the virtual machine model and byte-code
semantics. Section 3 presents benchmark results for our implementation. We con-
clude with a brief summary of related and future work in sections 4 and 5.
2 Virtual Machine Specification
For the remainder of the paper, we will consider a concrete instance of a state
space generating VM as presented in [28]. Due to space constraints, we cannot
present details of the machine. Instead, we will highlight its distinguishing features
informally, its global and local state, invariants which translations must preserve,
and crucial operations.
We are concerned with state space generation, hence our virtual machine has
a couple of features not all of which are commonly found at byte-code level in
conventional VM architectures like the JavaVM [22], in particular:
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Non-determinism If non-deterministic choice is encountered during executing,
the machine offers all possible continuations to the scheduler who then decides
which path to take.
Concurrency A builtin run byte-code allows to spawn processes at run-time.
Communication Both, synchronous and asynchronous channel objects are pro-
vided for inter-process communication.
First-class channels Like in Promela and π-calculus [20], our machine allows
channels to be sent over channels.
Priority scheme Our byte-code allows to specify which actions have to be given
preference. Together with explicit control over externally visible actions, this
allows to encode high-level constructs like Promela’s atomic and d_step.
Speculative execution Certain code sequences are executed speculatively, and
changes to the global state are rolled back if the sequence does not run to
completion.
External Scheduling Scheduling decisions are delegated to host applications.
This allows for implementation of different scheduling policies which is needed
to cater for simulation (interactive scheduling) vs. state space exploration with
some search strategy (breadth-first, depth-first, or combinations thereof).
Although we are confident that our VM is already a suitable target for quite
a number of high-level languages, we do not claim exhaustiveness here. That is,
depending on features of a high-level model, adjustments and additions might
be needed, or an entirely different state representation could even be beneficial.
However, we would like to stress the generic nature of our approach which is in no
way restricted to this specific example.
2.1 Architecture
The design of our VM was mainly driven by pragmatic decisions: it was our inten-
tion to create a model that is simple, efficient and embeddable as component into
host applications, with implementation effort split between the VM and compilers
targeting it. For example, many instructions make use of the VM’s stack because
it is trivial for compilers to generate stack-based code for expression evaluation.
On the other hand, a stack-based architecture alone is inconvenient for translation
of counting loops, thus registers were added. The RISC-like instruction set is mo-
tivated by the need for fast decoding inside the instruction dispatcher, the VM’s
most often executed routine.
Although our machine is a mixture of register-based and stack-based architec-
ture, we are nevertheless dealing with finite state models in this paper.
Because our machine model supports non-determinism, we cannot merely exe-
cute instructions like commonly known VMs, e. g. the JavaVM. Instead, the ma-
chine executes a step and yields a set of possible successor states. An external
scheduler finally decides which successor states (possibly more than one) are to
be executed further. In verification context, these scheduling decisions are induced
e. g. by model checking algorithms.
For presentational reasons we chose to specify successor states by combining
several (labeled) relations between states. Here, we mention only internal steps
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which are unobservable to the scheduler, and a prioritised step which concludes
a number of internal steps to finally render the resulting machine state visible as
successor.
As concurrency model we chose interleaving semantics for our machine, al-
though true concurrency semantics are conceivable as well.
2.2 Machine State
The machine’s global state Γ = (Π, e, G, Φ) consists of a finite set of processes Π ,
the identifier of a process with exclusive execution privileges e ∈ Pid⊥ (⊥ if none),
global variable store G, and set of existing channels Φ.
Channels are used to model message-passing synchronisation. In our machine,
communication channels are typed and bounded, and we distinguish between ren-
dezvous channels and asynchronous channels. Rendezvous channels have zero ca-
pacity. Nevertheless, a single message can temporarily be stored in a channel during
synchronous communication. Such states are internal to the virtual machine and
unobservable to the outside.
Our unit of execution, a process π = (p, M, Λ′) ∈ Π , is represented by its
globally unique identifier p, execution mode M (Normal, Atomic, Deterministic,
Terminated), and Λ′ = (L, m) as the local state of a process. L denotes the process-
local variable store and its program counter m the instruction executing next. When
a process becomes active, its state Λ′ is augmented with (zeroed) registers R0 and
a stack Dε = ε to its active local state Λ = (L, m, R0, Dε).
On purpose, the design of our VM allows it to be interrupted and restarted
from snapshots of its global state Γ at a later time, possibly even on a different
processor. This property allows us to embed our VM in distributed model check-
ing tools [9]. In our implementation we eliminated any overhead of taking state
snapshots, by having the VM work on a self-contained and contiguous binary state
representation which e.g., can be directly stored or sent over a network without
further marshalling.
2.3 Invariants
Translations to our byte-code language must guarantee the following invariants: a
process becoming active again always resumes execution with register set R0 and
the empty stack Dε. Conversely, at those points in the program when a process
may become inactive, the contents of registers and stack are discarded and need
not matter for the rest of its execution. Because the number of local variables is
fixed, a local state Λ′ thusly occupies constant space only.
2.4 Byte-code Semantics
Global and active local machine state is modified by instructions from our byte-
code language. Among them are operations one would usually expect for translation
of arithmetic and boolean expressions (NEG, ADD, MUL, LT, CMP), for loading con-
stants and variables (LDC, LDV), other stack and register handling (PUSH, POP), and
(un)conditional jumps for control flow (JMP, JMPZ).
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Table 1. Crucial byte-code operations
NDET a non-deterministic jump
(L, m, R, D) →int (L, m + 1, R, D)
(L, m, R, D) →int (L, a, R, D)
NEX step not executable
(L, m, R, D) 6→
STEP r, M ′ step complete with priority r ∈ Σpri and mode M ′
({(p, M, (L, m, R, D))} ∪Π, e, G, Φ)
r−→pri ({(p, M ′, (L, m + 1))} ∪Π, e′, G, Φ)
e′ := p if M ′ ∈ {A, D},⊥ otherwise
We will not go into details of any of the above mentioned operations nor of
more complicated operations on channels, mainly because they are not relevant for
our argument. They are documented more detailed in [28]. Instead, we focus on
three crucial operations given in table 1, which account for most of the flexibility
of our VM.
First, we deal with internal steps denoted by relation→int . Through local state
operation NDET a we express non-determinism explicitly in our machine. Informally,
program execution for the currently active process continues from this point both
at the following instruction, and in an alternative future at instruction a, thus
yielding two possible successors (not yet visible to a scheduler). This allows us to
express a variety of non-deterministic high-level constructs in our language.
We can translate conditions on input variables common in guarded-command
languages by first translating the input action A, then the condition E to be
satisfied, and then adding instructions which abort this internal executing path if
E is not satisfied: trans(A); trans(E); NEXZ (NEXZ being the conditional variant of
NEX). Informally, this means that unless E is satisfied, A retroactively has never
happened.
So far, all actions were considered internal. With STEP r, M , we allow a global
state change (and its associated sequence of actions) to be observed by a scheduler
as an r-prioritized step
r
−→pri . As minor detail, we specify execution mode M for the
following sequence of actions. This explicit notion of observability allows a flexible
granularity specification of actions, thus allowing conditions and actions to be
intertwined, as well as providing support for a rich language of actions. Duplication
of conditions can now easily be avoided by combining STEP with common control
flow instructions to translate condition cascades.
We emphasize that our intermediate language is not a toy example. It is, for in-
stance, expressive enough to encode Promela. A translation procedure is outlined
in [28, sec. 3].
3 Benchmarks
We implemented the virtual machine sketched in the previous section to confirm
the practicality of our approach. Our efforts took roughly one person-week for the
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Table 2. State generation: measured in states per second











implementation of a working version, amounting in about 3,000 lines of C code.
It turns out that this prototype performs competitive even when compared to
state-of-the-art tools like SPIN.
Contrary to SPIN, the sole task of our VM is state space generation. Additional
functionality like model checking, possibly together with partial order reduction [6]
etc., is duty of other components not covered here.
For our comparison to SPIN we employed standard breadth-first search with
full state space storage. We used the same hash function as SPIN does (due to
Jenkins).
Unfortunately, we cannot compare state space size directly, because in general
we generate more states1 than SPIN due to our finer-grained program counter. We
expect this to be cleaned up by subsequent optimisations passes in our compiler
(along with statement merging etc.) by reducing the number of STEP instructions.
Hence, in order to get a meaningful idea on the speed of our VM, we measured the
rate with which successor states are generated (table 2).
We used SPIN 4.2.5 to translate Promela models into corresponding C files.
By default, SPIN uses data-flow optimisations and statement merging. Our com-
piler does not yet have such optimisation passes, thus—to get a fairer comparison—
we disabled them in SPIN as well (-o1 -o3). To match our test setup we com-
piled the generated pan.c files with -O2 (C optimisations), -DNOREDUCE (disabling
partial-order reduction) and -DBFS (enabling breadth-first search). The resulting
executable was used for benchmarking.
For our tests we compiled models coming with the SPIN distribution into our
byte-code language and subsequently executed them on our VM. Our experiments
show that we are competitive in state space generation speed to SPIN. For very
small state spaces (below a few thousand states) our VM is ahead of SPIN (e.g.,
erathosthenes(7)), but this hardly matters because the overall runtime is in
fractions of seconds.
Larger parameters for erastothenes seem to be slightly in our favour as well.
The generally decreasing rate of generated states for both contestants is due to an
increasing numbers of transitions which have to be handled.
1 which multiplies due to interleaving semantics
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A notable deficiency becomes obvious through the snoopy model. Our VM is
roughly 3.7 times slower than SPIN. We identified extensive use of communication
channels as the culprit. Incidentally, communication is one of costliest operations
in our VM, and clearly could benefit from optimisations. On the other hand, our
VM outperforms SPIN on pftp, which makes use of six channels after all (state
space size as reported by SPIN: 439895).
Overall, with the exception of snoopy (for known reasons), speed of state space
generation for other example models is within a factor of at most two when com-
pared to SPIN, which is good enough for our purposes already. For example, state
space generation costs with our VM is already insignificant compared to commu-
nication costs in a distributed model checker.
The size of states, which contain all information needed to restart the virtual
machine from (global and local variables, channels, processes), is typically within
a few bytes of what SPIN reports.
4 Related Work
Virtual Machines Virtual machines have been used extensively in Computer Sci-
ence. A well-known example is e.g., the work of Wirth for the Pascal programming
language [29].
Independent to our work, two (unpublished, to the best of our knowledge)
attempts of virtual machine models for restricted Promela-like languages have
been made [11, 24]. In [11], the virtual machine is described as part of the general
design of a model checker, while our paper is focused on providing a reusable
component for state space generation.
ESML [7], the high-level language translated into byte-code is restricted in
several ways when compared to Promela, and its underlying virtual machine
inherits some of these restrictions e.g., it lacks support for asynchronous channels,
shared variables and dynamic process creation.
In [24, sec. 8] itself, Rosien describes some shortcomings of his attempt, e.g.,
lack of arrays, no support for data types beyond integers, unclear semantics for do
loops or handshake communication inside atomic blocks (“[. . . ] causes undesired
results, unexpected atomic deadlocks or otherwise erratic behavior.”).
Besides that, we are in doubt that the architecture of Rosien’s design can be
adapted easily to e.g., distributed settings where successive states may be generated
on different computers. This use case was specifically taken into account in the
design of our VM.
Both papers do not provide a complete formal model of their VM or of the
translation into their byte-code language, making it non-trivial to derive imple-
mentations from their work, neither are implementations readily available.
BACI The Ben-Ari Concurrent Interpreter (BACI) suite in its latest version
compiles a version of Wirth’s Pascal enriched with concurrency constructs into the
byte-code language PCODE, which is then executed on a virtual machine. BACI
is widely used as teaching device for concurrency, not for verification purposes,
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hence the byte-code language is still relatively high-level and not stream-lined
for simplicity and efficient execution. Also, the virtual machine does not allow to
specify the granularity of visible actions, as is the case with ours.
To the best of our knowledge, formal semantics of the byte-code language or
virtual machine are not available.
TyCO VM In [18, 19], a virtual machine for the process algebra of Typed Concur-
rent Objects (TyCO), a close relative to asynchronous π-calculus, is presented. Fea-
tures include a process concept, communication channels, and a notion of atomic
execution (coined thread). Since its virtual machine is meant for program execu-
tion rather than verification, it lacks nondeterminism, an external scheduler and
invisible states, when compared to our work. Also, TyCO’s more complex machine
state is not designed for snapshotting and restarting. We stress the authors’ report
that their virtual machine executes efficiently, also due to optimisations carried out
at byte-code level.
Probmela A probabilistic extension of Promela is presented in [3]. Through pri-
vate communication with one of the authors (Ciesinski) we recently learned about
their endeavour to implement a virtual machine. No published work of these efforts
is available so far, but the cited Probmela paper reveals a number of simplifying
deviations from Promela semantics, e.g. atomic regions always running to com-
pletion, making them equal to Promela’s d_step and thus obviating the need for
priorities on byte-code level.
However, we see the existence of their project as evidence that we are on the
right track, and we are confident that probabilistic extensions can be fitted into
our virtual machine model. This is left as future work for a possible collaboration.
Java Path Finder and Bandera Java Path Finder 2 [27] translates Java byte-
code into Bandera intermediate representation (BIR), which then can be model-
checked using Bogor [23], or translated to Promela, using SPIN as back-end
model checker. The intermediate representation is a high-level guarded command
language, not unlike Promela. While it can be translated further down to a certain
extent, constructs like arrays, locks, exceptions, and high-level control constructs
remain, complicating an implementation of its operational semantics. On the other
hand, we are confident that BIR can be translated further down to an extended
version of our byte-code language.
The Bogor framework consists of a large Java code base, which we conjecture is
not easy to replicate in another language if needed. Again, from the tool point of
view, our aim is not to beat the Bogor framework in terms of features, but rather
to provide a small but versatile component which can easily be reused, or written
from scratch based on a formal specification.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We presented a virtual machine-based approach to state space generation. The ma-
chine’s semantics turn out to be straight-forwardly implementable, thus encourag-
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ing reuse of our specification. Among the byte-code instructions are all operations
commonly needed for the specification of concurrent systems: non-determinism,
process creation, communication primitives, and a way to express scheduler con-
straints (atomic regions). As such, our byte-code language doubles as a general
framework for the assignment of semantics to high-level modeling languages for
concurrent systems.
To confirm our design, in [25] we detail how to assign understandable and
executable operational semantics to the full Promela language by translation to
our byte-code language.
We implemented the Promela compiler and the corresponding virtual ma-
chine [1]. Benchmarks showed that it is a viable alternative to SPIN’s state space
generator in terms of speed, and superior for embedding into third-party model
checkers. Although a Just-in-time compiler for our byte-code is conceiveable to
further increase VM speed, we believe the extra complexity is not worth the effort
for now.
Future Work An implementation of our virtual machine is currently being inte-
grated with the DiVinE [9, 17] framework for distributed model checking.
Additionally, we are looking into an optimisation phase for our Promela com-
piler along the lines of [30].
We are also looking into extensions of our virtual machine with notions of time
[26], probabilities [3], or dynamic memory allocation [15], and their effect on its
complexity.
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map 	 = dito 
ëóCóC21í¬6/çÈýCí¬5C@5¬>C+·<?6/ç
map f [] = [] 
ë«óCóC21í¬6/çÈý¬@5¬>A+W<?6/ç
map f (x : ys) = f x : map f ys
"È×4> Ù(?äVàHÜ














filter1 	 = dito 
ëóCóC21í¬6/çÈýCíC5¬@5¬>A+W<?6/ç
filter1 p [] = [] 
ëóCóC21í¬6/çÈýC@V5¬>A+W<W6/ç
filter1 p (x : ys) | p x = Just x : filter1 p ys




filter2 	 = dito 
ë«óCóC21í¬6/çÈýAí¬5C@5¬>C+·<?6/ç
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filter2 [] = [] 
ë«óCó¬2fí¬6/çýA@5¬>A+W<?6/ç
filter2 (Nothing : ys) = filter2 ys







filter2 xs | nomore xs = [] 
ëóCóC21í¬6/çÈýCíC5:C2féA>Aí¬ñS-1<·è
(+W@<WóA-«5CéA6/ç>A<W@   2fñS@5C5íC5¬êÁ>C@V0ë«ó¬óC2fí76/çAû)3+W+W0ìVí<·BC+W@BÁ@5H-1<·@V2f@V5Èý
nomore 	 = True 
ë«óCó¬2fí¬6/çýAíC5C@57>A+·<?6/çé3û -
Nothing
nomore [] = True 
ë«ó¬óC2fí76/çÈýA@5¬>C+·<?6/ç
nomore (Nothing : ys) = nomore ys




qsort [] = xs 
ëóCóC21í¬6/çÈýA@57>A+·<?6/ç
qsort xs = let
p = head xs
ls = filter (< p) xs
es = filter (== p) xs
gs = filter (> p) xs
in
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>C)3öÄ>A<W@'ïÈ<?0L-1@í¬5Hóe@V016/çC2/ü35CñH-§é3û ->C)S0f0f@+Wóe@  l+·@VB@V5H-@5H-fç¬ü,+.-i÷ -ª)35Ë@2/0f@-fìV@')3+?0^é>A<W@
ë«óCóC21í¬6/çCêS+·@V<W6/çíC5¬ê>Aí¬216/ç>A<W@§ûé,+Wê,@57>A@,ý
qsort xs | allsame xs = xs 
ë«óCó¬2fí¬6/çý-f21<·è<?)3+È0fé,2f-f<W@2f-
(+W@<WóA-5¬é6/ç >C<·@ bBC+W@BÁ@V5S-1<·@V2fí¬5CêÅ>A@i0ë«ó¬óC2fí76/çCC2/ü,>A<Wñq)q-10V÷æ¢)3ìVíBð¬010^@V5 )3+W+·@;ï<.õ
0L-1@5C@V+·@VB@V5H-f@¥BÁ<.->C@B @V210^-f@V5èS@21ê,+W<W6/ç¬@57*@2/>A@V5Èý
allsame [] = True
allsame (x : ys) = allequal x ys
æ<W@V0f@2úP@V2fêS+·@V<W6/ç<W0^-«@<W5@<W5Aû),6/çC@V2ê,2.,ö,-f@2J< Cí¬5CñH-Vý
103
allequal 	 = True 
ëóCóC21í¬6/çÈýAíC5¬@5¬>A+W<?6/ç
allequal x [] = True 
ëóCóC21í¬6/çÈýA@V5¬>A+W<W6/ç






	 ++ = dito 
ë«óCó¬2fí¬6/çýCíC5C@V5¬>A+W<W6/ç
[] ++ ys = ys 
ë«óCó¬2fí¬6/çýC@5¬>C+·<?6/ç


















insert 	 = dito 
ëóCóC21í¬6/çÈýAíC5C@V5¬>A+W<W6/ç
insert n i x [] = [] 
ëóCóC21í¬6/çÈýA@V5¬>A+W<W6/ç
insert n 0 x ys = x : insert n n x ys
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delete 	 = dito 
ëóCóC21í¬6/çÈýCíC5¬@5¬>A+W<?6/ç
delete n i [] = [] 
ëóCóC21í¬6/çÈýC@V5¬>A+W<W6/ç
delete n 0 (y : ys) = delete n (n − 1) ys


















select 	 = dito 
ëóCóC21í¬6/çÈýCíC5¬@5¬>A+W<?6/ç
select n i [] = [] 
ëóCóC21í¬6/çÈýC@V5¬>A+W<W6/ç
select n 0 (x : xs) = x : select n (n − 1) xs
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ring 	 = True
ring n i [] = False
ring n 0 xs = allsame (select n 0 xs) && ring n 1 xs
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